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Preface
This publication brings together the main research outputs delivered under
a common theme “Regional trade agreements and international production networks” of the
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) research programme,
Phase II (2008-2010).  ARTNeT is an open network of national-level research institutions in
the region established by ESCAP and the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC), Canada.  The network has benefited from steadfast support by its core partners, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and World Trade Organization (WTO).  Launched in 2004
with 10 member institutions, by the end of 2010 ARTNeT had grown to 30 institutional
members and 11 associate partners in 18 countries in the Asia and Pacific region.
ARTNeT’s operation is based on a three-pillar approach:  (a) the implementation of
a demand-driven research programme; (b) the improvement of linking research to policy;
and (c) increasing applied research capacity in the region, especially of the least developed
and low-income developing country members.  This book, as is the case with most of the
work published by ARTNeT, combines all three of these components.  It presents research
on the topic that was endorsed by the Multi-stakeholders Steering Committee in 2007 (at the
inception of Phase II of ARTNeT), thus responding to the needs of policymakers and other
stakeholders in the region.  Special care is taken to ensure that research is communicated
well so that its relevance for policymakers is not diminished.  Last, but of equal importance,
the work and interaction of the research team with advisers and reviewers contributed to the
overall research capacity of the network’s members.
The study was divided into three parts.  The introduction to part I presents the
research questions that were explored in the study and describes the structure of the book.
Chapter 2 summarizes the literature on determinants for existence and evolution of global
value chains and international production networks, the impact of changes in trade policy
and, more specifically, regional trade liberalization.  Chapter 3 provides a synthesis of the
findings under each of the sectoral case studies in selected Asian countries:  (a) the
automobile industry in China, India and Indonesia; (b) the computer hard drive sector in
Thailand; and (c) the textile and clothing sector in Bangladesh.  Part II contains the sectoral
papers (chapters 4 to 8).  Part III focuses on identifying some recommendations to
policymakers on how to approach trade liberalization under regional trade agreements in
order to benefit existing production networks and promote the development of new ones.
This study was undertaken by a regional team initially led by Dionious Narjoko and
then by Mochamad Pasha, both from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Indonesia.  They were supported by Raymond Atje, Director of CSIS.  The details on the
research teams are bylined in each chapter.  The ARTNeT secretariat expresses its
appreciation to all individuals and institutions involved in this study and looks forward to
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Part I
Regional Trade Agreements and
International Production Networks:
Concepts and Empirical Findings3
1.  Introduction
Numerous academic and policy papers as well as seminar and conference materials
have been dedicated to either regional trade agreements or international production
networks, yet only a few studies have addressed the linkages between these two important
areas of economic integration.  This study, “Fighting Irrelevance:  Regional Trade
Agreements and International Production Networks in Asia”, provides new evidence from
selected sectors of some of the Asian economies that contributes towards closing this gap.
The research project was initiated as part of the Phase II research programme of the
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) under the Multilateral
Trade Liberalization and Regional Integration theme.  The objective of the project was to
explore the linkages between existing regional trade agreements and international
production networks in the region.  Given the resource and time constraints, the project
focused on only three sectors in five Asian countries – automotive, textiles and clothing, and
electronics – which have proven to be fruitful areas for the establishment of international
production networks in a number of countries in Asia during the past several decades.
What distinguishes this study from similar studies is its reliance on primary data and
information collected through interviews and focus group discussions.  The main targets of
the interviews were companies in the three selected sectors.  The analysis by the study thus
takes into account both primary data and statistical data from secondary sources.
The reason for choosing this research approach was the lack of secondary data and
the need to complement it with corporate perceptions of the linkages between regional trade
integration and international production networks.  It is important to remember that
corporations, particularly multinational corporations (MNCs), were the main driving force, at
least initially, behind the establishment of industrial production networks in the region.
MNCs were following standard criteria
1 when making their decisions on the establishment of
international production networks; but whatever the criteria were, the process resulted in the
market-driven establishment of IPNs.  Only recently, with the proliferation of the regional
trade agreements, the impacts of trade policy changes have been taken into consideration
as possible influential variables in the establishment and operation of IPNs.  The
presumption is that an RTA should increase the depth of the production networks, as the
formal reciprocal trade liberalization agreements between countries are meant to smooth
the channels for movement of goods, services and resources among the countries
concerned.
The study revealed that based on the perception of the respondents in the five
selected countries, formal trade agreements were not considered a major driving force in
strengthening IPNs; rather, it relies on market initiatives.  In addition, given that the
negotiation approach of many of these agreements is so-called “positive-list” the exclusion
1 Profit and market share maximization, and stability in the supply of raw materials.  As a result,
MNCs have relocated several of their labour-intensive production processes to capitalize on the
relatively low cost of labour in developing countries.4
of a number of industries from trade agreements meant that they would have not received
the benefits from regional liberalization efforts in any case.  Such is the case in the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Agreement, in which the automotive sector is one of the sectors excluded
from the agreement.  Another factor that contributes to the perception that a regional trade
agreement (RTA) does not greatly affect the strengthening or deepening of IPN is a firm’s
scale of operation.  Larger firms involved in IPN have a larger scale of activities, i.e., they
trade in multiple markets.  Therefore, they are more likely to be affected by the overlapping
rules of origin (RoOs) across trade agreements.  This study found that the survey
respondents, which are large firms affiliated with foreign MNCs, are sceptical of the role of
RTAs.
Nevertheless, trade agreements have also brought about some positive
developments in the strengthening of the IPNs.  For example, the India-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (ITFTA) increased trade in automotive parts and components between the two
countries.  The survey of the hard disk drive (HDD) industry in Thailand suggests the
co-existence of IPNs and industrial clustering.  In fact, clustering has enabled foreign MNCs
to coordinate production activities, from sourcing parts to assembling the final product, and
enabled quick adjustment to provide better just-in-time management.  Interviews with
respondents in this study also revealed related problems with high service link (SL) costs,
such as inefficient custom procedures and a lack of logistics infrastructure.  This implies that
without the ability to move goods in an efficient manner, RTAs would not have relevance to
the development of IPNs.
There are, of course, limitations to this study.  There is a large degree of variation in
the levels of economic development of the countries in the region.  Since this study was
limited to selected sectors and countries, it could not capture all those factors in the
development of networks that might be relevant to other sectors and countries.  In addition,
many regional trade agreements have come into force only recently, so it may be too early
to assess their impact on the dynamics of IPNs.  Notwithstanding such limitations, it is
hoped that this study can provide insights into the linkages between IPNs and RTAs, and
that it will be useful in policy discussions and policymaking in Asia and the Pacific.5
2.  International production networks and trade
liberalization:  A literature review
Dionisius A. Narjoko
2.1. Introduction
This chapter reviews the relevant literature in order to provide an analytical
framework for the analyses in the subsequent chapters.  It covers some sub-topics related
to the theme of this study, in particular, the theoretical approach to international production
networks, key findings from empirical studies on the subject, and the role of trade policy
(often understood as trade liberalization) in creating or sustaining an IPN.
Section 2.2 explains the concept, theoretical approaches and other topics related to
IPNs, such as the relationship between an IPN and agglomeration.  Section 2.3 reviews the
empirical literature on IPNs, while Section 2.4 discusses factors that contribute to the
creation of IPNs in the Asian region, i.e., the role of MNCs and trade liberalization policies.
2.2. Explaining IPNs
2.2.1. The idea of the value chain
Porter (1985) briefly defined the value-chain concept as a chain of related and
dependent (business) activities needed to produce a product or service, starting from
conception, through different phases of production, delivery to final consumers and
after-sales services, to disposal or recycling.  It underlines the notion of sequential and
interconnected structure of economic activities, with each element or link in a value chain
and adding value in the process (Henderson and others, 2002).
More specifically, Porter divided all of the activities in a value chain into two big
groups:  primary and support.  Primary activities include research and development,
manufacturing, marketing, and logistics services; while support activities include finance,
human resources management, and technology development and procurement.  Figure 2.1
describes the categorization of these activities.
Moreover, two characteristics reflect the complexity of a value chain, as noted in
UNIDO (2004).  First, a value chain may include a wide range of related and dependent
activities within each link of the chain or between different chains.  It is common for
a producer of an intermediary input to be involved in several value chains.  Second,
activities of a value chain can span within and across geographic boundaries, either at the
country level or the regional level.  This implies that the activities are not only carried out
within the boundary of a single firm – as in the traditional Porter value-chain concept – but
also by more than one firm located in more than one country or region.6
2.2.1.1. Global value chains
These characteristics have become more noticeable with the evolution of the
value-chain concept.  Value-chain activities are now often observed to make up a large
interconnected value-chain system that has become known as a global value chain (GVC)
(Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
In parallel with GVC, the concept of global or international production networks
(IPNs) emerged.  In contrast to the concept of GVC, which focuses on the activities in value
chains, IPNs focus on the (complex) interrelationships among firms operating along the
value chains in a systematic nature.  To put it simply, an IPN focuses on the interaction
between firms that are involved in two or more value chains, thereby implying network
linkage of value chains in which two or more value chains share the same firm (Sturgeon,
2000).  As in the GVC concept, the notion of “international/global” in IPN indicates the global
nature of the relationships (i.e., across country borders).
IPNs are viewed as complementing GVC (UNIDO, 2004; Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
They reflect the accelerated fragmentation of knowledge-intensive activities of some value
chains, which is possible because these activities have become increasingly modularised
(UNIDO, 2004).  The modularization allows the activities to be separated from the value
chains and performed at different locations (Ernst and Luthje, 2003).
2.2.2. Defining IPN
There is no unique definition of an IPN.  According to Henderson and others (2002),
an IPN is defined as the nexus of interconnected functions and operations through which
goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed.  Production networks not only



























































Primary activities  
Source: Porter, 1985.7
integrate firms as well as parts of firms into structures that blur the traditional organizational
boundaries, but also integrate national economies.  Henderson and others also postulated
that the nature and articulation of the network were influenced by the social and political
context within which it is embedded.  Ernst and Kim (2002) described an IPN as a major
innovation in the organization of international business, where it combined concentrated
dispersion of a value chain across countries with a parallel process of integrating
hierarchical layers of network participants.  Kimura and Ando (2005b) defined an IPN as
comprising vertical production chains that are extended across countries within a region as
well as distribution network across the world.  Kimura and Ando (2005b) identified the major
player in the network as corporate firms belonging to the machinery industry, including
general machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment and precision machinery.
2.2.3. Analytical framework for explaining IPN
It is important to understand the mechanics of the network and to derive the
determining factors of IPNs.  There are two approaches that the literature records so far on
the explanation of an IPN.  These are discussed below.
2.2.3.1. Industrial organization approach (‘flagship’ model)
The first analytical approach views IPNs from the perspective of industrial/business
organization, particularly concerning international business.  This approach was put forward
by Ernst and Kim (2002), who said that the emergence of IPNs had been the result of fiercer
competition in international markets.  This is a natural consequence of two processes that
happen at the same time, i.e., rapid trade and investment reforms that had occurred in many
countries, and the rapid development and diffusion of information and communications
technology (ICT).  The processes lead to a dramatic change in the idea of how
multinationals operate.  They should no longer operate with their focus on a stand-alone
overseas direct investment, but should move towards a new model of business operation.
The new model was named by Ernst and Kim as the “global network flagship”, and
they postulated three driving forces behind the transformation from the traditional
multinational-corporation model to the flagship model (Ernst and Kim, 2002).  The first
driving force was liberalization.  This includes trade liberalization, capital-flow liberalization,
more liberal policies governing foreign direct investment (FDI), and privatization.  Their main
argument was that the global corporations of the flagship model benefited from liberalization
and also provided the corporations with opportunities in the form of a substantial reduction
in costs and risks for conducting international transactions, and an increase in the liquidity of
capital, globally.
The following are the benefits and opportunities provided by liberalization:
(a) Locational specialization, which would translate into a wider range of choices
of firm entry (e.g., licensing, subcontracting, franchising etc.);
(b) Outsourcing, which provides a flagship company with external resources and
capabilities that it needs to complement its core competencies;8
(c) Spatial mobility, which means a reduction in the cost of spreading the value
chain to other locations.
The second driving force is the growing complexity of the dynamics of competition.
The major issue here is a dual challenge in which, on the one hand, companies need to
serve all major markets if they want to perform internationally, since globalization tends to
make the borders of countries or regions irrelevant.  On the other hand, companies must
also integrate their global-scale of activities, in order to exploit and coordinate linkages
across different locations.  The growing complexity changes the determinants of firm
organization, growth and location.  One example is the hard disk drive-producing MNCs’
decision to establish a production base in South-East Asia to increase efficiency by
transferring labour-intensive activities, such as assembling, to several countries in the
region.  More specifically, it becomes substantially more difficult for firms to generate all the
capabilities they need internally to cope with the complex and fierce competition.  Therefore,
the appropriate approach appears to be to selectively source-specialized capabilities from
outside the firms.  Thus, it needs a shift from the individual style of company organization to
a more collective style of company organization.
The third force is the rapid development and diffusion of ICT.  Essentially, it allows
for the development of a leaner and more agile production system that is able to cut through
country borders.  It plays a role as a “flexible infrastructure” that can link and coordinate
economic activities at distanced locations (Antonelli, 1992; and Hagstrom, 2000).  The idea
of a production network that needs to be able to quickly adapt to the fast changing global
circumstances is thus perfectly moderated by the rapid development and diffusion of ICT.
All these have formed one of the major impacts of technology that is able – at the same time
– to increase the mobility, or dispersion, of firm-specific resources and capabilities across
regions as well as create greater scope for cross-border linkages (i.e., the integration of
some dispersed specialized clusters).
1
The industrial organization approach views an IPN as a network that covers
intra- and inter-firm transactions and forms of coordination; it consists of various hierarchical
layers that range from a flagship company down to many, usually smaller, locally specialized
suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
Here, the flagship company dominates the network and is the heart of it.  It provides
strategic and organizational leadership beyond resources that lie directly under the
management control (Rugman, 1997).  The strategy of a flagship company thus becomes
the strategy that governs the position and role of the other participating firms in the
network.
2 In most cases, the flagship retains in-house many of the activities in which the
company has some comparative advantage, and outsources the rest.
1 Ernst and Kim (2002) argued that the other impact of ICT was the fact that the cost and risk of
developing ICT had, in fact, been a main factor for market globalization/integration. This is because,
naturally, the huge expenses associated with R&D for developing the technology need to (somehow) be
amortized; this is allowed, in one way, by increasing sales – i.e., if the companies conducting R&D want
to keep the constant level of their profitability, given the enormous R&D costs.
2 The participating firms include all subcontractors, suppliers, service provider and strategic partners.9
As noted, the flagship company dominates a production network.  The power for
controlling the network comes as a result of the control of the company over its critical
resources as well as from its sufficient capacity to coordinate transaction and knowledge
exchange with the other nodes of networks.  Because of this characteristic, the other – and
smaller – participating firms therefore do not have the same reciprocal control over either
the flagship or strategy of the flagship company.
There are two types of (international) flagship companies, i.e., “brand leaders” and
“contract manufacturers”.  An example of a brand leader is Cisco (Ernst and Kim, 2002),
where the flagship is connected to 32 manufacturing plants globally.
3  These plants were
formerly independent, but they became interrelated once they all supplied Cisco.  The
suppliers had to go through a lengthy process of certification to ensure that they met Cisco’s
requirements.  Unlike brand leaders, contract manufacturers, such as Solectron or
Flextronics, establish their own (international) production networks that serve the global
brand leaders.  The contract manufacturer type rapidly gained in importance in the 1990s
together with the phenomenon of divestment of many overseas facilities by brand leaders
(Ernst and Kim, 2002).  The contract manufacturer type was thus seen as the “panacea” of
the 1990s (Lakenan, Boyd and Frey, 2001), although it occurred, at least initially, mostly in
the electronics sector.  As noted in Ernst (2002), the increase in the importance of the
contract manufacturer type reflects a growing importance of vertical specialization that is
particularly pronounced in the electronics industry.
According to the flagship model, there are two tiers of local firms that supply the
flagship company, i.e., higher- and lower-tier suppliers (Ernst and Kim, 2002),
4 with
higher-tier suppliers playing an intermediary role between the global flagship and lower-tier
local suppliers.  The higher-tier suppliers deal directly with the flagship, possess valuable
proprietary assets and have even developed their own mini-production networks.  The
suppliers in this tier should be able to support all steps in value chain, and even undertake
some coordination functions that are necessary for the global supply-chain management.
An example of higher-tier suppliers can be found in Taiwan Province of China’s Acer group
(Ernst, 2000).  Meanwhile, lower-tier suppliers are in a more precarious position.  As Ernst
and Kim explained, the lower-tier suppliers normally lack proprietary assets, have a weak
financial situation and are highly vulnerable to external shocks (e.g., market conditions, and
technology and financial crises).  The lower-tier suppliers’ main competitive advantages
are low-cost production with speedy and flexible delivery.  These suppliers rarely deal with
the flagship company and mostly work with the higher-tier suppliers, and are typically used
as “price breakers” and “capacity buffers” that can be dropped (from the production
networks) at very short notice.
It is worth mentioning two key points related to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), within the idea of the flagship model.  First, SMEs are usually among the lower-tier
firms.  The major competitiveness value of firms in the lower tier is their very low cost
3 Other examples of brand leaders include General Electric, IBM, Compaq and Dell.
4 Ernst (2004) argued that the division of the suppliers tier was specific to suppliers in the Asian
region.10
structure and high degree of flexibility, which are the main characteristics of SMEs in
general.  Second, the fact that SMEs are located in the lower-tier of IPNs naturally creates
a threat to their survival.  This is simply because, as price breakers and capacity buffers,
they can be dropped at short notice, thus making them the weakest link in a production
network (Ernst, 2004).  Sturgeon and Lester (2004) gave as an example the adoption by
Compaq of a new strategy to produce and sell personal computers for less than $1,000,
which resulted in many small companies that manufactured personal computers in Taiwan
Province of China being forced to shut down their operations.
2.2.3.2. Production process approach – “two-dimensional fragmentation”
Another approach views IPNs in terms of the nature of the production process, often
known as the fragmentation theory.  Production of a final product usually consists of many
production processes that are vertically integrated; here, the fragmentation theory
postulates that such vertically integrated production processes can be divided into
separable production blocks that can be operated in locations that are most suitable for the
activities of each block (Kuroiwa and Toh, 2008).
The fragmentation theory approach is, in principle, a newly developed strand of
research in international trade theory.  Sanyal and Jones (1982), and Jones and
Kierzkowski (1990) developed an early theoretical model that established the concept of
fragmentation.  Other studies along this line include those by Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001),
Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001), and Deardorff (2001), who further enhanced the capability
of the fragmentation concept in both theoretical and empirical analysis.  The Kimura and
Ando (2005a) study is among the most recent in developing the analytical framework within
the fragmentation approach.
The idea of fragmentation can be understood from Deardorff (2001), who defined
fragmentation as “the splitting of a product process into two or more steps that can be
undertaken in different locations but [which] lead to the same final product”.  Suppose that
there is initially a large factory taking care of all the production activities from upstream to
downstream.  If a careful look is taken at the individual production blocks, however, it can be
seen that some require close attention by technicians, while other production blocks are
labour-intensive.  Therefore, if the firm can separate the production processes and locate
them in appropriate places, total production cost can be reduced.  The relocation of the
production blocks can occur across national borders, which is commonly observed in IPNs.
Fragmentation becomes economical when the so-called cost of service links
connecting production blocks is low enough.  Service links costs include transport,
telecommunications as well as various coordination costs between the production blocks.
Service links also depend on the nature of technology.  Here, globalization is seen as a way
to reduce service links costs and enable firms to “fragment” their production blocks in an
attempt to further reduce overall production costs.11
Kimura (2008) suggested that two key elements were needed for the existence of
fragmentation – first, there must be some cost-saving in the production blocks; second, the
cost of service links must not be too high.
As noted above, Kimura and Ando (2005a) presented the most recent analytical
framework for explaining IPNs.
5  That framework lends itself to explaining the mechanics of
IPNs in East Asia and it was therefore of particular importance for this study.  As noted
in many other studies, including Kimura (2008), IPNs established in East Asia were
perhaps more complex and sophisticated than suggested in the traditional description of
fragmentation as in, for example, Deardorff’s (2001) framework.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) categorized various types of fragmentation activities into
two groups in a two-dimensional space (figure 2.2).  The first dimension is the “distance”,
which captures the physical distance between the original position and the new location of
the fragmented production blocks.  This dimension is represented by the horizontal axis in
5 The presentation here is borrowed mainly from Kimura and Ando, 2005a, and Kimura, 2008.
Figure 2.2. Two-dimensional fragmentation


















figure 2.2, with the origin being the “original position”.  Thus, when the distance is short, or
not far from the original position, the fragmentation tends to occur within a country’s borders;
however, when the distance is rather far from the original position, the fragmentation most
likely occurs beyond a country’s border (i.e., cross-border fragmentation).
The other dimension is “uncontrollability”, which captures the extent of managerial
controllability over the fragmented production blocks.  The dimension is represented by the
vertical axis of figure 2.2.  Managerial controllability over production blocks reduces as
a point moves further from the original position.  Given that ownership should be the
important factor linking controllability, it is thus presumed that the ownership of the parent
(or perhaps the flagship) company is smaller when a point moves away from the original
position, even though the relationship between control and ownership might not be linear.  A
point near to the original position represents intra-firm fragmentation, while a point that is
quite far from the original position represents inter-firm, or arm-length, fragmentation.
The fragmentation along the vertical axis, in short, represents fragmentation in the
form of outsourcing to (possibly) unrelated firms.  Various forms of outsourcing are
observed, such as original equipment manufacturing (OEM), original design manufacturing
(ODM) and electronics manufacturing services (EMS).  These forms are observed
particularly in East Asian fragmentation.  In this form, fragmentation is the element that adds
to the traditional conception of fragmentation that is considered to be specific to the
fragmentation model of East Asia.
The main idea behind fragmentation is separating production blocks with some
potential cost-saving benefits.  Table 2.1 summarizes this for the two-dimensional
fragmentation model, together with the (service-link) costs arising from conducting the
fragmentation.  The “distance” fragmentation faces service links costs that arise from the
geographical distance to production blocks (e.g., transportation, communications and
intra-firm coordination costs).  The cost-saving benefits, therefore, need to be drawn from
location-specific advantages.  These include not only the traditional economic factors, such
as wage levels and resource availability, but also the existence and quality of infrastructure
and its services, and the policies of the host country’s government (e.g., a favourable
investment climate, liberal trade policy and flexible labour policy).
Meanwhile, as for “uncontrollability” fragmentation, the cost-saving in principle
should come from advantages of “de-internalization” and, therefore, from the counterpart’s
competitive advantages.  Cost-saving is feasible when counterparts have better technology
and managerial capability, allowing some production cost savings when the production
processes are conducted by the counterparts rather than by the parent, or flagship, firm.
However, some service link costs still exist in the “uncontrollability” fragmentation, i.e.,
everything that occurs due to the loss of managerial control over the production blocks.
2.2.4. IPN and agglomeration
Observation of IPNs, particularly those in East Asia, suggests that the mechanics of
production networking is not as simple as described by the analytical frameworks above.
Some researchers (e.g., Kimura and Ando, 2005a; and Yeung, 2008) argued that there was13
a close relationship between IPNs and agglomeration, and that in fact the two worked
hand-in-hand.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) argued that fragmentation and agglomeration
were important when the relationship among firms was issue, and that this was particularly
true when intra-firm location decisions were considered – although theoretically it appears
implausible due to the opposite nature of the two (i.e., fragmentation implies “separation”
while agglomeration implies “collection”).  Yeung (2008), meanwhile, argued that IPNs must
take place in industrial clusters.
Before moving on in this discussion, it is important to review the idea of
agglomeration.  As mentioned by Yeung (2008), there are three major types of industrial
clusters in which the agglomeration process take place, according to the following divisions
given by Gordon and McCann (2000):
(a) Type 1 – the classic model of pure agglomeration;
(b) Type 2 – the industrial-complex model;
(c) Type 3 – the social-network model.
These models are summarized in table 2.2.  The type 1 model postulates that
industrial clusters are developed through natural agglomeration economic activities and
firms in the clusters therefore, enjoy positive externalities from their location.  These firms,
however, do not necessarily have interdependency among them.
The agglomeration that underlies the type 1 model originates from the availability of
some specific input that can be used by all firms in the clusters, such as specialized labour.
The type 2 model agglomeration comes from the deliberate construction of industrial
complexes that have the objective of minimizing transaction costs for inter-firm trade
through spatial concentration and proximity.  Firms coming within this model enjoy low
transportation and logistics costs as well as low uncertainties through mutual interactions
that are facilitated by physical proximity.  Unlike type 1 model firms, type 2 model firms
assume some interdependencies among them.  Finally, the type 3 model refers to the
importance of local networks of interpersonal relationships, trust and institutionalized
practices.
Table 2.1. Service link costs and cost-saving elements of the two-dimensional
fragmentation model
Service link cost Production cost
Fragmentation (distance) Cost due to geographical Location advantages
distance
Fragmentation Cost due to weaker control “De-internalization”
(uncontrollability) advantages (counterpart’s
ownership advantages)14
According to this model, strong social and institutionalized networks should assist in
some specific knowledge being developed in the clusters, which, in turn, should contribute
to technological innovation and knowledge development.  Type 3 model firms are often
recognized for their highly-localized innovation and production activities.






 accruing to firms in
sources
clusters
Pure agglomeration Neo-classical 1. A local pool of specialized Within clusters
economies model economics after labour (lower search costs)
Alfred Marshall 2. Local provision of non-traded
inputs (economies of scale)
3. Maximum flow of information
and ideas (product and
market knowledge)
Industrial complex Location theory 1. Lower transport and logistics Within clusters
model after Alfred costs
Weber 2. Greater certainty in
transactions
Social network Embedded in 1. Localized trust and Within clusters
model new economic inter-personal relationship
sociology (relational assets)
2. Institutionalized practices,
e.g., conventions and norms
(institutional thickness)
Source: Adapted from Gordon and McCann, 2000.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) further argued that there were two channels by which
agglomeration connected with fragmentation.  First, the connection comes as the result of
the increasing returns nature of service link costs.  Typically, service link costs, either in
terms of “distance” or “uncontrollability”, characteristically have strong economies of scale.
Therefore, it is natural to postulate that there should be some locations that are specifically
built to provide low service link costs – utilizing the scale economy nature of the costs.  In
what follows, it is also natural to predict the tendency for many production blocks to be
located in these locations, often observed in practice as industrial clusters.
Looking at the typology of industrial clusters (table 2.2), low service link costs are
present in all three types of clusters.  In the type 2 model, for example, the low service link
costs are to be found in terms of transport and logistics costs, which fits in with the idea of
fragmentation along the “distance” dimension.
The other channel is to provide support for arms-length fragmentation inside
agglomeration.  This is a situation where some critical transactions involving inputs for the15
arms-length production block, such as exact delivery timing, are needed.  In this situation,
upstream and downstream firms need to be located near each other.
The key point for the relationship between fragmentation and agglomeration is that it
gives an element of locational advantages along the “distance” dimension – through the
existence of low distance-related service link costs (e.g., transportation and logistics).  At
the same time, agglomeration moderates fragmentation along the “uncontrollability”
dimension through the opportunities for control separation that stem from the existence of
numerous potential business partners growing in industrial clusters.
In his study of activities of some industrial clusters in South-East Asia, Yeung (2008)
found evidence that fragmentation and agglomeration worked hand-in-hand in forming
cross-border production networks.  He found that the classical pure agglomeration
arguments that underlay all models of industrial clusters (table 2.2) were not sufficient to
explain the growth and development of some industrial clusters in the region.  This is
observed in the industrial clusters that produce HDDs, in which Yeung (2008) found no
resemblance in the characteristics of these clusters those of the model in table 2.2,
particularly the type 2 industrial complex model.  Yeung found that these clusters were
formed and developed with the strong presence and contributions of lead firms and their
strategic partners in international production networks.  Industrial clusters for the HDD
industry in Penang, Bangkok and Singapore collectively formed a tight regional production
network led by lead firms such as Seagate and Western Digital.  Firms in these clusters
enjoy the benefit of network economies through their participation in the HDD industry value
chain.
2.3. Review of empirical studies on IPNs
The subject of IPNs is a growing research topic, but the body of empirical literature
on this subject is still rather sparse.  To some extent, this can be explained by the fact that
the topic itself is being continuously expanded.  However, this lack of empirical studies is
also linked to the availability of data and proper methods of analysis.  Nonetheless, some
empirical studies are available in the literature, and this section reviews selected ones.  To
organize the review, this section is divided into three sub-sections based on the major
issues to be examined.  It is worth noting that almost all of the empirical studies reviewed
here concern IPNs in the Asian region.  This is because IPNs grow more rapidly in this
region, compared with those in Europe or North America.
2.3.1. Evidence of IPNs in East Asia
Empirical studies on the existence and development of IPNs dominate the body of
the empirical literature including, for example, Ng and Yeats (2003), Kimura and Ando
(2005a and 2005b), Ando (2006), and Athukorala and Yamashita (2006).  All these studies
employed international trade data or firm-level data in reporting on the occurrence and
development of IPNs.
A rapid increase in the importance of trade in those industries in Asia that are
intensive in human capital, technology and capital – such as machinery, electronics,16
telecommunications, and parts and components – arguably provides the first and clearest
evidence for the occurrence of IPNs in the region.
Ng and Yeats (2003), in their comprehensive examination of international trade data
for countries in East Asia, outlined two basic facts.  First, by detailing the product
composition of country exports during 1985-2001, they found that the export share of
machinery and transportation goods increased by about 27 percentage points in that period.
A large increase in the share was observed for many countries in the region, except for
Brunei Darussalam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia.  In fact, China,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand recorded very large increases of more than
30 percentage points.  Second, Ng and Yeats (2003) found that high technology and skilled
labour-intensive products dominated the list of the fastest-growing export products in the
region at the four-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level during the
same period.  They found that electrical machinery (defined using Rev. 2 of SITC 77)
exports accounted for about 20 per cent of the total export value of the fastest-growing
products.
Kimura and Ando (2005a), as well as Athukorala and Yamashita (2006),
re-emphasised the observation by Ng and Yeats (2003).  Using the Harmonized System
(HS) of data classification for international trade, and focusing only on machinery and
machinery parts and components during the 1990s’ decade for some countries around the
world, Kimura and Ando (2005a) found that the export share of those products in many East
Asian countries had reached more than 40 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, by the
end of the decade.
Another important insight was provided by Kimura and Ando (2005a), in addition to
the increased importance of the machinery trade, was that a clear change had occurred in
the pattern of trade between developed and developing countries.  At the beginning of the
1990s, trade in machinery products was dominated by countries such as Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States.  In 2000, however, this had changed, with many
developing East Asian countries becoming top world traders of such products.
The second form of evidence for the existence of IPNs is an indication of the
growing importance of vertical intra-industry trade.  Ando (2006) attempted to distinguish
types of trade by countries in the East Asian region during the 1990s by using data from
three sample years, 1990, 1996 and 2006.  Using the six-digit level of HS trade data and an
appropriate methodology (i.e., the “decomposition threshold approach”), Ando decomposed
each country trade into two groups – one-way trade and intra-industry trade (IIT) – and
further decomposed IIT into horizontal and vertical IIT.  For each country, a certain range of
overlapping values of exports and imports is defined as IIT and the rest as one-way trade.
Meanwhile, within IIT and still for each country, the intra-industry trade of products with
a small unit price differential between exports and imports is considered as horizontal IIT,
and the rest (i.e., reflecting high/large unit price differential) as vertical IIT.
The vertical IIT reflects the existence of product fragmentation, according to the
analytical framework adopted by Ando (2006) from, for example, Falvey and Kierzkowski,
1987, and Flam and Helpman, 1987.  This framework is based on the argument that two17
countries with different income distribution have different factor endowments or different
technologies.  This, by standard comparative-advantage arguments, results in countries with
high technology and income levels exporting high-quality products, while countries with low
technology and income levels export low-quality products.  Therefore, the large difference in
the export prices, which reflect the quality of products, implies vertical IIT, which is often
regarded as the “quality ladder” phenomenon.
Conducting an empirical exercise, Ando (2006) found some interesting evidence that
suggested the incidence of product fragmentation in East Asia.  Her findings can be
summarized as follows.  First, for the overall trade in machinery products by the countries
under consideration, the importance of vertical IIT increased sharply while the importance of
one-way trade declined substantially.  In particular, the share of one-way trade in most of the
countries was about 40-50 per cent in the early 1990s, but that share declined to about
half of it in the early 2000s.  All countries except the Republic of Korea and Singapore
experienced rapid growth in vertical IIT.
Second, the importance of vertical IIT is clearly apparent in machinery parts and
components, indicated by the much higher increase in vertical IIT for machinery parts and
components rather than for machinery as a whole.
The third, and perhaps the most important finding regarding product fragmentation,
is the indication of the rapid expansion of “back-and-forth” transactions.  Specifically, Ando
(2006) found no evidence that vertical IIT in low-income countries was systematically in the
form of commodities with export prices lower than import prices.  In other words, there is no
evidence of the “quality ladder” hypothesis.  This is because quite a large extent of vertical
IIT is the export price, which is higher than the import price.  Ando translated the statistics
into a situation whereby countries import (expensive) capital-intensive intermediate inputs,
use these inputs in local production, and then export the produced goods as either final or
other intermediate inputs  that have higher value-added.
Some other evidence for the existence of IPNs in East Asia was derived from the
examination of firm-level data, such as that conducted by Kimura and Ando (2005a and
2005b), for example.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) conducted some descriptive and
econometric analyses using two rich datasets of Japanese multinationals operating around
the world.  The datasets enabled them to gauge the characteristics of Japanese MNCs as
well as their (foreign) affiliates across countries as well as some changes in the mechanism
of production relationship between the (Japanese) parent companies and their (foreign)
affiliates.
Regarding characteristics, the findings by Kimura and Ando (2005a and 2005b) can
be summarized as follows.  First, a large portion of Japanese firms that have invested
abroad (i.e., about 80 per cent of all Japanese MNCs) have at least one affiliate in the East
Asian region; however, overall, more than half of all the MNC affiliates are located in this
region.
Second, most of the Japanese MNCs and their affiliates operate in the
manufacturing sector, and about half of them operate in the machinery sector.  Moreover,18
the extent of this concentration on manufacturing operations has tended to increase over
time, as indicated by about a 10 per cent increase in the number of the affiliates operating in
the sector.
Third, based on the list of activities implemented both by the parent companies and
by the affiliates, together with the fact that most of the affiliates are SMEs, Kimura and Ando
(2005a) inferred that parent companies established their foreign affiliates with the objective
of conducting a subset of activities that originally were (supposedly) to be conducted by the
parent companies.  Kimura and Ando (2005a) argued that this – together with the previous
characteristics – was a typical strategy of firms involved in manufacturing operations, which
essentially reflects the existence of product fragmentation.
The fourth characteristic, which provides stronger evidence of the existence of IPNs
in East Asia, is a suggestion that the extent and incidence of outsourcing activities is very
large for the Japanese firms’ operations in East Asia.  This comes as a result of a logit
regression analysis for the operation of the parent firms that includes, among other factors,
an outsourcing dummy variable.  A positive coefficient of the outsourcing dummy variable
would support the conclusion that outsourcing is very important for the product
fragmentation process.  As table 2.4 shows, the estimated coefficient for the dummy
variable was indeed positive for the regression of the firms investing in East Asia.  Together
with the estimated coefficients of the other variables, Kimura and Ando (2005a) further
inferred that Japanese firms operating in East Asia tended to (a) have large employment
levels at home, (b) use superior technology, (c) enjoy extensive foreign sales, (d) conduct
in-house R&D activities and, most importantly, (e) be highly flexible in de-internalizing their
production process by fragmenting their production blocks among other companies (i.e., the
affiliates).
Another important finding was that the extent of flexibility, and hence presumably
capacity, for de-internalizing – and hence conducting outsourcing – appeared to be
significantly larger for the Japanese MNCs investing in East Asia, compared with those
investing in the United States and in European countries.  The coefficients of the
outsourcing dummy variables were either no longer significant or showed negative signs
(although often insignificant) for the regressions of firms investing in the North American and
European regions in more recent years, i.e., a comparison of the regression results of 2000
with those of 1995 (table 2.3).
The other set of important findings by Kimura and Ando (2005a), who observed
changes in the mechanism of the production relationship between the parent companies
and their affiliates, showed that more than 90 per cent of sales, or purchases, of the
affiliates in East Asian countries went to, or came from, countries in the region.  A more
important finding was the indication that much of those transactions originated not only from
Japan to local economies or:  from local economies to Japan, but also expanded to other
countries within the region.  The figures are:  for sales by affiliates in 1998, 49 per cent went
to the domestic market, 25 per cent to Japan and 17 per cent to other countries within East
Asia, except Japan.  For purchases in the same year, 43 per cent of the purchases came
from the local economy, 35 per cent from Japan and 19 per cent from the other East Asian
countries, except Japan.19
T
able 2.3. Logit-regression result for the characteristics of Japanese MNCs investing in other countries
(i) Dependent variable:  1995
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(i) Dependent variable:  1995







































































Adapted from Kimura and 
Ando, 2005a, and authors’
 calculations based on METI database.
Notes:
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Results are statistically significant at 
a 
1 per cent level,
 b 
5 per cent level and 
c
 10 per cent level.  
The data for the outsourcing dummy for 1995 and 2000
are not exactly the same due to changes in the questionnaires.  In the case of 1995, the questionnaire was strictly limited to 
the production commission
in the production of manufacturing goods.  On the other hand, the 2000 questionnaire requested that the outsourcing expenditure
 be embodied in
production costs, sales costs etc.
* Indicates similar regression model, but done on larger firms.22
There is also evidence that the Japanese firms’ affiliates in East Asia have tended to
gradually substitute their intra-firm transactions with other firms, i.e., the arm-length firms.
Kimura and Ando (2005a) found that the affiliates’ share of either intra-firm sales or
purchases declined quite substantially in a very short period (1995-1998), with a matching
increase in the share of arm-length transactions.  As for the statistics, during the same
period the share of the affiliates’ intra-firm transactions declined from 31 per cent to 30 per
cent, and from 43 per cent to 33 per cent for sales and purchases, while the share of the
affiliates’ arm-length transactions increased from 59 per cent to 61 per cent for sales and
from 52 per cent to 65 per cent for purchases.
It is worth mentioning that the increased importance of the arm-length transactions
indicates the existence of “back-and-forth” transactions, a fact that is also consistent with
the major findings by Ando (2006).
Kimura and Ando (2005a) further noted that the extent of the increased amount of
“back-and-forth” transactions, however, varied substantially across the two importance
subsectors within the general machinery sector.  Specifically, the data indicated that the
extent of the “back-and-forth” transactions by the affiliates was greater in the electronics
sector, compared with the transactions in the telecommunications sector.
2.3.2. Mapping existing production networks
IPNs comprise vertical production chains that extend across the countries in the
region as well as distribution networks throughout the world.  In the past decade, the East
Asian economies added “the formation of international production/distribution networks” to
their major characteristics, with MNCs as the major players in the machinery, textiles and
garment industries.
Ando and Kimura (2003) found that although similar networks existed in other parts
of the world (e.g., the United States-Mexico, and Germany-Hungary/Czech Republic).  The
networks in East Asia are distinctive and have the following characteristics:  (a) they have
become a substantial part of each country’s economy in the region; (b) they involve a large
number of countries at different income levels; and (c) they include both intra-firm and
arm’s-length relationships.  Ando and Kimura calculated customs duty import ratios (ratio of
total customs duty revenue of a country to the c.i.f.-based import value) and found that the
ratios were much smaller than the average tariff figures.  Another insight was that the ratios
presented a clearly decreasing trend over time.  These phenomena were partly due to
unilateral tariff reductions for IT-related products in the 1990s and to the effective usage of
the duty drawback system.
Ando and Kimura (2003) concluded that the most important change in the trade
pattern of the region was the explosive increase in the trading of machinery parts and
components, including general machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment and
precision machinery.
A study by Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang (2004) provided a more detailed look at the
mapping of production networks in East Asia.  They compared the development of23
production networks in East Asia with Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus on
the electronics and automotive industries.  The study revealed that the electronics industry
was fragmenting faster than the automotive industry, mainly for the technical reasons of high
value-to-weight ratios and lower capability needs for the “fragmented” process.  Export
growth in electronic products was also due to faster innovation and demand growth, with
fragmentation having been a major force.  East Asia did much better in developing
production networks in the electronics industry than did Latin America and the Caribbean,
owing to: (a) the strategies used to build up local capabilities; (b) targeted FDI strategies;
and (c) countries in the region offering efficient export-processing sites when production
networks started.
The intensity of fragmentation differs by industry, depending on four factors:
(a) technical divisibility of production processes; (b) factor intensity of the process (labour-
intensive vs. less labour-intensive); (c) the technological complexity of each process
(simpler processes are usually relocated); and (d) the value-to-weight ratio of the product
i.e., light, high-value products can be shipped long distances, in order  to exploit differences
in cost, while heavy, lower-value products can only be shipped to proximate areas or remain
in the parent country.
As for electronics, the intra-East Asia trade in this industry as a whole grew much
faster than the exports to the rest of the world – here, economies defined as East Asia
include:  China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines;
Singapore; Taiwan Province of China; and Thailand.  By 2000, the region’s trade was valued
at about 38 per cent of total electronics exports (50 per cent including Japan).  Intraregional
imports grew even faster and outpaced imports from the rest of the world, with the East
Asian countries contributing 50 per cent and Japan contributed the another 20 per cent.
Consequently, the regional trade balance became negative over time, with the deficit of
these nine East Asian economies growing faster than with Japan; however, the trade
balance with the rest of the world became increasingly positive, especially with the United
States.  This significant increase in intraregional trade had a large “fragmented” component,
which means that the region was becoming knitted into a tight production network, not only
to meet increasingly regional needs, but also to serve the rest of the world.
China, meanwhile, evolved differently from the other economies.  In 2000, the
regional share of Chinese exports fell by 39 points while its share of imports rose by
76 points.  During the same period, the rest of the world was the destination for 51 per cent
of its exports while accounting for only 8 per cent of China’s imports, indicating that China
was acting as a base for producers from neighbouring economies for processing and
exporting to other regions.  Singapore was more oriented to the other East Asian economies
and least of all to Japan, which is actually in line with Singapore’s emerging role as a
regional hub for MNC operations in East Asia.
Thus, a tight network is emerging within East Asia, with Japan playing an important
but not dominant role.  China’s entry is strengthening regional competitiveness.  MNCs are
fitting locations into complex specialization patterns that allow East Asia to retain facilities
and expand exports – although trade data cannot reveal how the pattern is changing.  There
is still competition for exports and high-value functions between the locations, but production24
networks have helped relatively high-wage countries such as Singapore to retain export
competitiveness.
With regard to the automotive sector in East Asia, Japan is the dominant player in
the production network.  However, the region has not formed a coherent network.  Auto
exports accounted for 2.8 per cent of total exports in East Asia in 1990 and 3.1 per cent in
2000.  Japanese MNCs use East Asia to assemble components for domestic markets and
for export to the rest of the world, as indicated by Japan’s low automotive imports and huge
exports.  The leading exporters from the Republic of Korea sell mainly to the rest of the
world, using significant imports from Japan.  Meanwhile, Thailand’s position, as the third
largest exporter, is similar to that of the Republic of Korea, although it is more dependent on
Japanese imports.  The Philippines is the only country that trades significantly within East
Asia, but it is a minor player in the electronics sector.
In East Asia, Japan has not built regional networks to serve its home market but
instead uses production bases to export to other destinations.  United States auto
companies have not invested in East Asia to serve their home market, unlike United States
electronics companies, since automotive products are too heavy.
Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang (2004) asserted that there was room for development
and expansion of the automotive production network in East Asia.  The Republic of Korea
became a significant auto exporter and invested in the region, but not for developing
integrated production systems.  Thailand is becoming a large production base for MNCs and
is currently the second-largest East Asian exporter.  Given the expansion of China’s auto
industry and the rapid growth in demand in the region, integrated production is likely to
increase, with the Republic of Korea, China, and Thailand as the hub of the future, but with
Japan still playing a major role and the other countries contributing as major suppliers of
complex components.
A study by Hiratsuka (2005) of production networks in hard-disk drive components
showed a clearer map of the extent of the East Asian networks.  In 1996, major IT-producing
nations met under WTO auspices and agreed to bind their MFN tariffs at zero for specific IT
goods, including computers, telecommunications, semiconductors, semiconductor
manufacturing equipment, software, instruments and apparatus.  The resulting Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) is a package deal in that no product-coverage exceptions are
allowed.  The ITA zero-tariff bindings are on a most-favoured nation (MFN) basis and thus
are available to exporters from any WTO member.
The ITA goal was to establish global free trade in the IT sector.  Initially, it was signed
by Japan, European Union member States and the United States.  However, it soon
produced a domino effect, as smaller countries signed up to the ITA as a way of attracting
foreign IT manufacturers.  Thus, ITA promoted production unbundling on a global scale
(figure 2.3).
Meanwhile, another study by Hiratsuka (2007) revealed more on global production
network, between East Asia, the European Union and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).  The study noted that one of the prominent features of the East Asian25
economy was the development of production fragmentation or networks characterized by
vertical specialization.  The trade pattern inside the enlarged East Asian region has
changed, from the traditional one in which final products were traded based on traditional
comparative advantage, to a pattern of trading massive amounts of parts and components.
Intermediate goods sourced from the same industrial activity have actively been traded
among the Asian economies, thus expanding intra-industry and intraregional trade.
Concerning intraregional trade of parts and components, three points need to be
addressed.  First, South-East and East Asia (particularly ASEAN and China) mutually trade
parts and components for manufacturing final products within the region.  Second, Japan
exports the bulk of its parts and components to ASEAN and China, and imports final goods
from them.  Finally, East Asia’s production networks have a close link with NAFTA and the
European Union, which export a large portion of their parts and components to ASEAN and
China.  Meanwhile, China and ASEAN export parts and components as well as consumer
goods to those advanced regions.
Figure 2.3. Global production network in IT-related goods
Source: Taken from Baldwin, 2007, which was adapted from Hiratsuka, 2005.
Note: This figure shows the nations where parts are sourced for hard-disk drives assembled in
Thailand; the hard-disk drives are then shipped to various markets for use in electronic
products.26
As agglomeration develops, materials and parts are gradually procured within
a country rather than from advanced countries.  In fact, Japanese affiliates operating
overseas tend to procure from Japan first and then gradually from other countries.  Logistics
service costs incurred in supporting these procurements are not small.  However,
transportation service costs in ASEAN and China are lower than those in advanced
countries.
2.3.3. Determinants of product fragmentation
Few studies that have attempted to gauge the determinants of production network
are available in the literature (e.g., Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; and Kimura, Takahashi
and Hayakawa, 2007).  These studies adopted the general methodology of the gravity
model, which is quite popular as an empirical tool for examining bilateral trade between
countries.  The adoption of the gravity model usually follows the idea of expanding the
statistical equation of the determinants of bilateral trade between two countries by adding
some relevant variables derived from the analytical framework of product fragmentation.
Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007) focused on finding evidence of some
reduction in the extent of service link costs in East Asia, relative to the situation in the North
American and European regions, and on testing the hypothesis of whether locational
advantage matters in product fragmentation.  They included geographical distance (DIS)
and the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita (income gap) as the proxy for
service link costs and locational advantage, respectively, plus regional dummy variables to
facilitate the difference across regions (i.e., East Asia and Europe).  It is important to note
that what constitutes locational advantage includes, for example, the advantage regarding
factor-input prices (e.g., wages), good quality infrastructure and infrastructure services, and
a conducive policy environment.
After estimating the equations, Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007) found
support for the hypothesis that locational advantage explains product fragmentation.  This
inference comes from the result that the coefficients of the income gap are positive across
the estimated equations, which implies that trading partners with wider differences in income
tend to trade more.  In addition, the inference is strengthened by the introduction of income
gap in equations that have regional dummy as one of its variable.  Introducing the income
gap evidently reduces the magnitude and importance of the regional dummy variable.  In
other words, much of the intraregional bilateral trade in East Asia can largely be explained
by income differences between trading partners; and because GDP per capita is a proxy for
wages and thus a proxy for locational advantage, Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007)
concluded that locational advantage did matter in explaining bilateral trade in parts and
components, as noted above.
The result for the estimated coefficients of distance suggests that the extent of
service link costs in East Asia is substantially lower than in the European region.  In
particular, the estimated coefficients for distance are much smaller in East Asia than those in
the European region.  Thus, while service link costs in East Asia facilitate trade, the
coefficients suggest that the costs tend to penalise the performance of bilateral trade in
parts and components among countries in Europe.  The result for service link costs also27
suggests that East Asia provides a more favourable environment for production networking
than Europe does in terms of service links (Kimura, 2008).
The reduced service link costs suggested by the studies cited above also comes
from substantially lower transportation costs over time.  Hummels (1999) showed that the
average of the overall trade-weighted transportation costs had declined quite substantially in
the past 30 years.  This was due to technological advancement in the mode of transport,
such as using much bigger ships that could reduce the unit cost of the shipped goods, and
the expansion of air transport for delivering goods.  As reported by Hummels (2001), the use
of more advanced technology and systems in the transport sector enabled the cost of time
to be reduced from about 30 per cent to around 10 per cent.
6
Using the same framework and methodological approach, Ando and Kimura (2007)
added another important point regarding service link costs from the experience of East Asia.
That is, a high degree of transactions among production blocks requires more than just low
transportation costs; this is lower service link costs in terms of the production process.  Ando
and Kimura arrived at this inference based on the results showing that the estimated
absolute values of geographical distance coefficients were larger for the trade in parts and
components compared with those for trade in final machinery products and all other
merchandise.
Adding more insights into the determinants of product fragmentation, Athukorala and
Yamashita (2006) included intra- and extraregional dummy variables to capture the potential
effect, if any, from regional trade memberships (i.e., AFTA, the European Union, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, ANDEAN and ANZCERTA).  The results, however, were mixed.  Specifically,
the coefficients for the RTA dummies were only significant and positive – meaning promoting
trade in parts and components in the case of AFTA, while the coefficients representing the
other RTAs were either insignificant or showing an unexpected negative sign.  In summary,
Athukorala and Yamashita concluded that there was no evidence to support the hypothesis
that RTAs promoted (vertically) product fragmentation.  This is consistent with the fact that
much of the product fragmentation in the world has occurred mainly because of tariff
concessions.  The results from Athukorala and Yamashita’s research support the findings of
Egger and Egger (2005) who argued that the formation of an RTA would simply result in
substituting the current tariff concessions under export promotion schemes of developing
countries, rather than generating new incentives for promoting trade based on product
fragmentation.  In other words, in order to promote more trade based on product
fragmentation, an RTA must move beyond tariff concessions as a form of trade incentive.
Related to the role of regional or bilateral trade arrangements on IPNs it is worth
reporting the findings of Kumar (2007), who noted a potential positive impact of the RTA
concluded between India and the Republic of Korea on IPN.  Although India and the
Republic of Korea are already part of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), the RTA
between the two countries has gone beyond tariff concessions of trade in the goods outlined
6 The same point on the declining shipping costs in the East Asian region was also presented in
a report by the Japan External Trade Organization (2002).28
in APTA.  Apart from tariff concessions, the RTA – known as the India-Korea Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (IKCEPA) – also includes trade in services, intellectual
property rights, measures of trade facilitation and investment liberalization.  Kumar (2007)
found that soon after the start of negotiations, Tata Motors of India acquired Daewoo Motors
of the Republic of Korea in 2005, and began a regional production networking strategy for
producing small and medium-sized cars.  This business strategy was implemented in order
to gain early advantage when the RTA entered into force on 1 January 2010.  In particular,
IKCEPA includes the promotion of cooperation, either through investment and/or tariff
reductions, in several sectors including the automotive sector.  In addition, some Republic of
Korea multinationals were also extending their regional production networks in India.
2.4. Trade liberalization and IPNs
The previous section shows that IPNs have been developed and established in the
East Asian region, and this is marked by the large extent of intraregional trade within the
region in the past two decades or so.  An important question here, together with the other
determinants of IPNs in the region, is whether or not the existence of the networks can be
explained by policy factors.  This section addresses this subject as well as a few other
issues related to the impact of many RTAs on IPNs.
2.4.1. Policy determinants of IPNs in East Asia
Adding a variable of policy changes can further explain the production networks in
the East Asian region.  The building blocks of production networks in East Asia stem from
two region-specific policy episodes or events.  One was the so-called “hollowing out” of the
Japanese economy in the 1980s, which triggered the relocation of Japanese firms to
neighbouring countries (Baldwin, 2007).
7  The hollowing out was motivated by the erosion of
competitiveness in the Japanese industries resulting from an increase in unit labour costs.
The rapid growth in wages and incomes in the Japanese economy during the 1980s and
1990s was not matched by increase in labour productivity.
Second, at the same time as the industry relocation process, East Asian countries
implemented the so-called “dual-track” strategic approach to industrialization (Kimura,
2006b).  The approach promoted the import-substitution and export-promotion
industrialization strategy.  In this approach, industries that commonly fall under the import-
substitution policy include the automotive, electrical appliances, basic metals and chemical
industries, while industries that have been part of the export promotion strategy are usually,
or mostly, either resource- or labour-intensive industries.  The export-promoting industries
are usually insulated from the rest of the domestic economy, which applies the import-
substitution approach, and are located in export processing zones.
7 The “hollowing out“ also occurred in several other more developed East Asian countries/areas at
that time, e.g., the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China in the 1990s.29
The hollowing out of the more developed East Asian economies, and Japan in
particular, nicely fitted into the “dual-track” strategy approach.  This triggered another round
of policy responses by the countries that had been the target of industrial relocation,
covering both investment and trade.
The investment policy response essentially comprised many policy packages with
the objective of attracting FDI.  It is worth mentioning that the “targeted” countries’ FDI
policies were very aggressive, reflecting the rather tight competition among them for the
alternative manufacturing sites of Japanese and other countries’ businesses.  Kimura
(2006b) noted that due to the fear of losing FDI to other countries, ASEAN countries even
took the radical approach of “accepting everybody” in their FDI policy approach.
As for trade policy, many Asian countries, and ASEAN countries in particular,
unilaterally cut their tariff rates, which is often viewed as a “race to the bottom” (Baldwin,
2006).
8  Moreover, according to Baldwin, some of those tariff cuts were in the form of
duty-drawback and duty-free treatment for establishments in export processing zones.  In
addition, over time, many countries realized the large benefit of lower trade costs by
switching from special treatments to lowering applied MFN tariff rates; as a result, many of
those countries have continued to cut their tariff rates unilaterally in the past two decades
(table 2.4).
Table 2.4. Unilateral tariff cuts in East Asia, 1991-2003
(Unit: Per cent, average applied tariff)
Country/area 1989 1992 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
India 59 34 31 28
Viet Nam 14 15 15 15 16
Thailand 40 40 20 16 15 14
China 42 35 16 16 15 11
Malaysia 14 14 9 9 9
Republic of Korea 14 11 8 8 8 8
Indonesia 23 16 11 9 7 7 7
Taiwan Province of China 10 6 6 6 6 6 5
Philippines 28 19 19 9 7 7 5 4
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0
Source: UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database.  Average applied
import tariff rates of non-agricultural and non-fuel products.
Note: Years are approximate since not all nations report data annually; however, tariffs change
slowly, so data for adjacent years have been substituted where needed.
8 Kuchiki (2005) mentioned some anecdotal evidence on the “race-to-the-bottom” unilateral tariff cuts.30
To summarize, the hollowing-out of Japanese businesses, changes in the
industrialization strategies of developing Asian countries, and their subsequent adoption of
deeper liberalization of FDI and trade policies have initiated and developed production
networks within the East Asian region.
The race-to-the-bottom in the unilateral tariff cuts and liberal FDI policy essentially
means a reduction in trade costs.  This aligns with some studies that have argued that the
reduction in cost for trade is what matters for the formation, and therefore the existence, of
IPNs.  Yi (2003), for example, showed theoretically the propagation effect of tariff reduction.
In particular, lower tariffs reduce the cost of producing vertically specialized goods by more
than that of regular goods; moreover, this propagation effect, according to Yi’s model,
increases as the number of production stages increases.  The model also indicates that tariff
reductions produce non-linear effects on the trading of vertically specialized goods.  This is
because the effect of the reductions in the second round (of further tariff reductions)
becomes much higher when the vertically and fragmented production mechanism is
established from the first round.
Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003), in their study of the determinants of vertical
production networks involving United States multinational companies, provided some
support for the theoretical model devised by Yi.  In particular, they found that intermediate
inputs were negatively related to the cost of trade, and that the extent of the relationship
was very strong.  This therefore suggests that affiliates do respond to the change in the
price of intermediate imported inputs; in fact, the magnitude of the price change was found
to be rather large.  Working out from the estimated coefficient, Hanson, Mataloni and
Slaughter estimated that a 1 per cent reduction in prices – due to a reduction in trade costs
– led to a 3.3 per cent increase in the amount of intermediate input demanded by the United
States affiliates.
Nevertheless, the current literature does not provide sufficient evidence of the
linkages between existing RTAs and IPNs.  As noted in section 2.3.3, the gravity model
econometric exercise carried out by Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) revealed mixed
results for the RTA dummy variables; some coefficients were significant and positive, while
others were negative and even insignificant.  This mixed result showed that perhaps in
assessing the linkages between existing RTAs and IPNs, the gravity model may not be the
best fit.  RTAs are policies, and assessing policies in a gravity model setting may be
technically difficult.  Moreover, it is difficult to differentiate the effects of the
institutionalization of integration through RTAs and market-led integration in the gravity
model, which may explain the conflicting results of the model of the RTA dummy
coefficients.  Against this backdrop, there is a need for a more in-depth study of the linkages
between existing RTAs and IPNs.
2.4.2. RTAs and IPNs:  Other key points from the literature
The increased importance of IPNs and intraregional trade in East Asia imply a strong
incidence of regional integration.  However, this has occurred more because of market-led
integration, rather than integration that comes from formal trade agreements.  This is
because many of the (unilateral) tariff cuts that were made in the past two or three decades31
were motivated by the actions of private businesses; this is often called Asian-style
regionalism (Baldwin, 2007).  More recently, following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis,
countries in East Asia moved one step ahead with their regional integration agenda, in an
attempt to formalize the established market-led integration.  This was done by the
establishment of RTAs between countries within the region.  Policymakers in East Asia hold
the view that the formal arrangements can be regarded as part of the policy framework for
expanding production networks and supply chains formed by global MNCs and emerging
East Asian firms.
The key issue here is that – with the growing number of formal trade agreements –
how will the existing formal agreements influence IPNs, which have been working relatively
well in the region? Will they strengthen or weaken IPNs?
Before answering this question, it is important to first understand the current
situation regarding RTAs.  Without going into greater detail, a summary is needed of
a so-called “mess” resulting from the proliferation of many trade arrangements in the region
(Baldwin, 2007).
9  Many trade deals are currently being negotiated or discussed, but only
a few have actually been signed and implemented, creating the so-called “noodle bowl
syndrome”.  As described by Baldwin (2007) as well as Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), the
rapid growth in the number of agreements was, to a large extent, triggered by China’s
initiative to form FTAs with ASEAN (i.e., a domino effect resulted from the ASEAN-China
FTA).  Given the significant size of the Chinese economy, the domino effect reflects the
response of the other “big” countries in the region (i.e., Japan and the Republic of Korea) to
balance the potential regional power imbalance.
Some of the agreements in the region involve ASEAN countries as a single entity,
such as the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and Republic of Korea-Japan RTAs.  In the case
of the RTAs with ASEAN in particular, the degree of complexity is even higher because such
RTAs entail bilateral agreements with each of the ASEAN countries.  Thus, for the ASEAN-
China RTA, for example, China and each ASEAN member choose their own sensitive list
and bilateral market access, depending on the list.  It is worth noting that this type of
arrangement is unique to the region.  Even greater complexity is added by the fact that
some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Singapore, are actively pursuing their own
bilateral agreements.  Yet, the noodle bowl does not seem to stop expanding, given the
rather ambitious agenda of ASEAN, which is actively pursuing RTAs with other countries,
such as India and Australia-New Zealand (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007).
Another key point is that, despite the increasing number of agreements, only a very
few have been implemented so far, such as the ASEAN FTA (i.e., AFTA).  Although AFTA is
perhaps the oldest, and hence the most well-established preferential trade agreement in
the region, it does not appear to have had a substantial impact on ASEAN intraregional
trade.  Part of the next section provides some explanation of why this happened; in short,
however, the rapid unilateral tariff cutting that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., the
9 See, for example, Baldwin, 2007, and Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007 for a more detail description of
the “Asian noodle bowl syndrome”.32
“race-to-the-bottom” phenomenon explained above) appears to have undermined the
preferential advantages offered by the agreement.
2.4.2.1. How exactly do RTAs influence IPNs?
Theory suggests the impact of RTAs can go in one of two directions, either
strengthening or weakening the network.  The political economy framework of preferential
trade developed by Baldwin (2006) provides some idea of this theory.  Borrowing from
Baldwin (2006), figure 2.4 illustrates the equilibrium of a tariff setting in a country that
optimizes government choice, given the supply and demand of trade protection.
10
Figure 2.4 presents two curves, GFOC (unil) and FE, where the GFOC maps the politically
optimal tariff choice that a government can choose in unilateral setting, and the latter, FE,
maps the equilibrium number of firms in an import-competing sector.  The horizontal and
vertical axes represent the number of firms (n) and tariff rate (T), respectively.
10 See Baldwin, 2006, for a more detail explanation of the political economy approach of preferential
trade.
Figure 2.4. Impact of preferential trade agreements: Baldwin’s
political economy of tariff choices
Source: Reproduced from Baldwin, 2006.33
A country’s RTA with a trade partner shifts the FE schedule to the left (to FE’).  In this
scenario, RTA implies a tariff cut for the country’s importing sector (the movement from T
0 to
T’), and it has the effect of raising the amount of imported goods from the country’s RTA
partner due to the tariff reduction resulting from the RTA.  At the same time, however, the
increased amount of imported goods in turn forces domestic firms to exit the sector (the
reduction of n from n
0 to n’).  All these factors are reflected by the shift of E
0 to E’.  This
scenario leads to more trade between the two countries and hence, “trade blocs become
building blocks” (i.e., trade-creating).  The other scenario, of course, would be “trade blocs
are stumbling blocks” (i.e., trade-diverting).  This is illustrated by the right-shift of the FE
curve, moving the equilibrium point E
0 to E’’.  This scenario exists because, under Viner’s
ambiguity, the RTA may instead lower the amount of imports that correspond to a given level
of MFN  tariffs.  The import-competing sector now provides a smaller supply of goods, while
the expected profit of a firm increases; however, because higher tariffs give more protection,
only domestic firms respond to the increase (in expected profit), resulting in a higher number
of firms with E’ equilibrium.
The trade-creating effect is certainly the effect that policymakers are interested in,
even within the idea of how RTAs could strengthen IPNs.  Identifying practical policy
measures within this idea, however, is not easy, given the number of issues related to the
idea.  The rest of this section addresses this subject.
One important policy area is rules of origin (RoO), because they determine whether
products are eligible for preferential treatment under an RTA.  To facilitate the discussion, it
is useful to briefly mention the analytical framework and certain aspects of RoO, borrowing
from Krueger (1999), Krishna (2005), Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007), Kawai and
Wignaraja (2007), and Baldwin (2007).
The proliferation of RTAs increases the attention given to RoO.  Krueger (1999)
found that RoO could cause controversy.  In particular, she explained that under the United
States-Canada RTA, a major dispute occurred between the two countries regarding RoO on
automobiles.  The Canadian assemblers had imported engines produced in the United
States and treated those engines as coming under the RTA.  The United States insisted that
a sizeable number of engine parts had been imported outside the RTA and that the vehicles
concerned were not eligible for RTA duty-free treatment.  This exemplifies the fact that the
enforcement and implementation of RoO also imposes costs, and can therefore be regarded
as a trade barrier.
Krueger (1999) asserted that RTA negotiations over RoO offered an opportunity for
producers to lobby for restrictive rules for goods of concern to them.  From a protectionist
viewpoint, RoO are an excellent instrument for two reasons.  First, they are not transparent;
it is impossible for the average person to know the cost of RoO.  Second, RoO provide
a good instrument for trade protection if such rules help the high-cost producers of
intermediate goods (e.g., auto parts) to gain access to the partner’s market in preference to
other lower cost sources outside the area of preferential trade arrangement.  The use of
higher cost parts from within a preferential trade arrangement means that the final products
are subject to zero tariffs when shipped within the arrangement.  This is in contrast to using
the lowest cost parts available from countries outside the RTA, which means that the final34
assembled product will not comply with the RoO and will face duties when shipped within
the area of the RTA.  Under this scenario, RoO create trade diversion.
Krishna (2005) provided a more complete narrative on RoO.  In line with Krueger
(1999), he mentioned that RoO are basically hidden protection; they create what look like
tariffs on imported intermediate inputs and they affect the price of domestically-made inputs
as well.  These RoO are negotiated industry-by-industry and there is enormous scope for
well-organized industries essentially to insulate themselves from any potential negative
effects by devising suitable RoO.  Thus, when RoO are agreed upon, they have some effect
on determining the extent of preferential treatment for fellow members.
Krishna, however, also showed that RoO had some beneficial characteristics.
Without RoO, a preferential trade agreement could be highly liberalizing, as the lowest tariff
would apply to each import category.  However, RoO are not entirely beneficial.  If
transportation costs are highly significant, trade deflection also has a real cost since it
wastes resources.  RoO thus might prevent or reduce such wastage.  For example, if
transshipping costs are slightly below the tariff differential, deflection occurs and welfare is
reduced while the consumer price is unchanged, resources are used in transshipment and
tariff revenue falls.  RoO help to prevent such a scenario.
RoO can also provide an incentive for regional producers to buy intermediate goods
from regional sources, even if their prices are higher than that for similar goods from outside
the region.  This is in order to make their product “originate” in a preferential trade
arrangement and thus qualify for preferential treatment eligibility.  However, in practice, this
protects suppliers, and therefore creates another form of trade protection.
With regard to methods, there are three approaches for determining origins:
(a) change in tariff heading/classification; (b) criteria for local value-added content; and
(c) specific manufacturing process requirement.  The change in tariff approach requires the
final product to have a different tariff heading than the input used, while the value-added
criteria approach requires a minimum value-added to be placed on the inputs, locally.  The
third approach requires that some specific production processes be undertaken in the local
economy.
In addition to the above three basic approaches, there are a few other rules that are
commonly included in the origin determination that are, or are related to:  (a) cumulation;
(b) the de minimis rule (or tolerance); and (c) duty drawback.
Cumulation regulates inputs from preferential trading partners that can be used in
the production of final goods without undermining the origin of the product.  There are three
types of cumulation regulation – bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation.  Diagonal
cumulation, which works on a regional basis, means that inputs from anywhere in the region
can be used without undermining the origin status.  Full cumulation, meanwhile, means that
any processing activities carried out in countries participated in an RTA are deemed to
satisfy the content requirements regardless of whether the activities are sufficient to confer
originating status on the input materials themselves.35
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Source: Reproduced from Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007.
Notes:
a Applicable for textiles, and wood-based products, iron and steel as an alternative rule, and
for wheat and flour as an exclusive rule.
b For yarns and fibres used for clothing and textile products, 8 per cent applies; the de
minimis rule does not apply to agricultural products or applies with restrictions.
c Strategic Economic Partnership (SEP); members: Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand
and Singapore.36
The de minimis rule, or tolerance, specifies a percentage of non-originating products
to be used in the production process without affecting the origin status of the final goods.
Duty drawback, meanwhile, waives applicable duties on the non-originating input
materials used in production.  It should be noted, however, that duty drawbacks are
commonly not allowed in many RTAs.
Another important aspect is the nature and characteristics of RoO from RTAs in East
Asia.  One characteristic is an increase in the variation of RoO provisions governed by RTAs
in the region (table 2.5).
11  In particular, RTAs in the region adopt a combination of the three
approaches as well as a varied cumulation and tolerance rule.  In short, East Asia’s multiple
RoO approach embedded in the overlapping RTAs, as noted in Kawai and Wignaraja
(2007), adds up to already complex RTAs in the region and creates the “noodle/spaghetti
bowl” effect.
Another characteristic is the movement towards substantially simpler RoO, despite
the noodle/spaghetti bowl argument.  Evidence of this is reflected in the evolution of RoO
provisions under AFTA and the more recent ASEAN FTA with China and the Republic of
Korea.  The simpler RoO provision under these RTAs allows producers to choose either the
change in tariff heading or the value-added content as the method for determining origin
status.  Given this already simpler provision, the ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA moved
further to set even more liberalizing RoO provisions by substantially widening the coverage
of a number of products eligible for the adoption of the change of tariff classification method.
With regard to the simpler RoO, what initially was set by AFTA for the 40 per cent local
value-added content appears to have become a benchmark for the other RTAs.  The
ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Republic of Korea RTAs both apply the 40 per cent rule.
An important issue regarding RoO is related to their implementation.  There are
obviously some implementation issues, but one key issue appears to be the fact that there
is no guaranteeing RoO can always satisfy the idea of preferential trade in an RTA.  This
conclusion can be drawn from past experience of AFTA where there has been very low
utilization of preferential treatment from RoO provisions under AFTA (Kawai and Wignaraja,
2007; Baldwin, 2007; and Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  Given the absence of
information provided by the ASEAN Secretariat, some studies have estimated that the
extent of intra-ASEAN trade benefiting from AFTA preferences – translated into the AFTA’s
RoO provision – is very small, ranging from 3 per cent to 5 per cent of total intra-ASEAN
trade.
The question is, therefore, why have the preferences under AFTA not been optimally
used?  One reason could be because exporters are unable to satisfy the RoO requirement
for local value-added content, or at least have difficulties in doing so, due to the fact that
major manufacturing products traded within the ASEAN region have a high degree of the
product-fragmentation process.
11 See Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007, for a detailed summary of the nature and
characteristics of RoO provisions in East Asian RTAs.37
Another reason is the fact that the margin preference given by AFTA through its RoO
provisions is just too small to compensate for the costs of satisfying the origin requirements
– which means taking the preferential treatment offered by AFTA.  The complexity of
administering, and complying with, RoO burdens exporters with high compliance costs.  An
additional complexity arises from the difference in customs’ valuation across the ASEAN
countries (Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  This problem was earlier highlighted
during JETRO (2004) interviews with several Japanese firms operating in the ASEAN
region, when it was revealed that some exporters preferred to use the “red-lane” in customs
clearance procedures, instead of the “green-lane”, which offers traders in AFTA goods some
benefits in terms of lower costs for cargo handling and administration costs.
2.4.2.2. How do RTAs support IPNs?
How, then, can RTAs support IPN? There has not been much discussion of this
subject in the literature.
12  Having said this, however, a few studies have put forward ideas
on how RTAs could strengthen the formation and development of IPNs.
One idea suggested better designed and implemented RoO provisions were needed
in many RTAs.  Achieving this may require some refinement of the provisions – an example
would be the RoO provision improvement made by AFTA in the 1990s and early 2000s.
13
Based on the discussion above, refinement or improvement could be carried out in at least
two directions.  First, overlapping RoO across trade agreements should ideally be
harmonized.  As noted above, the overlapping RoO in East Asian RTAs gives rise to the
noodle bowl effect.  In fact, the 2006 JETRO survey of Japanese firms reported that more
than 60 per cent of the firms operating in the region thought that the RoO should be
harmonized; many of the firms preferred some form of common RoO approach (Japan
External Trade Organization, 2007).
Another idea suggested reducing the costs of the RoO.  This could be done by
introducing less restrictive cumulation rules, such as diagonal or full cumulation, allowing the
duty drawback provision, and setting a higher de minimis (tolerance) rule (Manchin and
Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007).  Full cumulation could facilitate increased product fragmentation
and, therefore, increased economic linkage and trade within a region.  Meanwhile, a higher
de minimis (tolerance rule) would reduce the too-stringent requirements imposed by local
value-added content or change of tariff classification, and therefore lower production
costs.  In addition, administration costs could be reduced in many ways that reflect the
“trade-friendly” approach.
The idea of reducing costs appears to be quite promising.  Estevadeordal and
Suominen (2005), for example, reported that where many of the above measures were
implemented they fostered trade creation compared to situations where RoO did not allow
duty drawback, higher tolerance and less restrictive cumulation rules.
12 In fact, this is what motivated the current study, with the aim of providing some insights into the
subject.
13 See Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007, for details of the improvement in AFTA’s RoO
provision.38
Taking the case of IPNs in East Asia, Kimura (2006) argued that RTAs could be
adopted as a vehicle to further activate IPNs.  This is based on two interconnected
presumptions that (a) RTAs are flexible policy tools, in terms of speed, scope, and
sequencing, and (b) many of needed policy initiatives for promoting IPNs are not covered by
WTO policy disciple.  Therefore, countries could make use of RTAs to design policy
initiatives that are needed to promote IPN activities in their countries.
Kimura (2006a) further asserted that although much had been done through
market-led liberalization, there was still much room for RTAs to promote IPNs, as
international transactions were far from friction-free and national border effects were still
high.  All these can be dealt with, in principle, by furthering the reduction in service link costs
– referring to the two-dimensional product fragmentation approach (Kimura and Ando,
2005a).  Based on this approach, policy initiatives under RTAs could be directed towards:
(a) Reducing the costs arising from geographical distance (e.g., removal of
explicit and implicit trade impediments, improving trade facilitation, developing
logistics services etc.);
(b) Promoting production cost savings in the fragmented production blocks (e.g.,
developing human capital, establishing a stable but flexible labour policy,
developing a strong but healthy financial sector etc.); and
(c) Promoting institutional building to reduce firms’ arm-length transactions (e.g.,
policies for reducing the informational cost of searching for business partners,
policies that secure intellectual property rights etc.).39
3.  Linkages between regional trade agreements and
international production networks:
Evidence from five case studies in Asia
Mochamad Pasha
3.1. Background
International production networks have become important drivers of global trade as
well as regional trade in Asia, particularly in the past two decades.  These networks are
channels through which national economies are becoming interlinked by using the
advantages of production fragmentation.  The establishment of networks has influenced the
patterns of trade in Asian economies (see, for example, Athukorala, forthcoming).  Trade
agreements have been another major factor influencing trade patterns (and flows).  Since
1995, there has been a proliferation of free (or preferential
1) trade arrangements, both
bilateral and regional.
The pattern of global trade in terms of commodity and geographical structure has
indeed changed substantially in the past three decades.  This was marked by an increasing
share of trade in parts and components in total trade, compared with trade in final goods.
Statistically, for example, the value of trade in parts and components increased three times
from 1987 to 2003, while the value of trade in final goods increased by about two times
during the same period.  This increase represents an increase in the share of trade in parts
and components from 16 per cent in 1987 to 20 per cent in 2003.
Based on the literature survey detailed in the previous chapter, much of the increase
in the global parts and components trade was in the East Asian region.  Many recent studies
(e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2003; Kimura and Ando, 2005a; and Athukorala and Yamashita,
2006) have shown evidence of this change.  Ando and Kimura (2003), for example, noted
very high shares of parts and components in machinery trade for countries in the region,
reaching about 40 per cent to 50 per cent.  In the case of South-East Asian countries, the
share reached about 80 per cent.  Meanwhile, Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) showed
that the share of East Asian countries – excluding Japan – in global exports almost doubled
between the early 1990s and 2000s.  They also noted that the degree of dependence on the
trade in components was proportionally greater in the East Asian region than in other
regions of the world.
The increased trade in parts and components indicates the rising importance of
IPNs.  The formation of the network is facilitated by the growing production fragmentation, at
the international level.  According to Athukorala and Yamashita (2006), international
1 The term “preferential trade agreement” is also used in the literature to denote an exception from the
non-discriminatory principle of WTO (MFN clause – Article I).  In the current study, RTA refers to any
type of reciprocal exchange of discriminatory trade concessions between two or more countries.40
production fragmentation is broadly defined as cross-border dispersion of component/
assembly within a vertically integrated production process, with each country specializing in
a particular stage of the production sequence.
Ando and Kimura (2003) and Kimura and Ando (2005a) provided some evidence at
the company level on the existence of international production fragmentation – and hence,
IPNs – using data from Japanese firms operating in East Asian countries.
2  Among other
findings, these two studies showed that investment by Japanese companies was directed
more to other countries in East Asia and that it was concentrated more in the manufacturing
sector, which differed from the Japanese investment in North America and European
countries.  In addition to the investment factor, another Japanese corporate behaviour
characteristic perhaps provides more support for the claimed importance of international
production fragmentation and IPNs – i.e., Japanese affiliates in the East Asian region are
more export-oriented than those in other parts of the world.  More importantly, from the
perspective of “regional” production networks (i.e., international production networks
operating in a single geographical region), most Japanese affiliates in East Asia direct their
exports back to the region.
The extent of participation by individual countries in production networks greatly
varies.  In South-East Asia there are three layers of countries with regard to participation in
IPNs.  The countries that are most involved are Malaysia and Thailand.  The middle layer
comprises Indonesia and the Philippines while the bottom layer includes countries that have
yet to become more integrated in the global /regional production networks and trade.
Parallel to the growing trend of IPNs, in recent years there has also been
a proliferation of preferential trade agreements, particularly in East Asia.  The rapid increase
in the number of RTAs signed by countries in East Asia was triggered by competition
between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.  The ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement is the third-largest free trade area in the world, in terms of geographical scope,
after the European Union and NAFTA.  The significant size of the Chinese economy and the
establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement triggered the domino effect that
resulted in the proliferation of trade agreements in the region.
As noted in the introduction, this chapter addresses the question as to the extent
that regional trade arrangements affect the existing IPNs.  Do they moderate, inhibit or
foster development or have no effect (i.e., are neutral) on existing IPNs.  The study
described here is expected to contribute to the existing literature in at least two ways.  First,
it adds to the empirical facts on IPNs.  As noted by Kimura (2006a), there is a need to
expand the empirical literature (particularly from the East Asian region), as such findings are
necessary for the enhancement of theoretical thinking on the subject.  Unlike the other
topics related to trade and industrialization, the phenomenon of IPNs is still relatively new
and thus there is plenty of room for theoretical development.  The second potential
contribution is a better understanding on the “mechanism” behind the international
2 See also Kuchiki, 2005, for an example of regional production network formation in China’s
automotive sector, i.e., Toyota’s plants in Tianjin.41
production networks, particularly in relation to the world’s growing reliance on regional
integration
This chapter presents the results of five country case studies that explore linkages
between IPNs and RTAs in three different sectors.  The case studies focus on sectors in
which IPNs are prevalent in the selected countries.  The studies on China, India and
Indonesia focus on the automotive industry.  The study on Thailand covers the hard-disk
drive industry while the Bangladesh study concentrates on the textile and clothing sector.
This chapter begins with a brief description of the establishment of IPNs in East Asia in
order to introduce the following sections on the automotive, hard disk drive, and textile and
clothing sectors.
3.2. Establishment of IPNs in Asia
The rise of IPNs in East Asia can be explained by two policy factors.  Going back to
the 1980s, the “hollowing-out” of the Japanese economy triggered the relocation of
Japanese firms to neighbouring countries (Baldwin, 2007).  The hollowing-out was caused
by the erosion of the competitiveness of Japanese industries, stemming from the increase in
unit labour costs.  Meanwhile, about the same time, developing countries in East Asia, such
as the four “tigers”, began implementing the so-called “dual-track” strategic approach to
industrialization (Kimura, 2006a).  The idea of the dual-track approach is to promote import
substitution and exports simultaneously.
The hollowing-out of Japan and the dual track approach of developing East Asian
countries complemented one another.  This combination of policies set off another sequence
of policy responses from the countries that had been the destination for the industrial
relocations of Japanese companies (Baldwin, 2006).  The scope of the policies was on trade
and investment in order to attract investment by more firms.  The investment policy
response focused on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).  The trade policy response
was, in essence, a unilateral reduction in tariffs, often regarded as a “race to the bottom”
(Baldwin, 2006).  Most of the tariff cuts were in the form of duty drawback and duty-free
treatment specifically for relocation in export processing zones (EPZs).  Over time, trade
policy shifted away from these special treatments, such as those mentioned above, to
lowering applied MFN tariff rates in expectation of lower trade costs.  Hence, many of these
countries continued to cut their tariffs unilaterally from 1989 to 2003 (Baldwin, 2006).
Therefore, the cumulative effect from the hollowing-out of developed countries in East Asia,
dual-track industrialization, and trade and investment liberalization prompted development
of production networks within East Asia.
The previous discussion reveals that the establishment and growth of IPNs in East
Asia has been driven by market forces rather than by formal trade and investment
agreements.  This is because the bulk of the unilateral tariff cuts that occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s were motivated by pressure from the private sector on their governments
(Baldwin, 2007) as well as the so-called Washington consensus.  In the aftermath of the
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, initiatives were introduced for advancing regional
integration in East Asia; in other words, attempts were made to formalize the establishment42
of IPNs through trade agreements.  One example is the expectation of policymakers in
Indonesia that the establishment of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership agreement
would expand and strengthen the production network developed by MNCs and other firms,
particularly in the automotive sector where tariffs for numerous auto parts and components
were reduced, thereby increasing the country’s exports and promoting economic growth.
That expectation has yet to be realized, as indicated during the interviews with Indonesian
automakers who mentioned they had not yet experienced the effect of the agreement.
Nevertheless, there is still a need to explore the impacts of these conscious efforts to
expand regional trade and widen regional integration of already established IPNs and on the
establishment of new ones.
One caveat has to be mentioned.  Despite the increasing number of trade
agreements in the region,
3 only a handful have been fully implemented so far (see annex to
this chapter).  Therefore, it is perhaps too early to explore the impacts of RTAs.
Another factor in the development of IPNs is the reduction of service links, which
make connecting with the network more efficient and cheaper, and translates into a deeper
level of integration in IPNs.  In relation to the current study, one way of examining the
service link costs is through the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) ranking calculated by the
World Bank.  It is clear from looking at the rankings that China has taken major steps to
improve its trade infrastructure in order to gain a stronger foothold in IPNs that have led to
the impressive economic growth of that country.  The LPI ranking for Indonesia is rather
peculiar as it exhibits a sharp decrease in the span of just three years.  It should be noted
that LPI rankings are based on the perceptions of actors in the global freight forwarding and
express carriers industry.  As such, Indonesia’s LPI ranking is interpreted as indicating that
the country is lagging behind in improving its logistics infrastructure compared to other
countries, such as China.
4  Although the LPI index may not be a particularly good indicator,
as it relies on perceptions, it does provide an approximate indication of the logistics situation
in the countries it ranks.
 3 China initiating an RTA with ASEAN (ASEAN-China FTA) triggered the proliferation of RTAs in the
region.  The ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) encouraged Japan and Republic of Korea to pursue similar
agreements, either collectively with ASEAN or bilaterally, in order to remain competitive in the region.
4 World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2010: Indonesia.
Table 3.1. LPI ranking of selected countries






Source: World Bank, 2010.43
From the case studies it was found that:
(a) All five countries surveyed had adopted similar liberalization policies in
developing their industries, albeit to varying degrees;
(b) The case studies also support the finding that IPNs predate RTA with MNCs
and their partners operating in the automotive, electronics, and textile and
clothing sectors.  In general, Indonesia and Thailand were the first countries to
participate in the formation of IPNs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Trade
and investment promotion polices have been used largely by these two
countries, especially Thailand, to attract the establishment of local production
facilities by foreign MNCs.  Moreover, both countries are part of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), which dates back to 1992;
(c) India and Bangladesh also began to liberalize their economies in the 1980s by
allowing more liberal access to foreign firms and developing their private
sectors.  Both countries also actively took part in trade agreements as far back
as 1975 with the signing of Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA, then known
as the Bangkok Agreement);
(d) China only began taking an active role in establishing RTAs after its accession
to WTO in 2001.  It also joined APTA in 2002 and started to play an important
role in the proliferation of RTAs in the region, as discussed earlier.
As already established these five countries are engaged in IPNs in various forms
and are a part of various RTAs.  The extent of the network integration between the countries
varies, depending on the policy environment in each country and the industries concerned.
The following synthesis of the research findings starts by providing summaries of
the individual country studies.  It then identifies common issues across industries and
countries covered by the study.  The analysis is aimed at obtaining a better perspective on
industry characteristics and common issues, which is essential to formulating policy
recommendations.
3.3. Presentation of key findings from the selected sectors
3.3.1. Automotive industry
Japanese MNCs dominate the Indian and Indonesian automotive industries.  In
Indonesia, 90 per cent of the market is dominated by Japanese products.  In China,
however, the market shares are relatively more balanced between Japanese, the United
States and European companies.  The leading foreign companies in the automotive
industries of China, India and Indonesia include Toyota, Suzuki, Volkswagen and Chrysler.
The initial development of the industry in the five countries differed.  The automotive
industry in China began with the establishment of First Auto Works in 1953, followed by the
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation and Dongfeng Motors in 1958 and 1967,
respectively.  Foreign MNCs only entered the Chinese auto industry in the 1980s when44
Chrysler and Volkswagen were permitted to form joint ventures with the three local
corporations.
In India, despite the establishment of the automotive industry in the 1940s, growth in
the industry only began to pick up in the 1970s, because cars were previously considered
a luxury, expansion was limited and tariffs were prohibitive.  In 1985, India gained its first
auto joint venture business when the local company Maruti Udyog entered the passenger
vehicle market with Suzuki.  Coupled with economic reforms in India, joint ventures began to
flourish – culminating in the 1990s when the Indian automotive industry was dominated by
Maruti Suzuki, Tata Motors and Hindustan Motors plus Premier Padmini in the motorcycle
market.
The Indonesian automotive industry began as early as the 1920s with General
Motors setting up a production facility to supply the colonial market.  However, the industry
only began to take off in the 1970s as an import substitution industry.  Initially, Indonesia
was an importer of automobiles and parts.  However, the Government of Indonesia at that
time imposed a ban on the import of completely built up (CBU) cars and prohibited foreign
MNCs from assembling and distributing directly.  Thus, joint ventures were established to
serve the domestic market; MNCs from Japan, the United States and Europe had to
establish joint ventures with domestic partners to import cars in completely knocked down
(CKD) form for assembly and distribution.  Japanese joint venture companies included PT.
Indomobil Suzuki International and PT.  Toyota Astra Motor.
There are similarities in the development of the automotive industries in each of the
three countries.  Policies directed at liberalizing the industries initiated the participation of
MNCs, thereby planting the seed for IPNs.  Even though MNCs were already established in
the early 1980s, their activities only began to expand in the late 1980s.  Figure 3.1 shows
that the average applied MFN tariff rates for selected East Asian countries have been
reduced significantly since 1988.  As tariffs are an important component of service link
costs, the reductions have also meant that such costs can be appropriately reduced.  As
stated by Baldwin (2006), the unilateral “race to the bottom” (i.e., unilateral tariff
liberalization) prompted the development of IPNs.  However, as will be explained later in this
chapter, these low applied MFN rates may have had a limited liberalization effect of RTAs.
Incentives in the form of liberalization policies ensure that costs of relocation for
MNCs are less than the benefits.  Therefore, all three countries surveyed have relied on
incentives to encourage foreign MNCs to establish production locally.  The Government of
India has a range of incentives aimed at developing the automotive industry, ranging from
the provision of excise duty and tax incentives as well as incentives to promote R&D, to
export promotion measures and reductions of import duty on components.  Indonesia has
incentives in the form of zero tariffs for imports of components for passenger vehicles with
local content exceeding 40 per cent and for commercial vehicles with local content
exceeding 60 per cent.  Incentives in China include reductions in tax rates when making
fixed asset investments, priority approval when listing on stock exchanges, and easier
access to capital from abroad and government loans.45
In the development of the automotive industry in China and India, despite the high
profile of MNCs, local companies have taken an active role and have maintained a strong
presence in the market.  Local automakers began to emerge in China with companies such
as Geely, Cherry and Brilliance.  Tata Motors in India recently launched its low-cost product,
the Nano.  Thus the automotive industries in China and India are able to manufacture their
own products and compete with foreign MNCs.
Conversely, Indonesia’s attachment to automotive giants from Japan stems from the
fact that developing a competitive automotive industry needs huge investment, research and
development, which are currently scarce in that country.  Thus, local firms prefer to partner
with more experienced MNCs, such as Toyota, Suzuki and Daihatsu, in developing new
products.  One example is the production of the Toyota Avanza and Daihatsu
5 Xenia,
combining Daihatsu’s skill in developing compact cars and Toyota’s high-quality standards.
The product has a local content of between 60 per cent and 70 per cent.
Thus, participation in the production network has enabled China and India to
develop local products, while the network has enabled Indonesian automakers to tap into
the vast resources of MNCs to develop its own product.
Figure 3.1. Simple average applied MFN rates in East Asian countries
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS.
Notes: Thailand data for 2002 and 2004 are not available.  For the Republic of Korea, data for 1993,
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5 In Indonesia, Daihatsu is Toyota’s subsidiary.46
The role of the components and parts industry is vital because it provides support to
car manufacturers.  In addition, component manufacturing can expand a country’s
involvement in IPNs, taking advantage of the increasingly fragmented manufacturing
process.  In the past, auto makers in China imported parts and components.  Today,
a growing number of the components are manufactured in China for both domestic use and
export.  This is mainly due to the influx of major components manufacturers in China.  This
scenario is perhaps due to tariff reductions for parts and components tariffs as well as final
products.  In 2006, the tariffs for cars, SUVs and minibuses in China were reduced from
28 per cent to 25 per cent.  Components such as transmissions, clutches and radiators are
subject to a 10 per cent tariff rate.  Moreover, taxes on selected parts have also been
reduced from 13.8 per cent to 10 per cent.
Of the world’s top 100 auto parts and components firms, 70 per cent have already
set up production facilities in China, including, for example, Delphi, Bosch, Visteon and
Continental.  Local auto parts and components manufacturers such as Wanxiang, Shaanxi
Fast, Fuyao Glass, Xinyi Glass and Nanjing Autocar have also made notable entries in the
components sector by taking advantage of the 1,000 auto parts industrial parks across the
country.  This indicates that agglomeration supports the strengthening of IPNs by reducing
service link costs and coordination issues between production blocks, implying the spatial
advantage that China enjoys.  Improvements made by local components manufacturers in
terms of design and quality have contributed to the growing significance of China in the auto
parts and components export market.  Even though China is a late entrant in the auto parts
and components industry, economies of scale of its industry have reduced the average
service link costs, thereby providing these firms with a competitive edge over other
manufacturers.
In summary, the success of China’s automotive industry is attributable to four
factors:
(a) Low labour costs, at least at the initial stage;
(b) Incentives provided by the Government including, among others, land, import
and export duty rebates, and conditional access to the domestic market;
(c) The size of the Chinese economy, which allows the exploitation of economies
of scale and can be used to gain a competitive edge in other markets; and
(d) Protection of the domestic automotive sector, which provides the opportunity
for domestic firms to increase capacity and capability.
Thus, the case of China provides evidence that trade barriers may act as an
effective tool for developing competitive advantage.  However, three conditions must exist in
order to allow that to happen:  (a) a significant domestic market; (b) an initial competitive
advantage in the industry, such as low labour costs; and (c) a specific (that is, with a finite
duration) period of protection.
The development of auto parts and components in India began in the 1960s.  Local
content policy, entitled the Phased Manufacturing Programme, was introduced in 1991 and
laid the foundations for further development of the Indian auto components industry, which47
is relatively labour-intensive and is currently undergoing transition to become more
competitive in world markets, relying on its advantage of skill-oriented, labour-intensive
components production.  Manufacturing costs in India are 25 per cent to 30 per cent lower
than those of its western counterparts and there is a well-established pool of engineering
talent, which has resulted in MNCs such as Suzuki relocating their R&D centres to India.
Thus, India’s auto parts and components industry is in a good position to support the growth
of its automotive industry.  Industrial clusters also play an important role in the Indian
industry, with most components suppliers located close to original equipment
manufacturers.  The three main automotive industrial clusters in India are located in
Chennai, Pune and the National Capital Region, which includes New Delhi and its
surrounding areas.  The development of auto parts and components in India began in the
1960s.
In Indonesia, however, the auto parts and components industry is still
underdeveloped compared to the vehicle assembling industry.  Attempts were made to
encourage the growth of the auto parts and components industry in Indonesia through
a local content policy throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, as in the case of India.  The
Government of Indonesia introduced incentive schemes, such as tariff exemptions for local
content between 40 per cent and 60 per cent, to increase local content in cars manufactured
domestically.  However, the launch of the “National Car Programme” in 1996, which was not
in line with WTO principles,
6 derailed the incentives programme.  A new policy aimed at the
automotive industry, and which was in line with WTO recommendations, was implemented
in 1999.  This policy adopted the approach of reducing tariffs for auto parts and components
to zero, thereby encouraging the imports of components to boost the industry’s output.  The
“local content policy” was completely abandoned in favour of opening the market.  However,
car manufacturers pay only a 5 per cent duty when exporting their products to any ASEAN
member country, provided the products have a minimum of 40 per cent local content from
any ASEAN member (applying the cumulation principle).
With regard to the “race to the bottom” in tariff protection, figure 3.2 compares the
reductions in tariff rates imposed in 1999 and 2009 by the three countries on auto parts and
components.  The largest reduction was in India where the average tariff for auto parts and
components was 30.6 per cent in 1999 and 8.9 per cent in 2009.  The tariff reductions were
vital to the promotion of IPNs in the three countries, since it would be cheaper to move
components between production blocks.
Identifying the countries’ major trading partners in auto parts and components
around the world is useful in revealing whether their major partners comprised mainly East
Asian countries (table 3.2).  China’s top five export destinations for auto parts and
components are the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Germany and the United
Arab Emirates.  Meanwhile, China relies heavily on imports from Japan, Germany, the
Republic of Korea, Hungary and the United States.  The diverse regional representation in
China’s major trading partners in exports and imports indicates that while China is deeply
6 The “National Car Programme” violated Indonesia’s obligation under GATT Article I on General MFN
Treatment as well as Article III on National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation.48
Figure 3.2. Simple average applied MFN tariffs for auto parts and components
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS raw data.
Note: Tariff data for India do not specifically mention applied tariffs.
integrated in East Asia, it also connects with other markets.  Japan and the Republic of

























Table 3.2. China’s top five trading partners
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
United States 34.17 34.16 34.60 30.96 26.59
Japan 10.81 10.83 10.60 9.25 8.91
Republic of Korea 1.63 2.01 3.08 3.79 3.93
Germany 2.30 2.53 2.83 2.86 3.07
United Arab Emirates 2.90 2.65 2.46 2.50 3.01
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Japan 34.77 39.51 38.15 38.65 43.57
Germany 25.83 16.59 20.42 23.83 25.58
Republic of Korea 14.83 23.03 15.98 11.59 8.94
Hungary 2.18 1.02 2.23 3.99 4.43
United States 3.43 4.25 4.93 5.45 4.04
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.49
Table 3.3. India’s top five trading partners
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
United States 18.94 17.11 19.50 18.19 17.61
Italy 3.61 4.87 6.04 6.88 6.69
United Arab Emirates 5.69 6.19 5.08 4.71 4.40
Germany 3.86 2.88 3.00 4.09 4.30
United Kingdom 5.54 4.93 4.38 5.76 3.68
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Republic of Korea 32.83 27.31 25.69 29.42 28.06
Japan 19.93 16.43 10.54 12.41 16.56
China 2.29 5.64 9.86 12.23 12.68
Thailand 6.93 12.98 10.56 8.83 7.23
Czech Republic 9.71 10.97 14.26 6.57 6.09
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Meanwhile, India’s major export destinations comprised non-East Asian countries,
which may explain India’s modest East Asian export values (table 3.3).  The United States
and European countries are India’s main export partners.  However, on the import side,
India’s import sources comprise mainly East Asian countries, i.e., the Republic of Korea,
Japan, China and Thailand.  This suggests that India is becoming increasingly dependent
on East Asian countries for parts and components.  It also explains India’s automotive
industry’s reserved attitude towards pursuing RTAs with East Asia, as it fears such
agreements would only result in one-way trade.
Indonesia’s major trading partners are all East Asian countries (table 3.4).  However,
Indonesia imports more than it exports, reflecting the fact that the country’s auto parts and
components sector is not yet well developed.  Japan is the dominant partner, which
supports the argument that the Indonesian auto industry is heavily connected with Japanese
MNCs.  The dominance of Japan and Thailand, both as export destinations and import
sources, underlines the fact that Indonesia is a part of the production network built by
Japanese MNCs, with Thailand as its hub, to increase their foothold in the region.  A good
example is Honda, which made Thailand its production base (Raymundo and Taningco,
2009).  Honda not only conducts assembling in South-East Asia, but also builds
components – i.e., constant velocity joints produced in Malaysia, intake valves in the
Philippines, engine parts in Indonesia, and body and stamped parts in Thailand.  In addition
to the production side, IPNs provide steadily increasing car sales opportunities in emerging
markets (Tullao, Conchada and Aguinaldo, 2009) such as China, India and Indonesia, given
the size of their populations.50
Table 3.4. Top five trading partners of Indonesia
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
Japan 23.88 24.36 24.07 23.66 21.28
Thailand 9.25 8.63 9.97 10.55 12.07
United States 7.79 7.22 12.71 13.47 11.97
Malaysia 8.80 13.88 9.14 6.29 8.51
Philippines 5.79 4.45 3.79 3.89 4.72
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Japan 62.03 56.97 47.20 33.51 45.59
Thailand 14.63 17.92 22.95 32.82 28.40
China 4.62 4.18 5.23 8.16 5.96
Malaysia 2.07 2.68 3.37 4.25 4.79
Singapore 1.41 1.78 3.34 2.18 3.18
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.5 shows the intra-industry trade (IIT) index
7, which signals the existence of
IPNs, for auto parts and components of the three countries with East Asia from 2004 to
2008, using the formula developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) in which the values of IIT lie
between 0 and 1:
IIT =
where X stands for exports, M for imports, i for a product or a sector, and n for total number
of products or sectors.
When the index is close to 1, this indicates the existence of IPNs.  The IIT of both
China and Indonesia with East Asia showed an increasing trend during the period studied.
Nevertheless, the IIT for Indonesia fell from 0.98 in 2007 to 0.81 in 2008, when the IIT was
less close to 1; this may be due to the slowdown in the Indonesian automotive industry
brought about by the economic downturn.  However, the IIT during the same period
indicated the existence of IPNs between East Asia, China and Indonesia, and that the extent
of this network was increasing.  The IIT for India from 2004 to 2008 appears relatively
modest compared with those of China and Indonesia, suggesting that the network between
India and East Asia was not as extensive as those between its two counterparts.
7 Calculated based on SITC Revision 3 at the 4- and 5-digit levels.  Tyres for motor cars, tyres for
motorcycles, and motor vehicle chasses and engines are at the 4-digit level, respectively.  The remaining
data that is used is at the 5-digit level.  For a complete list of product codes used for the automotive
sector, see Annex II.
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As reported by Ramasamy (chapter 4 in this volume), China’s IIT for parts and
components almost tripled from 23 per cent in 1992 to 60 per cent in 2007; the increase in
IIT occurred for most product categories in the parts and components sector.  Meanwhile,
Nag (Chapter 5 in this volume) reported that the IIT of India with Western countries was high
compared to the ITT with East Asian countries, particularly for ignition parts and seats
(United States) where the ITT was 0.55 and 0.57, respectively, rubber products (Italy), and
chassis and body parts (Germany).  Therefore, this raises the question of whether the
Indian automotive sector can benefit from RTAs between India and East Asian countries.
Among the three countries surveyed, China was the more dominant in East Asia, in
terms of both exports and imports of auto parts and components (figure 3.3).  During
2004-2008, its import values increased from $1.62 billion in 2004 to $5.46 billion in 2008.
Meanwhile, Indian and Indonesian exports to East Asia were much lower than those of
Table 3.5. IIT in auto parts and components with East Asia
Country
Intra-industry trade index
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
China 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.95
India 0.76 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.68
Indonesia 0.89 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.81
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data, using SITC
Revision 3 at the 4- and 5-digit levels.  For a complete list of product codes
used for the automotive sector, see Annex II.
Figure 3.3. Exports of auto parts and components to East Asia











































China and were relatively stable, with Indonesia ranging between $900 million and
$1 billion and India remaining below $1 billion during the same period.
China’s imports from East Asia also increased significantly from $4.33 billion in 2004
to $7.09 billion in 2008 (figure 3.4).  Meanwhile, contrary to their export trends, India and
Indonesia’s imports of auto parts and components increased.  India’s imports from East Asia
increased from $500 million in 2004 to $2.09 billion in 2008.  Indonesia’s imports of auto
parts and components also showed an increasing trend, albeit with a minor decrease
between 2005 and 2007, after which they increased sharply in 2008 to $3.34 billion.
Figure 3.4. Imports of auto parts and components from East Asia













































The observed trend uncovered the increasing significance of the East Asian market
in the case of China, with both exports and imports growing.  Meanwhile, figures for Indian
and Indonesian exports to East Asia were low and relatively stagnant.  However, their
imports from East Asia showed an increasing trend, indicating that India and Indonesia rely
more on imports of parts and components from East Asia, with Indonesia being the more
dependent of the two countries.  The export and import figures also indicate that the
integration is deeper in the case of China compared to India and Indonesia.
Table 3.6 details exports of auto parts and components by China, India and
Indonesia to East Asia.  Note the similarities between the exported products, which suggest
that trade is done based on the quality of similar products that are produced in these three
countries.  On the import side (table 3.7), India and Indonesia import similar products, which
confirms that trade in these products between East Asia and the two countries is based on
the difference in product quality.  Meanwhile, with the exception of SITC 78439 and 78432,
China’s top five products are different from those of India and Indonesia.  Therefore, SITC53
Table 3.6. Top five export products to East Asia
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
China
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.80 1.18 1.52 1.98 2.48
71323 Parts/access motorcycles 0.22 0.26 0.35 0.46 0.59
6252 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.16 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.53
78434 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.41 0.47
78432 Recip. piston eng >1,000 cc 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.44 0.41
India
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.10
71323 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
6252 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
78434 Motor vehicle chassis+engine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Indonesia
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.44
71323 Tyres, new, for motor car 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.30
6252 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.17
78434 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.09
78432 Parts/access motorcycles 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.05
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.7. Top five import products from East Asia
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
China
78434 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.78 0.93 1.44 2.10 2.67
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 1.34 1.51 1.63 1.84 1.87
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 1.08 1.36 1.49 1.18 1.07
71322 Recip. piston eng >1,000 cc 0.45 0.58 0.48 0.40 0.53
78433 Motor vehicle brakes/parts 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.46
India
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.57 1.16
71323 Diesel etc. engines 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.23
6252 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.1354
78439 and 78432 products are intensively traded by the three countries in East Asia based
on product quality.
3.3.1.1. Impact of RTAs on IPNs in the automotive sector
This sub-section explores whether the proliferation of RTA supports the development
of IPN.  Survey evidence from China, India and Indonesia is unanimous in showing that the
current regime of RTAs does not help to enhance IPNs in the automotive sector in those
countries.  However, the evidence does show that RTAs have the potential to boost trade in
the automotive industry in the region.  There are several common driving factors.
First, RTAs signed by China, India and Indonesia either exclude the automotive
industry or the agreement is too general to accommodate that industry’s specific needs.  In
the case of India, since it trades more with Western countries than with East Asia, the
benefit of signing an RTA with countries in East Asia is debatable.  Although auto parts and
components in the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA) (table 3.9)
encompass a wide variety of parts and component products, industry players in Indonesia
have noted that IJEPA does very little to expand Indonesia’s automotive industry.  This may
be due to the fact that these products have different tariff reduction schedules.  Tariffs for
some products are immediately reduced when the agreement is in force; some are even
eliminated after the agreement is in force while others have different reduction schedules,
ranging from 4 to 15 years’ annual schedule.  However, the RTA between India and Thailand
reveals a positive outlook, as trade between the two countries in gearboxes and parts used
for spark ignition in engines has increased (chapter 5 in this volume).
Nevertheless, the mixed current outcome of IPN formalization through trade
agreements in the case of the automotive industry indicates that RTAs have not reached
their potential yet.  In the case of China, RTAs do not affect the trade of auto parts and
components simply because they exclude those products.  This is due to the view held by
Table 3.7 (continued)
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
78434 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10
Indonesia
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.67 0.89 0.62 0.42 1.78
71323 Parts/access motorcycles 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.61
6252 Motor vehicle drive axles etc. 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.19
78434 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.16
78432 Recip. piston eng <1,000 cc 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.12
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.55
the Chinese authorities that China is not ready yet for tariff-free competition in automotive
goods (chapter 4 in this volume).  As such, given the completion of tariff reductions in IJEPA
and the ongoing dynamics of ITFTA, RTAs could provide more support in expanding IPNs.
With regard to ACFTA, the mutual exclusion of the automotive sector, including parts
and components, is of interest.  Four ASEAN countries that have a thriving automotive
sector, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have included the sector in
their highly sensitive lists.  Meanwhile, China also includes cars, trucks, buses and auto
parts in its highly sensitive list.  Therefore, why are these countries ignoring the lucrative
benefits to be gained from opening their automotive sectors? There are two possible
reasons.
First, from the perspective of the ASEAN countries, their automotive sectors are not
yet ready to compete with Chinese firms.  This view is also shared by the Chinese firms and
authorities; an RTA would benefit a country only when the capabilities and capacities of the
industry have reached a competitive level.
The second reason is the significant presence of Japanese MNCs in the automotive
industry in ASEAN countries.  Japanese MNCs have been dominating the region’s
automotive sector for more than 40 years, during which they have been steadily increasing
their capacity and expertise, and expanding their networks in the region.  Chinese
automotive firms must tread carefully and build up their capacity and capability in order to
compete with Japanese MNCs.  To date, the presence of Chinese firms in South-East Asia
Table 3.8. RTA partners of China, India and Indonesia
RTA partners China India Indonesia
China – (a) (c)
India (a) – (b)
Indonesia (c) (b) –
Japan – – (e)
Malaysia (c) (b) (d)
Philippines (c) (b) (d)
Republic of Korea (a) (a) (f)
Singapore (c) (b) (d)
Thailand (c) (b) (d)
Viet Nam (c) (b) (d)
Sources: Compiled from Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements Database (APTIAD) and WTO RTA database.
Notes: The existence of RTAs between countries is denoted by the green cells.  The blue cell
denotes RTAs that are still under negotiation.  Gray cells indicate no RTA.  The characters in
the brackets stand for: (a) RTA partner in APTA (in force since 17 June 1976); (b) RTA partner
in ASEAN-India RTA (in force since 1 January 2010, goods only); (c) RTA partner in ASEAN-
China FTA (in force since 1 January 2005 (goods) and 1 July 2007 (services); (d) RTA partner
in ASEAN Free Trade Area; (e) Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (in force
since 1 July 2008); and (f) RTA partner in ASEAN-Republic of Korea RTA (in force since
1 January 2010 (goods) and 1 May 2009 (services).56
remains insignificant.  The only presence of Chinese automotive firms in the region is in
Indonesia, with Geely and Chery conducting low-volume CKD operations.  Geely assembles
less than 50 cars per month and Cherry only sold 240 cars in 2009 (Chrysler, 2010).
The exclusion of the automotive sector from ACFTA is in stark contrast to the RTAs
between individual ASEAN countries and Japan.  In IJEPA, for example, the automotive
industry is given more market access through tariff elimination schedules.  In particular,
numerous auto parts and component products are included in IJEPA (table 3.9).
The inclusion of numerous auto parts and components is significant, since on paper
this sector has the potential to expand the IPN in the auto sector between Indonesian and
Japanese firms.  In view of this, Japanese MNCs are one step ahead of Chinese firms.
Nonetheless, China is slowly building its capacity in the automotive sector, especially in
manufacturing parts and components.  In 2007, China became a net exporter of auto parts
and components; by 2008 it had become the third largest automobile manufacturer, trailing
the United States and Japan (chapter 4 in this volume).  Considering the emergence of
China’s auto industry, it is only a matter of time before the automotive sector is brought into
trade negotiations between China and ASEAN countries.
Table 3.9. Auto parts and components included in IJEPA and IFTA
RTA
Products included in RTA
HS Code Description
Indonesia-Japan 4009 Pipes and hoses of vulcanized rubber other than
Economic Partnership hard rubber, with or without their fitting (for example,
Agreement (IJEPA)
a joints, elbows, flanges)
4010 Conveyor or transmission belts or belting of vulcanized
rubber
4011 New pneumatic tyres, of rubber
4012 Retreaded or used pneumatic tyres of rubber;
solid or cushion tyres, tyre treads and tyre flaps,
of rubber
4013 Inner tubes, of rubber
4016 Other article of vulcanized rubber other than hard
rubber
6813 Brake linings and pads
7320 Springs and leaves for springs, of iron or steel
8407 Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal
combustion piston engines
8409 Compression-ignition internal combustion piston
engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)
8413 Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with
measuring device; liquid elevators57
8421 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers; filtering or
purifying machinery and apparatus, for liquids of gases
8482 Ball and roller bearings
8483 Transmission shafts (including cam shafts and crank
shafts) and cranks, bearing housing and plain shaft
bearings; gears and gearing; ball or roller screws;
gear boxes and other speed changers, including torque
converters; flywheels and pulleys, including pulley
blocks; clutches and shaft couplings (including
universal joints)
8484 Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined
with other materials or of two or more layers of metal;
sets of assortments of gaskets and similar joints,
dissimilar in composition, put up in pouches envelopes
or similar packing; mechanical seals
8706 Chassis fitted with engines, for vehicles of headings
8701 to 8705
8708 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of
heading 8701 to 8705
India-Thailand Free 870840 Gear boxes




a Pasha and Setiati, chapter 6 in this volume and 
b Nag, chapter 5 in this volume.
Note: China’s RTA excludes automotive parts and components.
Table 3.9 (continued)
RTA
Products included in RTA
HS Code Description
8 These methods are explained in more detail in chapter 2.
Second, the costs of complying with RTA procedures to obtain exemptions outweigh
its benefits.  In China, industry respondents were of the opinion that if auto parts and
components were to be included in RTAs then documentation requirements to utilize the
tariff concessions would need to be less cumbersome.  This is particularly important for
assemblers who obtain components from various countries and are partners in different
RTAs.  Complying with RTA procedures to obtain concessions may not be worth the effort if
the tariff reductions are small.  Related to this factor is the issue of rules of origin (RoO).
Custom procedures impede the flow of goods to and from the three countries.  There are
a number of methods to determine origin.
8 The three basic approaches are:  (a) change in
tariff classification; (2) the criteria of local value-added content; and (c) specific
manufacturing process requirements.  There are also three additional factors to take into
account:  (a) cumulation; (b) the de minimis rule (tolerance); and (c) duty drawback.
Table 3.10 lists the methods being used to determine origin by selected RTAs in which
China, India and Indonesia are participating.  Table 3.10 shows that the selected RTAs use58
a combination of methods to determine origin.  The use of multiple methods to establish
origin will result in overlapping RoO among RTAs and create the so-called “noodle bowl”
effect.
The threshold for local value-added content in the RTAs listed in table 3.10 is 40 per
cent, with some exceptions for the India-Thailand Free Trade Agreement.  The adoption of
the 40 per cent rule implies a move towards simpler RoO, which would assist in facilitating
the expansion of trade between the countries involved and thereby expand IPNs, while
reducing the “noodle bowl” effect.
Another important issue is the implementation of RoO.  One example revealed by
the survey in China is non-tariff barrier-related RoO, where classification of parts and
components is a huge problem.  In Japan and Malaysia the product code for ABS braking
systems is HS 9032 (electrical systems), while in Thailand the product code for ABS braking
systems is HS 8708 (hydraulic brakes).  In addition, HS 8708 is included in Thailand’s list of
highly sensitive products in ACFTA, while HS 9032 is not included in Malaysia’s list of
sensitive and highly sensitive products in ACFTA.  The difference in the import duty between
these two codes varies greatly (Ramasamy, 2011).  Thus, variations in customs codes pose
a problem for manufacturers who source parts from various countries, thereby inhibiting
wider IPNs.
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(AFTA)
a (40%)
ASEAN-China Yes Regional Diagonal
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a Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, (2007); 
b Chapter 3: Rules of origin of the Agreement
between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership, 
c Framework
Agreement with Thailand: Interim Rules of Origin.59
The surveys also showed the importance of transportation and telecommunications
in developing IPNs.  Indian firms have adopted e-sourcing to help them reorganize the
purchasing process, thereby reducing time spent on negotiations.  Rapid development of
ICT and infrastructure has played an important role in allowing MNCs to reduce costs and
risks in China.  The Indonesian survey highlighted the lack of a proper transport
infrastructure, particularly the problem of congested roads connecting production facilities
and ports.  Thus, the importance of reducing service link costs was underlined.
The survey in China also reported that streamlined customs and clearance
procedures would be beneficial.  Based on the perceptions of logistics ground operators,
China and India are doing far better in providing logistics infrastructure compared to
Indonesia (as shown in table 3.1).  It implies that both China and India are taking the
necessary steps to reduce service link costs in order to facilitate IPNs further.  The
recognition of the importance of reducing service link costs in China, India and Indonesia
implies that such costs alone cannot solely depend on RTA tariff reductions, but must also
be accompanied by improvement in trade facilitation.
9
3.3.2. Hard disk drive industry
Thailand is one of the world’s major producers and exporters of hard disk drives
(HDD) in the world.  HDD production began in Thailand around 1983 with the entry of
Seagate Technology of the United States.  The company’s prime motive for the relocation
was to access the relatively low cost of labour in Thailand.  During the initial five years of
operation in Thailand, Seagate trained numerous technical workers (resulting in a positive
spillover effect), many of whom were employed by new suppliers; the consequence was the
emergence of local suppliers.  As a result, other HDD manufacturers such as IBM and
Fujitsu began relocating to Thailand.
Subsequently, the Government of Thailand, through its Board of Investment (BOI),
began to implement trade and investment promotion policies to advance the HDD industry.
Thailand also began to lower its related tariff rates; however, the tariff rates for HDD
components are higher than tariffs for the final product.  Nevertheless, this distorted tariff
structure (the opposite of tariff escalation that is normally practiced) is offset by the
investment promotion policy.  HDD makers with an export-sale ratio greater than 30 per cent
are granted tariff exemptions.  Thus, the incentive policy plays an important factor in
Thailand’s HDD industry and its IPN participation.  Table 3.11 shows Thailand’s IIT levels in
HDD parts and components between 2004 and 2008
10.
Thailand is a major player in the HDD industry in East Asia.  Table 3.12 shows that
Thailand’s major HDD trading partners are Asian countries.  This indicates a strong
integration within the industry in Asia, particularly East and South-East Asia.
9 Trade facilitation is defined by WTO as removing obstacles to the movement of goods across
borders, e.g., the simplification of custom procedures.
10 Calculated based on Harmonized System (HS) 1996 at the 4 and 6 digit levels.  The data at the
6-digit level are ball bearings and other components.  The rest of the data are at the 4-digit level.  For
a complete list of product codes used for the HDD sector, see Annex II60







Source: Calculated from United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.12. Thailand’s five major trading partners in HDD components
(Unit: $ billion)
Partner 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner
Japan 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.65 0.56
China 0.19 0.62 0.53 0.67 0.49
Hong Kong, China 0.40 0.48 0.63 0.52 0.39
Singapore 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.31 0.31
Malaysia 0.24 0.39 0.24 0.22 0.26
Import partner
Japan 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.93 0.93
China 0.45 0.49 0.63 0.77 0.78
Australia 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.56 0.60
Malaysia 0.15 0.35 0.47 0.58 0.38
Taiwan Province of China 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
However, it is interesting to note that Thailand has steadily increased its imports of
HDD components from Asia, while exports of HDD components from Thailand to East Asia
have shown a decreasing trend (figure 3.5).  On the other hand, Thailand is a strong
exporter of HDD final products in East Asia with export values far above import values, with
net export values increasing from $1.42 billion in 2004 to $5.07 billion in 2008 (figure 3.6).
An interesting aspect of the Thailand case study is the coexistence between
industrial clustering and production networking.  Domestic fragmentation resulting from
industrial clustering does not completely rule out the industry making use of globalized
production.  It depends on what layers of the process are fragmented.  In the production
network of HDD components, manufacturers are at the centre with at least two layers of
suppliers.  In the first layer, HDD makers interact directly with Tier 1 suppliers.  The second
layer emerges when Tier 1 suppliers obtain inputs from Tier 2 suppliers.  Domestic61
Figure 3.5. Thai exports and imports of HDD components with Asian partners
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  The partners are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam.
Figure 3.6. Thai exports and imports of HDD final products with its Asian partners
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  The partners are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,






















































































fragmentation is likely to occur in the first layer, since various customized parts and
components are traded in that layer.  Thus, interpersonal participation is required in order to
create effective and efficient coordination.  The need for customization in HDD parts and
components requires a high degree of control.  That control is provided by the cluster
through close geographical proximity, which reduces service link costs from weaker control.
International fragmentation occurs in the second layer between Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers.
This is because the intermediates used by Tier 1 require less customization (for example,
printed circuit boards and integrated circuits, which can also be used in other industries).
Thus, the market-led IPN has been successful in transforming Thailand into a major
player in the HDD industry.  Survey evidence showed that RTAs have a neutral effect on the
IPN in Thailand’s HDD industry.  HDD manufacturer and components suppliers stated they
had no plan to utilize RTA-related concessions.  There is no problem with market access
since the tariff for HDD is zero in accordance with the Information and Technology
Agreement.  On procuring intermediates that have non-zero tariffs, using the BOI tariff
exemption scheme is preferable to using RTA schemes, as the BOI scheme offers tariff
exemptions on imports of inputs used for export-oriented activities.  For example, the
Thailand case study examined the pattern of motor imports, a component essential to
producing HDDs.  In 2009, 63.4 per cent of motor imports applied for tariff exemption
schemes, whereas motor imports under the RTA preferential scheme accounted for only
about 2 per cent.  The Government of Thailand provides incentives such as tariff exemption
on inputs and facilitates the development of industrial clusters, which is interesting as this
has inadvertently reduced service link costs which foster market-led IPNs.
3.3.3. Textiles and clothing industry
Bangladesh is a major exporter of knitwear and woven-wear products.  The country’s
IPN in textiles and clothing has been developed gradually since the 1980s.  The low cost of
production induced by low wage level attracted foreign firms to relocate this labour intensive
production process to Bangladesh.  The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) also provided least
developed countries such as Bangladesh with a quota facility for duty-free exports of
apparel to the United States and European Union markets.  This also induced foreign firms
to shift production facilities to Bangladesh in order to reap the benefits from the MFA quota
system.
The involvement of entrepreneurs from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of
China and Hong Kong, China, who were attracted by the MFA advantages, paved the way
for the development of export processing zones (EPZs) that provided benefits such as tax
holidays, duty drawback and tariff exemption for raw material imports.  Over time, spillover
effects gave way to the development of local entrepreneurship.  Domestic policies assisted
in developing such entrepreneurship, such as easy bank loans and back-to-back letters of
credit.  In addition, the textile and clothing industry flourished under the MFA until its
dissolution in 2004, and utilized the European Union EBA (Everything but Arms) market
access initiative; in essence that granted Bangladesh the same duty-free access as that
under the MFA, albeit without the quota.  Moreover, unilateral liberalization took place
through the reduction of tariffs, non-tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions.  In summary,63
Bangladesh’s involvement in the textile and clothing IPN is due to low labour costs,
preferential access provided by the MFA and European Union EBA, autonomous trade
liberalization and growth of local entrepreneurship.
However, the depth of the IPN in Bangladesh’s textile and clothing trade with East
Asia needs to be carefully assessed.  Table 3.13 shows that Bangladesh has a modest IIT in
raw materials and intermediates,
11 (specifically within the textile and clothing industry) with
East Asia.  Nonetheless, the IIT for 2006 displays an anomaly of 0.62, which is considerably
higher in comparison with other years.  This may be attributable to the characteristics of the
textile and clothing industry in which buyers can instruct firms to use specific materials from
a specific country.








Source: Calculated from United Nations Comtrade data.
Further examination of Bangladesh’s main import partners confirms this fact
(table 3.14).  In 2006, Bangladesh imported $970 million worth of raw materials and
intermediate products from China.  This also confirms the survey result showing the growth
of Bangladesh imports from China, not only because of the price factor but also because of
specific instructions from buyers to use particular types of materials from specific countries.
11 Calculated based on Harmonized System (HS) 1996 at the 2-digit level.  For a complete list of
product codes used for the HDD sector, see Annex II.
Table 3.14. Top five import partners of Bangladesh in textiles and clothing
raw materials and intermediaries
(Billions of United States dollars)
Partner 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China 0.47 0.58 0.64 0.97 0.64
India 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.44 0.57
Uzbekistan 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.44 0.51
Taiwan Province of China 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.19
Thailand 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.18
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.64
Meanwhile, East Asia does not appear as a main Bangladesh export destination for
textile and clothing final goods.  As figure 3.7 shows, values of exports to East Asia are
relatively small compared to those for exports to the United States and the European Union.
This fact can also be used to support the claim that networks between Bangladesh and East
Asia are not yet extensive enough.
Figure 3.7. Export values of final goods from Bangladesh
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  For a complete list of the product codes of textile and

















































RTAs are not considered an important factor in the development of the textiles and
clothing IPN in Bangladesh.  This is largely because the sourcing pattern for raw materials
and intermediate products in the textile and clothing industry relies heavily on buyer’s
specifications, geographical proximity, adequate supplies of the materials, the long-term
relationship between buyer and seller, and the price and quality of the products.  Thus, the
role of RTAs in strengthening the IPN is less evident.
An important feature of the Bangladesh textile and clothing industry is its reliance on
preference given by developed countries, such as that under the European Union EBA, to
attract foreign investors.  However, relying solely on the European Union EBA is not enough
to move up the production chain.  Investment in newer technology is needed so that the
textile and clothing industry can increase its product quality and move one step ahead of the
competitors in countries that are also given the European Union EBA preferences.
However, newly acquired technology without product diversification to produce more
sophisticated products cannot move Bangladesh’s textile and clothing industry up the65
ladder.  This can also be seen in the case of Viet Nam, where new technology made it
possible for rapid production adjustment; however, its textile and clothing industry still
neglects markets with high-quality requirements and continues to cater to markets for
unsophisticated products such as shirts and jackets (Trinh and Dinh, 2009).  Another
interesting fact revealed by the Bangladesh survey is that trade facilitation is considered
essential to improving the procurement process of raw materials and intermediate products.
Therefore, improved trade facilitation is an important element in reducing service link costs
and IPN development.
In summary, there is less evidence of IPNs in the textile and clothing industry in
Bangladesh.  This is largely because the sourcing pattern for raw materials and intermediate
products relies heavily on buyer specifications, geographical proximity, adequate supplies of
materials, the long-term relationship between buyer and seller, and price and quality of the
products.  Thus, there is only a one-way trade in the textile and clothing industry.  Compared
to the automotive and HDD sectors, Bangladesh’s IPN network in the textile and clothing
sector is still in the early stages of development.
3.4. Summary of findings in the case studies
A common theme emerges from the five case studies.  They reveal that in an age of
numerous RTAs, policy initiatives are still a critical part in attracting foreign MNCs.  These
policy initiatives are mostly in the form of tariff exemptions for importing intermediate
products or for high local content value and tax reductions.  The policies are an integral part
of the countries’ strategy to attract foreign MNCs to relocate some of their production
activities to the countries studied.  This finding highlights the important role of MNCs in
developing IPNs.  Another important finding is that based on the perception of the business
sector in the countries being studied, they all concur that RTAs are not a major factor in the
development of IPNs.  This may be explained by the fact that most of the RTAs are still in
the early period of enforcement and it will take some time for them to have a drastic effect
on trade; for example, the schedule for IJEPA tariff reductions for automotive parts and
components varies between immediate reduction after the agreement has been enforced
and a reduction or elimination after 15 years.  Given the discrepancies in the tariff reduction
schedule for different automotive parts and component products, it may be that the effect of
RTAs on IPNs can only be noticed after some time has passed.  In addition, some RTAs
exclude specific sectors from the agreement.  One example is ACFTA, in which the
automotive sector is excluded, thereby driving a wedge in the IPN development of IPN
between the Chinese automakers and their South-East Asian counterparts.
Another important theme that has emerged from the case studies is the sceptical
view in the business sector regarding the role of existing RTAs in IPN development.  This is
mainly due to the complex procedure required to qualify for tariff reduction under RTAs.
Figure 3.1 shows that unilateral tariff reductions result in low MFN rates.  However, low MFN
rates appear to lead to the low utilization of RTA facilities, i.e., preferential tariff rates.  A
study done by Kirk (2007) found that low MFN rates contributed to the limited impact of
AFTA on trade, where less than 5 per cent of total intra-ASEAN trade took place under the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).  This implies that 95 per cent of intra-ASEAN66
trade occurred under MFN.  There are two factors that help explain this:  (a) the cost of
complying with RoO is high; and (b) the margin of preference, which is the difference
between the MFN rate and the preferential rate, is too small to compensate for the
administrative costs involved in applying for preferential treatment.
RoO are an important element of any RTA since they are required to ensure that
preferences are available only to those that take part in the agreement.  Thus, complying
with RoO in order to be eligible to receive preferential rates entails administrative costs.  As
a rule of thumb, if meeting the conditions of the RoO results in an increase in the cost of
intermediate goods compared to pre-RTA levels, then there is potential for trade diversion to
occur (Kirk, 2007).  In Indonesia’s case there is low utilization of the ASEAN CEPT, which
stems from the fact that MFN rates are already low in addition to the high cost and
cumbersome procedures involved in filling Form D
12 (Anas, 2007).  Moreover Anas indicated
that most of Indonesia’s imports from ASEAN countries were already subject to MFN rates
of less than 5 per cent.  In this case, trade diversion did not occur; Indonesia just chose to
utilize MFN rates instead of using the AFTA preferential rates provided by ASEAN CEPT.
Furthermore, Kirk (2007) showed that AFTA’s margin of preference is too small to
compensate for the administrative cost of applying for preferential rates.  A recent study by
Kawai and Wignaraja (2010) confirmed this.  They surveyed firms operating in Japan,
China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.  Their study revealed
that out of 551 sample firms, 17 per cent of them preferred not to utilize RTA benefits
because of the low margins of preference.  In addition, 15 per cent of the firms stated that
their non-use of RTA benefits was due to the administrative cost related to RoO.  However, it
should be noted that in their study, 35 per cent of the firms surveyed reported the major
reason for not using RTA benefits was the lack of information on RTAs.  However, existing
RTAs in the countries studied show that the thresholds for local value-added content are set
at a uniform rate of 40 per cent.  The adoption of the 40 per cent rule implies a move
towards a simpler RoO, which would facilitate more trade between countries involved in the
RTA.  Therefore, this would make RTAs more relevant in strengthening IPNs.  Thus, the
overlapping RoO would not be a huge hindrance since the rate for local content is the same
at 40 per cent.  It may be that the problem is not with the RoO, but rather with their
implementation.  The bureaucratic process involved in determining origin can be quite
difficult and time-consuming for firms, and may be a hindrance to using RTA benefits.  This
implies that the cost of complying with RoO is high.
Despite the fact that RTAs appear irrelevant in developing IPNs, they still have the
potential to increase trade and strengthen IPNs.  One example is ITFTA, which has
significantly increased trade in certain auto parts and components between the two
countries.  The survey of the HDD industry in Thailand suggests the coexistence of IPNs
and industrial clustering.  Industrial clustering has enabled foreign MNCs to reduce service
link costs.  Cumbersome customs procedures, minimal logistics and the transportation
infrastructure are important issues raised by all the respondents in interviews and focus
12 Form D is used by ASEAN members to obtain ASEAN CEPT rates for their products.67
group discussions.  In other words, service link costs are not low enough to facilitate more
trade.  Thus, RTAs without measures to smooth out trade friction arising from high service
link costs will not have any significant effect in generating more trade between the countries
involved.68
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4.  Trade liberalization and international production
networks:  The automotive industry in China
Bala Ramasamy
International production networks (IPN) in Asia cannot be considered without taking
into account the important role that China plays within such networks.  The integration of
China into the global economy, particularly in East Asia, has raised international production
fragmentation to unprecedented levels (Haddad, 2007; and Athukorala, 2007).  At the start
of the 2000s, China’s processing exports (those that are produced from processing and/or
assembly of imported inputs) accounted for nearly half of its total exports.  In 2006,
51.5 per cent of China’s intra-East Asian trade was in machinery products, of which more
than half comprised parts and components.  The rate of annual growth in parts and
components with its East Asian partners between 1993 and 2006 was a significant 22.7 per
cent (Kimura and Obashi, 2008).  The drivers of IPN proliferation, as already described in
preceding chapters of this publication, can be clearly observed in China.  Three drivers of
this process, as explained by Ernst and Kim (2002), can be expanded for the case of China:
(a) The economic reform process that started in China in the late 1970s resulted
in trade liberalization, more openness to foreign direct investment and the
privatization of thousands of state-owned enterprises;
1
(b) Coupled with relatively lower labour costs and artificially weak exchange rates,
the opening up of China provided MNCs with an avenue to drastically reducing
their production costs.
2 Unsurprisingly, the low inflation rates experienced by
the world in the late 1990s to early 2000 can be partially attributed to China’s
low cost production opportunities, which became a powerful factor in attracting
for MNCs to relocate labour-intensive production to China.  Assembly
operations were dominant in the early part of China’s reform era; however,
from the late 1980s, China became host to numerous independent suppliers
who fell within the IPNs of popular brand names such as Bosch, GAP and
Nike;
(c) The rapid development of information and communications technology (ICT)
and infrastructure played an important role in China, as it did in many other
developing countries.  The investment made by the Government of China in
infrastructure allowed MNCs to reduce their own costs and associated risks.
3
1 China’s simple average tariff rate was 42.9 per cent in 1992, but dropped to 9.7 per cent in 2005
(World Trade Organization, 2008).
2 In 2002, the average hourly compensation for manufacturing workers in China was 3 per cent of that
received by American workers (Banister, 2005).  The undervaluation of the Chinese currency varies from
close to parity to 40 per cent, based on different studies (The Economist, 2009).
3 In 2007, for example, the number of Internet users per 100 persons was 15.9 compared with 1.8 in
2000, while the number of fixed and mobile phone subscribers increased from 18 per 100 persons to 69
within the same time period (World Bank, 2008).78
ICT allowed firms to maintain constant communication with their outposts in
China, and in many cases reduced production lead time, particularly when it
came to the transfer of designs.
The proliferation of regional trading agreements in East Asia also gained its impetus
in China.  An invitation by former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji in 2000 to ASEAN to establish
an FTA between China and ASEAN opened the doors for numerous other regional and
bilateral FTAs among countries in the region.  China itself is involved in 13 trade
agreements, the latest being the China-Pakistan Agreement on Trade in Services and the
China-Peru FTA.
4
The objective of this chapter is to consider the role, if any, of RTAs in the growth of
IPNs in China.  Without a doubt, IPNs preceded RTAs.  However, with the uncertainly
associated with the prolonged negotiations under the WTO Doha Round, additional regional
agreements can be expected, while existing ones might expand in depth and scope.  Thus,
the objective here is to consider these factors that are important to these RTAs and which
could therefore encourage greater use of IPNs in China.  This is done by considering the
automotive sector in China.  First, the IPNs are considered from a macro perspective by
evaluating the patterns and growth of trade in parts and components within the automobile
sector in China.  Some major policies that resulted in the change in those patterns of trade
are highlighted.  Second, the IPNs are evaluated from a micro perspective through a case
study of several players within the IPNs.  The objective is to identify factors that influence
decision-making as well as the challenges faced by firms vis-à-vis RTAs.  By taking into
account both macro and micro perspectives, it is possible to highlight issues that need to be
considered seriously by policymakers for RTAs to become an important driver of IPNs.
4.1. Bilateral and regional trading agreements involving China
China is a party to 13 FTAs, of which 10 are in force and three more are under
negotiation (APTIAD).  Some of the FTAs and other arrangements in which China is
involved are detailed below.
5
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): As with other countries that border the
Pacific Ocean, the Asia-Pacific region hosts China’s most important trading partners and
investors.  China became a member of the APEC forum in November 1991 and submits an
annual Individual Action Plan (IAP) that provides a roadmap of its intended actions in
various policy areas, with a view to realizing APEC’s (voluntary) liberalization goals.  In
2001, China joined the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) Scheme and started to issue
ABTC cards starting from November 2003.  In a previous summit in Peru, China joined other
members in confirming their support for the global free trade agenda.
4 The terms RTA and FTA can be used interchangeably with the term preferential trade agreement.
Therefore RTA and FTA refer to any type of reciprocal exchange of discriminatory trade concessions
between two or more countries, as also defined in chapter 3.
5 The agreements listed are based on those reported in “Trade Policy Review – China, 2008” (World
Trade Organization, 2008).79
ASEAN+3: China, Japan and the Republic of Korea have close economic ties with
countries in South-East Asia through the ASEAN+3 framework for cooperation.
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA): The Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and ASEAN was signed on
4 November 2002, and came into force on 1 July 2003.  Under the agreement, both parties
agreed to negotiate the establishment of ACFTA within 10 years.  The comprehensive
agreement includes: (a) eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers for all trade in goods;
(b) progressively liberalizing trade in services; (c) establishing an open and competitive
investment regime to facilitate and promote investment among partners in ACFTA; and
(d) simplifying customs procedures and developing mutual recognition arrangements.  To
accelerate the establishment of ACFTA, an “early harvest programme” specified that tariffs
on all products in HS Chapters 18 and a limited number of products outside those chapters
were to be eliminated in the first three years, beginning on 1 January 2004.  A longer time
frame (i.e., no later than January 2010) was given to Cambodia, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam.  ACFTA, comprising the original ASEAN 6
(Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) was
established in January 2010; however, flexibility up to 2015 was provided for Cambodia, the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam.
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA): This agreement came into force in 1976 as
a preferential trading arrangement between developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region
and was known as the Bangkok Agreement.  China acceded to the agreement on 12 April
2001 and began implementing concessions on 1 January 2002.  APTA is the only
agreement that includes both India and China.  APTA is essentially a preferential trading
arrangement designed to liberalize and expand trade progressively in the Asia-Pacific region
through measures such as the relaxation of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and trade-related
economic cooperation.  The coverage of preferences is at least 50 per cent of the number of
tariff lines of each member, while concessions given to member States are at least
50 per cent on average (ESCAP, 2008).
Closer Economic Partnership Agreements – China, Hong Kong and China, Macao:
Signed on 29 June 2003 and 17 October 2003, respectively, both agreements resulted in
the full elimination of tariffs on imports originating from Hong Kong, China and Macao,
China from 1 January 2006.  The agreements also include the opening up of markets for
services and investments.
China-Chile FTA: On 18 November 2005, Chile became the first country in South
America to sign a bilateral FTA with China.  The agreement represented an unprecedented
event in Asian and Latin American relations, as countries agreed to lift tariffs on 92 per cent
of products exported from Chile to China and 50 per cent of the products exported from
China to Chile over the course of 10 years.
6  The reduction in tariffs is expected to increase
bilateral trade, and more importantly provide new financial opportunities for Chinese and
6 National Customs Service, Chile-China Free Trade Agreement 2006, accessed at www.aduana.cl/
prontus_aduana_eng/site/artic/20070227/pags/20070227172530.html#T3.80
Chilean business leaders.  Under the agreement, approximately half of China’s exports to
Chile were granted duty-free treatment, while 21 per cent of the remaining duties will be
phased out in five years, 26 per cent over the course of 10 years, and 3 per cent completely
excluded from the scope of the free trade agreement.  At the APEC summit in Peru in
November 2008, a China-Peru FTA was officially announced, making it the second Latin
American country to conclude an FTA with China.
China-Pakistan FTA: On 5 April 2005, China and Pakistan signed an FTA Early
Harvest Agreement under which bilateral tariffs on certain products were eliminated
gradually between 1 January 2006 and 1 January 2008.
China-Australia FTA: China and Australia signed a Trade and Economic Framework
Agreement on 24 October 2003.  The agreement promotes strategic cooperation in:
(a) energy and mining; (b) textiles, clothing and footwear; (c) agriculture; (d) mechanical and
electronic products; (e) tourism; (f) education; (g) inspection and quarantine; (h) customs
cooperation; (i) environmental protection; (j) investment; (k) information and
communications technology; (l) biotechnology; (m) public health; (n) food safety; and
(o) and intellectual property rights.  On 18 April 2005, the two countries agreed to
commence negotiations on an FTA, which are currently ongoing.
China-New Zealand FTA: New Zealand signed a similar Trade and Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement on 28 May 2004 with China.  Under this framework,
both countries agreed to promote cooperation in: (a) agriculture; (b) animal husbandry;
(c) forestry; (d) wool; (e) services, including education, tourism, air services, and labour and
professional services; (f) science and technology; (g) environmental protection;
(h) information and communications technology; and (i) investment.  New Zealand and
China also signed an FTA in April of 2008 that will eliminate tariffs on all trade during the
following 10 years.  This was the first full FTA between China and a developed nation, and
as such is an historical milestone in the opening up of China’s markets to the West.  The
agreement will eventually eliminate tariffs on all trade, with all tariffs below 5 per cent being
immediately dropped (which covers 35 per cent of New Zealand products going to China),
while those in the 6-20 per cent range are being phased out over a five-year period (ending
in 2012) and tariffs of more than 20 per cent being reduced immediately to 20 per cent and
then phased out over six years.
7 The agreement covers a vast group of products and
services, including provisions for the movement of persons and visa issues.
China-Singapore FTA: Negotiations for this FTA started in October 2006 and a deal
was struck in late October 2008.  The agreement, which came into effect on 1 January
2009, eliminates tariffs on 85 per cent of Singaporean exports to China while a further
10 per cent of exports were to become duty-free by 2010.  However, China will continue to
impose tariffs on 260 products, such as coffee, pepper, paper products and certain vehicle
parts, to protect its home-grown industries.  Singapore was to remove all tariffs on Chinese
imports from 2009.  This FTA is a precursor to similar agreements that will be signed with
the ASEAN States in 2012.
7 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008, “Key Outcomes: China-New Zealand Free
Trade Agreement”, accessed at http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-Key-outcomes/index.php.81
China-Pakistan Agreement on Trade in Services: This is the most recent agreement
concluded by China.  In line with Article 83 of the China-Pakistan FTA on goods between the
two countries, negotiation on a trade in services agreement was concluded after five rounds
in December 2008.  The agreement, which gives Pakistan access to 11 Chinese sectors and
gives China access to 160 Pakistani sectors, was set into force in October 2009.
4.2. Automotive sector in China
China’s auto industry started in 1953 with the founding of the First Auto Works
(FAW).  Subsequently, the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) and Dongfeng
Motors Corporation were established in 1958 and 1967, respectively.  Due to reform
policies, Chrysler and Volkswagen were allowed to establish joint ventures with the three
local players in the 1980s.  Peugeot and Citroen were allowed to enter China in the early
1990s.  The industry saw the establishment of local independent car makers such as Geely
and Chery in the late 1990s as well as significant investments made by late arrivals such as
GM, Honda, Nissan and Ford.  Not surprisingly, in terms of production and sales of
completed automotive vehicles, China is one of the fastest growing markets in Asia as well
as the world.  The automotive sector in China is well served by the country’s position as
a low-cost producer and its increasingly wealthy population.  These factors have contributed
to China’s increasing importance as a centre for regional production integration of the
industry within Asia; consequently, it is rapidly becoming a hub for components and parts
production, completed unit assembly and completed unit sales.
According to WTO (2008), China is the world’s third-largest automobile manufacturer
after the United States and Japan.  In 2006, the automotive sector accounted for 7.3 per
cent of total value-added manufacturing and 7.7 per cent of the total manufacturing
workforce (2.8 per cent in 2004).  In 2006, China had some 100 vehicle manufacturers and
around 4,500 auto parts manufacturers.  Foreign firms, through joint ventures with local
partners, accounted for around 75 per cent of all cars produced in China; 95 per cent of all
cars produced in China in 2006 were sold in the domestic market.
In 2010, China reached record levels in both production and sales, with increases of
more than 30 per cent, year-on-year.  Total production rose to 18.26 million units (an
increase of 32 per cent) with passenger cars accounting for 13.9 million units.  Trucks and
buses made up the remaining 4.37 million units.  At the same time, sales of vehicles
expanded to 18.06 million units (table 4.1).  The growing prevalence of home-produced
models has been increasingly evident.  In 2007, for instance, 1.24 million Chinese-branded
sedans were sold in 2007, accounting for 14 per cent of total units sold.  The exceptional
growth in car sales and production in the past decade is expected to continue, although
efforts by the Government to cool down the economy as well as higher oil prices in 2011
may result in lower growth.
Since 2005, China has been a net exporter of completely built units (CBU) and has
exported 16,000 units more than it has imported.  However, despite that surplus, in terms of
value China recorded a trade deficit of RMB 3.6 billion in vehicle sales, which reflected
China’s relatively lower position in the value chain, i.e., exports that comprised mainly82
low-end personal cars and commercial vehicles.  For example, the average price of an
imported sedan ($33,892) was four times the average price of the average exported car
($8,693).
8 Despite its low position in the value chain, China’s CBU exports continued to
increase and the trade deficit has narrowed since 2005.  In 2007, China’s automotive
exports surged by 79 per cent to 612,000 units.  Passenger car exports more than doubled
to 188,600 units in 2007, while exports of buses and off-road vehicles rose 210 per cent to
85,100 units and 220 per cent to 25,700 units, respectively.  Chery, Geely and Brilliance
were China’s leading exporters.  Trucks accounted for 40 per cent of total vehicle exports in
2007 while passenger cars captured a 31 per cent share.  The remainder included bus and
vehicle chassis.  Vehicle exports were expected to top the 1 million mark per annum by
2010.
9  The major export markets are the Middle East, Africa and Asia.  The Russian
Federation is rapidly becoming an important market as well.  Exports to Europe and the
United States have lagged behind due to their higher emission standards and quality issues.
As China is expected to produce more units in the future, industry consolidation is
expected to occur gradually.  There are about 1,500 registered auto producers, of which
fewer than 100 sold more than 10,000 vehicles each in 2006.  Many of the small
manufacturers sold only 300 to 500 vehicles each.  The Government of China has been
encouraging consolidation in the fragmented industry in order to create a few national
champions that can compete with global giants at home and abroad (Kong, 2008).  Since
foreign auto manufacturers are still not allowed to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in
China, consolidation will mainly focus on the leading domestic producers – FAW, SAIC,
Dongfeng, Changan, BAIC, GAIG, Chery and Geely.  However, foreign automakers will play
a major role in this consolidation process, as these automakers and their joint ventures have
historically maintained a market share of about 80 per cent in the personal car market.
10
Figure 4.1 shows the various joint ventures in the passenger car market while box 4.1
provides further details on China’s automotive policy framework.
Table 4.1. Production and sales of automobiles, historical and projected
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012*
Total production 5.71 7.28 8.882 9.35 13.79 18.26 15.533 17.086
(CBU million)
• Cars (million) 3.93 5.23 6.38 6.74 10.38 13.90 11.158 12.274
• Commercial vehicles 1.78 2.05 2.5 2.61 3.41 4.37 4.509 4.96
(million)
Sales (CBU million) 5.76 7.22 8.796 9.38 13.64 18.06 13.22 14.277
Source: China Automotive Market Yearbook 2010.
Notes: * Projected figures; CBU = completely built units.
8 Fitch Ratings, “The Chinese auto industry – tuning up for steady growth”, 26 April 2006.
9 Chinese Association of Automobile Manufacturers.
10 Fitch Ratings, op. cit.; According to the Wall Street Journal (5 February 2009), “the economic crisis
engulfing China is also causing many smaller car makers to go out of business, which is a big gain for
large local players like Geely and Chery as well as for foreign players, as competition is reduced”.83
Source:
Based on Harper and others, 2007; information on ownership and partnerships updated by the author
.

































































































Consistent with the growth in the production, sales and exports of automobiles, the
auto parts and components sector in China has also seen impressive improvements.
Although car manufacturers previously imported parts and components for assembly in
China, an increasing number of these components are now being manufactured in China for
both domestic use and exports.  This is mainly due to the entry of major auto parts
producers into China.  Of the world’s top 100 auto parts suppliers, 70 per cent already have
a presence in China.  Some 1,200 foreign-funded or joint-investment parts manufacturers in
China now hold 50 per cent of the market.
11  Among them are brands such as Delphi,
Bosch, Visteon and Continental.  Local parts manufacturers such as Wanxiang (China’s
largest maker of auto parts), Shaanxi Fast, Fuyao Glass, Xinyi Glass and Nanjing Aotecar
have made impressive entry into the industry, taking advantage of the 1,000 auto
parts-based industrial parks across the country.
12
China’s  exports of auto parts reached RMB 14.5 billion in 2007 as major
manufacturers had become more confident of their quality.  Sales revenue of China’s auto
parts producers reached RMB 403.5 billion in 2006.  The output value of China’s auto parts
was projected to reach RMB 800 billion in 2010.
13
11 “China’s emerging car industry“, Business Week, 12 April 2007.
12 “China auto parts industry report, 2007-2008“, Reuters, 10 March 2008.
13 Ibid.
Box 4.1. Main features of China’s automobile policy
Foreign investment in the automotive industry requires prior approval from the central
Government.  Foreign firms need to have their own product patents and trade marks,
product development and manufacturing technology, independent international sales channels
and financing capabilities.
For CBU vehicles and engines, the Chinese partner must own at least 50 per cent of
the equity share.  The limit can be relaxed if the intention is exporting and if the company is
located in an export processing zone.  A foreign enterprise must set up its own research
and development (R&D) department in China and manufacture products that meet international
technical standards.
Each foreign automaker is allowed to have two joint ventures per vehicle category;
additional joint ventures are allowed if it involves investing with the local partner to acquire
other domestic automakers.
The minimum capital requirement for new entrants is RMB 2 billion, of which
self-owned capital must be no less than RMB 800 million, while an R&D institution must be
established with an investment of no less than RMB 500 million.  The total investment for
auto-engine manufacturers should be no less than RMB 1.5 billion, of which self-owned
capital should be no less than RMB 500 million.  New assembly plants must have an
annual capacity to produce at least 10,000 trucks, 50,000 autos with four-cylinder engines
or 30,000 autos with six-cylinder engines.85
4.3. China’s auto industry and international trade
In value terms, China is a net importer of final goods in the automobile sector.  In
defining final goods as SITC 781 (passenger motor vehicles, excluding buses), SITC 782
(goods and specialized transport vehicles) and SITC 783 (road motor vehicles not
elsewhere stated), figure 4.2 shows that the large gap between imports and exports was
decreasing in 2007.  Exports of final goods have experienced exponential growth since
2003.  This may reflect the emergence of China’s own auto producers such as Geely, Chery
and Brilliance.  Among the product categories, SITC 781 makes up about 60 per cent of
total final goods.  Figure 4.3 shows that SITC 781 is the dominant reason for China’s trade
deficit in the auto industry.  SITC 782 and SITC 783 (buses etc.) show a trade surplus for
China in recent years.
China’s imports of final goods come from traditional auto producers such as
Germany, Japan and the United States (which together made up nearly three-quarters of
China’s total vehicle imports in 2007).  China’s exports are more varied in location.  The
Russian Federation, as explained above, was the single largest destination.  Other
lesser-known developing country export markets are important destinations for China’s auto
makers.  These include the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan and Algeria.
International trade in parts and components contributed to more than two-thirds
(67 per cent) of China’s trade in the auto industry.  China was, in the past, a net importer of
Automobile manufacturers exceeding certain levels of production, sales and R&D
expenditure are granted preferential treatment by the central Government, such as reduced
tax rates when making fixed asset investments, favourable conditions for bank loans,
priority approval when listing on stock exchanges, and easier access to capital from abroad
and government loans.
Imports of motor vehicles can only be done through the coastal ports of Dalian,
Tianjin, Shanghai and Huangpu as well as the terrestrial ports of Manchuria, Shenzhen and
Xinjiang Alashankou.  Imports of used vehicles are prohibited.
Tariffs on imported parts are linked to the final value of vehicles.  If imports of key
pieces reach or surpass a stipulated volume, they are considered as assembled parts and
may be subject to tariff rates applied to CBU units.  The simple average applied rate
(including interim duty) for motor vehicles (ISIC 3843) was 13.5 per cent in 2006.  The tariff
for vehicle components is 10 per cent.
Expenditures for R&D are tax deductible provided they comply with technological
policy.
Measures are in place for preventing local protectionism; local governments should
not implement discriminative policies on automobiles not produced locally nor adopt measures
that could result in discriminative consequences.








































































































































































Figure 4.2. Imports and exports of final goods (SITC 781 , 782 and 783)
in China’s auto industry, 1992-2007
Source: United Nations Comtrade, downloaded from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
Note: SITC 781 refers to passenger motor vehicles, excluding buses; SITC 782 refers to goods and
specialized transport vehicles; and SITC 783 refers to road motor vehicles not stated
elsewhere.
Source: United Nations Comtrade, downloaded from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
Note: SITC 781 refers to passenger motor vehicles, excluding buses; SITC 782 refers to goods and
specialized transport vehicles; and SITC 783 refers to road motor vehicles not stated
elsewhere.
Figure 4.3. China’s trade in final goods by product category87
auto parts and components.
14  As shown in figure 4.4, China only became a net exporter of
parts and components in 2007.  The growth in trade for parts became exponential in 2002,
which coincided with the growth of China’s auto industry, as explained above.
Improvements made by local manufacturers in terms of design and quality also contributed
towards making China a net exporter.  United Nations Comtrade macro trade data does not
provide much explanation as to the exact parts traded (figure 4.5).  In 2000, 45 per cent of
parts traded fell under SITC 78439 (other parts and accessories).  Although the figure
declined to about 33 per cent in 2007, it was still the largest category.  However, other
important product categories that were featured significantly in 2007 included: SITC 78434
(gearboxes), SITC 78433 (brakes), SITC 78432 (parts and accessories of bodies), SITC
7783 (electrical equipment), SITC 77313 (ignition wiring sets), SITC 71651 (electrical
generating sets), SITC 71391 (other parts for internal combustion engines) and SITC 7132
(internal combustion engines).
The important role played by international production networks in China’s parts and
components industry is also obvious when intra-industry trade (IIT) is considered.  Two-way
exchanges of related products between nations can emerge due to differences in factor
endowments (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), and consumer tastes and preferences
(Krugman, 1980).  The extent of China’s IIT in automotive parts and components (at the
14 For the purpose of this study, parts and components in the auto industry have been defined as SITC
7132, 71391, 71651, 7422, 7439, 7463, 77313, 7783 and 784.  These classifications are under SITC
Rev. 3.  These items were selected after an analysis of the items listed by Athukorala (2007) and
Kaminski and Ng (2001) as well as the author’s review of the SITC list.
Table 4.2. Import sources and export destinations of final goods, 2007
Imports Exports
Partner Per cent Partner Per cent
Germany 33.25 Russian Federation 18.67
Japan 27.49 Islamic Republic of Iran 6.49
United States 13.18 Kazakhstan 5.99
Republic of Korea 6.97 Algeria 4.65
Slovakia 5.21 Viet Nam 4.45
United Kingdom 4.71 South Africa 4.30
Sweden 3.17 Ukraine 4.16
Austria 1.57 United States 3.94
Mexico 0.71 United Kingdom 2.96
France 0.67 Syria 2.86
Top 10 cumulative 96.93 Top 10 cumulative 58.47












































Figure 4.4. China’s exports and imports of parts and components, 1992-2007
Source: United Nations Comtrade, downloaded from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
Figure 4.5. China’s trade in parts and components: Important product categories
(per cent)
































5-digit level SITC) is shown in figure 4.6;
15 IIT tripled from about 23 per cent in 1992 to
60 per cent in 2007.  The increase in IIT occurred in nearly all product categories (figure
4.7).  Zhu (2008) differentiated between horizontal and vertical IIT and found that the latter
dominated this industry.  This indicates that China’s lower production costs have acted as
the prime driver of IIT.  However, horizontal IIT is increasing, indicating that sophistication in
output is increasing, and demand for high-quality components is showing an upward trend.
The source of imports and destinations of exports for 2007 are shown in table 4.3.
There are no surprises as the main auto producing countries such as Japan, Germany, the
Republic of Korea and the United States were the sources of imports while the United
States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Canada were important destinations.
Considering the sources of imports and destinations of exports for final goods as
well as parts and components in China’s automotive-related trade, it can be concluded that
RTAs do not play a significant role.  Apart from Hong Kong, China, important trading
partners in the auto sector are not those with which China has an RTA.  For example,
countries within ACFTA (China’s oldest and most advanced trade agreement) do not feature
well in the auto trade (table 4.4).  Only exports of final goods to Viet Nam stand out as being
significant.  However, it must be noted that automotive final goods, part and components as
defined in this chapter accounted for only 6 per cent of total China trade in 2007.  Trade with
RTA partners may be more significant in other sectors.
Perhaps of greater significance than RTAs was accession by China to WTO in 2001.
Under its current WTO obligations related to trade in completed vehicle units and parts
China made the following reductions:
(a) As of 1 July 2006, China’s Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council
reduced tariffs on cars, SUVs and minibuses from 28 per cent to 25 per cent;
(b) Taxes on selected parts were reduced from 13.8 per cent to 10 per cent;
(c) Tariffs on parts such as transmissions, clutches, and radiators became 10 per
cent.
15 The most widely used method for calculating IIT was developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1971).
Different modifications of the Grubel-Lloyd measure are often employed in IIT literature, i.e., the
unweighted IIT method and the weighted IIT method.  The preferred measure of IIT and the measure
adopted in the study detailed in this chapter is the adjusted Grubel and Lloyd (1975) index using the
relative size of exports and imports of a particular good within an industry as weightings:
where Xi and Mi are China’s exports and imports of product I, respectively.  The value of this index is
zero if all trade is inter-industry trade; it is equal to 100 if it is completely IIT.
IIT =                                             x 100
n
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Figure 4.6. China’s intra-industry trade in automotive parts and components,
1992-2007


























































Table 4.3. Import sources and export destination of auto parts
and components, 2007
Imports Exports
Partner Per cent Partner Per cent
Japan 16.28 United States 14.69
Germany 9.87 Japan 8.48
Republic of Korea 5.10 Republic of Korea 3.78
United States 3.40 Canada 1.92
France 1.66 Germany 1.61
Hungary 1.45 United Arab Emirates 1.38
United Kingdom 0.79 Italy 1.30
Spain 0.69 Islamic Republic of Iran 1.14
Canada 0.61 United Kingdom 1.03
Other Asia, n.e.s. 0.58 Hong Kong, China 0.97
Top 10 cumulative 40.43 Top 10 cumulative 36.3
Source: United Nations Comtrade, downloaded from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
Table 4.4. China’s trade with selected RTA partners, 2007
Trade in automotive
Trade in automotive
All goods  parts and
final goods
(% of total trade) components
(% of total trade)
(% of total trade)
Country/area Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
Malaysia 3.0 1.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2
Thailand 2.4 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3
Philippines 2.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4
Indonesia 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1
Viet Nam 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 4.5
Singapore 1.8 2.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.4
New Zealand 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Pakistan 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Chile 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8
Hong Kong, China 1.3 15.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.4
Macau, China 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Australia 2.7 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.6
Total 16.6 25.4 1.1 4.3 0.0 8.2
Source: United Nations Comtrade, downloaded from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.92
The reduction in tariffs for final goods as well as parts and components could further
explain the dramatic rise in China’s trade.  However, the emergence of China as an
important automotive player in the global market has not been without obstacles.  China
recently lost its first trade dispute with WTO when it was challenged by the United States,
Canada and the European Union over non-competitive trading practices.  Since 2006, China
charged the same import tariff of 25 per cent for a completed unit as it charged for a kit of
imported parts.  The United States, Canada and the European Union argued that the
imported parts did not constitute a complete kit for a whole unit, and should therefore be
liable for an import tariff of only 10 per cent.  This policy was designed to protect domestic
manufacturers and encourage foreign vehicle manufacturers to purchase from domestic
suppliers.  These policies were recently ruled as discriminatory and China now fully
complies with WTO regulations.
4.4. IPNs and RTAs: Firm-level issues
The research detailed here on the issue of IPNs and RTAs at the micro level was
based on in-depth interviews with seven China-based firms in the automotive sector.  Those
firms included Chinese car manufacturers, world-renowned parts manufacturers, a spare
parts dealer for a well-known Swedish car manufacturer and a medium-sized exporter of
auto parts.  Details of the interviewees are given in box 4.2.
The interviews were based on open-ended questions, allowing respondents to
provide detail explanations and examples of issues surrounding the trade in automotive
parts and final goods.  The key issues that resulted from the interviews are detailed below.
Box 4.2. Brief overview of interview respondents
Company A is a Swedish firm incorporated in the United States.  It develops markets
and manufactures airbags, seatbelts, safety electronics, steering wheels, anti-whiplash systems,
seat components and child seats as well as night vision systems and other active safety
systems.  It serves all leading automobile manufacturers worldwide through 80 facilities in
more than 30 countries that employ nearly 42,000 people globally.  Operating in China for
more than 20 years, the company manufactures safety systems by buying and assembling
the components in its factories in Changchun, Nanjing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.  The
components are sourced from Europe and the United States as well as from domestic
producers.  Very little is sourced from other Asian countries due to the high quality required
for the safety systems.  Nearly 70 per cent of the output is for the local market (covering
nearly all major car manufacturers in China) while the rest is exported mainly to Australia,
the Republic of Korea and Japan.
Company B is a foreign-owned company and a subsidiary of a well-known Swedish
brand.  It sells spare parts, 99 per cent of which are imported from Belgium and France,
sometimes via Singapore, to dealers in China.  A small proportion is imported from an
assembly plant located in the Republic of Korea.  There is only limited local sourcing
because the quality of local parts is unstable.  Nevertheless, the local quality has improved93
recently.  Local production through external suppliers could start in five years for domestic
consumption as well as for exports to Europe and Australia.
Company C is a leading global supplier of mobile electronics and transportation
systems, including powertrains, safety, steering, thermal, and control and security systems,
electrical/electronic architecture and in-car entertainment technologies.  Its technology is
also found in computing, communications, consumer electronics, energy and medical
applications.  The company, which is headquartered in the United States, has approximately
155,500 employees and operates 148 wholly-owned manufacturing sites in 35 countries
with sales of $22.3 billion in 2007.  Since 1993, the company has had a presence in China,
where it has established a solid footprint with a world-class research and development
centre, mature manufacturing facilities and customer service centres in many cities including
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi, Yantai, Changchun and Baicheng.  Recently,
the company expanded into the aftermarket in China, launching its high-quality original
equipment products and services for Chinese drivers.  It specializes in wiring, harnesses
and electric circuits, using raw materials from China (50 per cent) and abroad (50 per cent),
and sells the final output to major car manufacturers (both joint ventures and local players)
in China (85 per cent) and abroad (15 per cent).
Company D is China’s largest exporter of passenger cars.  In 2007, it exported almost
120,000 cars to nearly 70 countries, and has seven assembly plants in Asia, Africa, Europe
and South America.  It has the technology for building core components and was the first
Chinese automaker to manufacture cars and to develop products for foreign original equipment
manufacturers.  The company’s main business is the production of CBUs, engine gearboxes
and spare parts.  However, 90 per cent of its revenue comes from CBU sales.  The
company produces the critical components itself, while non-critical component production is
outsourced, mainly to other suppliers in China.  The main market for its cars is China while
its important export markets are the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
Company E is headquartered in Germany, and has nearly 200 production and R&D
sites in 36 countries.  It is a leading automotive supplier worldwide, producing a range of
automotive components including brake systems, components and systems for powertrains
and chassis, instrumentation, infotainment solutions, vehicle electronics, tyres and technical
elastomers.  It is the world leader in a number of automotive components including hydraulic
braking systems, airbag electronics and instrumentation.  In 2007, it employed more than
150,000 people worldwide and recorded sales worth €16.6 billion.  It began its automotive
operations in China in 1994 and opened its Asia headquarters in Shanghai in January
2006.  Today it has nine automotive plants and one test centre in China.  The company
employs a specialist, based in Shanghai, to track RTAs in the Asian region.  Although it
prefers local suppliers, high quality standards have to be met.  The company puts much
effort into developing local suppliers, particularly in China.  Local suppliers are preferred
because it shortens the supply chain, improves the reaction time during frequent demand
fluctuations and possibly reduces the landed costs.
Company F is a Chinese company with a well-known foreign joint venture partner.  It
produces light-duty vehicles including pick-up trucks and vans.  The company dominates
China’s high-end light bus market and is a leading player in the market for diesel-engine94
4.4.1. Awareness and importance of RTAs
From the fact that the respondent companies were of different sizes, a clear
indication was perceived that RTAs appeared to matter more to larger players than smaller
ones.  Those respondents who were world players in the production and assembly of parts,
for example, had dedicated personnel for tracking the development of RTAs in the region,
since such agreements are an important criterion when making decisions on the location of
future plants or supplier sources.  In particular, when these companies are Asia-based,
RTAs appear to be more important.  Chinese car manufacturers who were interviewed
claimed some knowledge of RTAs but added that the agreements usually ignored the
automotive industry.  Unsurprisingly, China’s RTA partners did not appear to be important
sources and destinations of their products.  Smaller-sized players such as exporters and
spare-parts dealers had limited knowledge of RTAs, claiming that import duties were passed
on to consumers in any case.
The degree of importance of RTAs in business decision-making is dependent on
three factors:
(a) The depth of tariff reduction;
(b) Volume of business;
(c) The amount of documentation required for tariff reduction eligibility.
Smaller firms require a substantial reduction in tariffs if the effort put into the
documentation process is to be worthwhile.  On the other hand, firms that deal with large
volumes of parts and components claim that even a 3 per cent reduction in tariffs may save
a plant a substantial amount in costs.  Thus, while the current import duty on parts and
components in China is 10 per cent, a reduction to 5 per cent as a result of an RTA may be
considered important by a large player that imports several million United States dollars
worth of parts for assembly in China.
commercial vehicles and high-end light buses.  Its local brand names dominate the mid-
and high-end markets.  It produces the main components such as engines, body frames
and parts, and outsources other components to China-based suppliers.  Its main market is
China (90 per cent) but it also exports to North Africa and the Middle East.  The company
uses local suppliers because they offer competitive prices while ensuring shorter lead time
and convenient communications.
Company G was established in 2003 as an international manufacturing, exporting,
trading and industrial support company in Shanghai.  It is part of a Tehran-based group with
70 overseas locations.  It deals with a range of auto products including electromotors and
bearings for its affiliated factories, companies and customers in the United States, Europe,
Africa and the Middle East.  In China, it sources parts for export and, more recently, it
established an assembly plant for some motor parts.95
4.4.2. Selection of suppliers and markets
When sourcing for parts and components, product quality appeared to matter most.
As many of the respondents were dealing with safety-related products (e.g., braking
systems, airbags etc.), the ability of suppliers to meet quality standards set by car
manufacturers was considered essential.  Landed price (which includes import duties) is
also important, but without a compromise on quality.  The long-term relationship with the
supplier was also taken into consideration by all the respondents.  For the foreign
producers, the ability of parts suppliers to meet the quality standards of one manufacturer
provided some assurance that the standards imposed by other manufacturers could also be
met.  Although tariffs and non-tariff barriers were considered important by all the
respondents, quality and supplier relationships were considered critical factors in the
selection process.  Thus, there appeared to be a preference for Chinese suppliers or foreign
suppliers with a presence in China.  As mentioned above, tariffs and RTAs become
important if they reduce the landed price substantially.
A related issue in the selection process is the localization of the production of parts
and components.  Among the local respondents, there was a clear preference for dealing
with local suppliers because of the ease of communication as well as the convenience of
managing quality and logistics issues, which ensured a reduction in lead time.  The fact that
many foreign producers of parts and components, such as Bosch, Delphi and Continental,
have established production and assembly bases in China means that most parts can be
sourced from within China.
16  In the early 1990s, automotive components were shipped in
kits to China, assembled and then exported back to the producer country.  That explained
the small gap between exports and imports in the 1990s (figure 4.2).
In recent years, the technological capabilities of Chinese producers have increased
while the production capacity of local producers has been enhanced by the increasing size
of the local automotive industry as well as the forging of greater alliances between foreign
suppliers and local producers.  As a result, China has become an important exporter of parts
and components.  The growth of the auto parts industry in China is illustrated by the figures
available at Gasgoo.com (China’s largest auto parts business portal).  It classifies the auto
parts industry into three segments – the domestic original equipment market, the export
market and the aftermarket (spare parts) (table 4.5).  With a total market output of RMB740
billion (about $105 billion), the sector is expected to become a significant component of
China’s  manufacturing industry.  Despite being a latecomer in the auto parts and
components industry, the economy-of-scales advantage experienced by Chinese producers
has reduced the average service link cost (Kimura and Obashi, 2008), thus providing those
producers with a competitive edge over their counterparts elsewhere.
16 The example of the Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporation (SAIC) provides clear evidence.  For
its Roewe 550 (formerly Rover) model, purchasing parts and components within China is feasible
because its key supplier, TRW Automotive Holdings Corp., an American-based global safety system
supplier, produces domestically in China, while driver and passenger airbags are manufactured by
SAIC’s joint ventures in Shanghai and Changchun.96
Table 4.5. Growth in the Chinese auto parts market
Segment 2002 2007
Domestic original equipment RMB 190 billion RMB 500 billion
Exports RMB 15 billion RMB 120 billion
Aftermarket RMB 70 billion RMB 120 billion
Source: www.gasgoo.com.
Herein lies the conflict between protecting the domestic industry and the expansion
of trade through an RTA.  Tariff protection (as practiced by China and Thailand) results in the
emergence of a domestic parts and components industry, as car manufacturers are forced
to transfer the technology and production capacities within the country.  Once volume is built
up and economy-of-scale effects are realized, the country has a competitive advantage and
becomes an exporter.  In the case of China, the size of the potential market provided an
added incentive for developing a thriving local industry.  Thus, an RTA will benefit a country
only when the capabilities and capacities within an industry have reached a competitive
level.  Since automotive goods are still not included in the RTAs to which China is a party, it
can be assumed that the Chinese authorities are not convinced the nation is ready for tariff-
free competition.
4.4.3. Non-tariff barriers to IPNs
The challenges faced by firms involved in international trade are well known.
However, the same challenges are amplified for firms within an IPN.  Participants in the
supply chain need to adhere to strict delivery (or lead) times, as failing to do so may cause
the entire chain to collapse due to accumulated delays.  In addition, as parts and
components may originate from different locations across a region (or worldwide in the case
of China’s automotive sector), the documentation involved in customs procedures can be
substantial.  The respondents highlighted three main barriers that inhibit efficient flow of
products in their IPNs.
The first barrier is the codification of parts and components, which varies from
country to country.  This barrier is particularly challenging for assemblers who source parts
from different countries.  Despite efforts by various RTAs to harmonize the customs code,
17
at the practical level the national Customs Department decides on the code of a part or
component.  The problem is further exacerbated when the code is changed from time to
time, either due to revision of the codification system or changes in customs officers.  This
creates uncertainties for firms, which affects their strategic planning.  For example, an ABS
braking system that is coded as HS 9032 (electrical system) by Japan and Malaysia, is
classified as HS 8708 (hydraulic brakes) by Thailand.  The import duties vary greatly
between these codes.  Furthermore, HS 8708 is usually classified under the sensitive list
and would not be considered for tariff reduction in an RTA.  Thus, differences in the
17 See, for example, www.aseansec.org/10113.htm for the case of ASEAN.97
codification system act as a deterrent to wider IPNs.  Related to this issue is the calculation
of local content, which also varies from country to country.  The respondents referred to the
standardized European Union Community Customs Code which allows importers to use the
certificate received from one European Union partner throughout the Union.  However, it
should be noted that it took the European Union 25 years to formulate and realize
a common code (Wulf, 2005).
Second, if RTAs are to make a significant impact on IPNs, documentation
requirements for tariff reduction eligibility must be reduced to a minimum.  As one
respondent noted, “RTAs are a cost to us”.  For an assembler who sources parts from
various countries who are partners in different RTAs, the documentation required can be
cumbersome and may not be worth the effort, particularly if the tariff reduction is small.  In
this regard, the respondents said they preferred a multilateral agreement or an RTA with
more members, if standard documentation processes apply.
Third, IPNs would flourish if customs clearance procedures were streamlined and
made less cumbersome.  Smaller importers/suppliers that cannot benefit from lower tariffs
(because the margin between the WTO-imposed duties and RTA-agreed margin of
preference is small) or from low volumes are unable to gain from an RTA.  The agreements
can only be useful if products that move between member countries can be cleared from
ports at a faster rate.  To these firms, an RTA should result in less documentation for
clearance or a reduction in the sample of shipment that goes under customs scrutiny.  As
mentioned already, if RTAs are designed to bolster trade between member countries, trade
facilitation has to be an important feature of the agreements, particularly among firms within
a value chain.
4.5. Discussion
The current study of the automotive sector vis-à-vis RTAs and IPNs highlights
several issues.
First, China’s accession to WTO changed that country’s automotive industry
significantly.  The largest jump in imports of final goods as well as parts and components
occurred after 2001, most likely due to a reduction in tariffs.  At the same time, China also
received MFN status from its trading partners, which boosted its exports, and made it a net
exporter of parts and components in 2007.
Second, RTAs appear to matter little in China’s automotive sector.  RTA partners do
not feature strongly in auto trading.  This may be due to the exclusion of vehicles, parts and
components in RTA deals.  However, as the proliferation of RTAs continues, and the depth
of agreements increases, RTAs may prove to be significant in the future.  It is important to
note that rather than trying to protect its own automotive sector, China may insist that its
trading partners open up their markets to Chinese-made products.  The Chinese producers
who were interviewed were already lamenting over the barriers imposed by the Russian
Federation and others on Chinese – made autos.  Unsurprisingly, the strategies employed
by those firms are similar to those employed by their counterparts when they entered China98
in the 1990s, i.e., export the parts and components in kits and assemble them in target
markets to avoid high import duties.
Third, China’s success as an auto parts and component producer can be attributed
to the following factors:
(a) Low-cost labour, at least at the initial stage;
(b) Incentives provided by the Government in the form of land, import and export
duty rebates, conditional access to the domestic market etc.;
(c) The size of the Chinese market that provided economy-of-scale advantages
that were then used to gain a competitive edge in other markets;
(d) Protection of the domestic auto industry against outright competition, allowing
the growth of local firms’ capabilities and capacities.
The Chinese auto industry is an excellent example of how initial protection of the
industry through tariffs and non-tariff barriers, careful provision of incentives and liberal
domestic policies can change a near non-existent industry into one that meets world
standards.  This implies that trade barriers may act as a potent tool for developing
competitive advantage.  However, there are three conditions: a significant domestic market
should already exist; the industry should have some initial competitive advantage (e.g., low
labour costs); and a period of protection.  If these conditions do not exist, trade barriers can
only result in inefficient allocation of resources.
Fourth, for RTAs to have a positive effect on IPNs, an industry-specific agreement
may be useful.  In particular, for the automotive industry, the number of parts and
components involved is so extensive that documentation procedures become tedious when
some parts qualify for tariff reduction while others do not.  In this context, a multi-lateral tariff
reduction, or an RTA that involves more countries would be helpful if the agreement has
standard clauses for all parties involved.  The current practice of customs codification, which
varies from one partner to another, does not contribute to the benefit of free trade.  In this
regard, an industry-specific agreement for the automotive sector should take into
consideration the peculiarities of the industry and include those products that can expand
trade within the sector.  Industry-specific agreements need intense involvement of
businesses rather than leaving the negotiations to bureaucrats who have a limited
knowledge of industry issues.
Finally, businesses are of the opinion that governments should be clear as to the
objectives of RTAs.  If the objective is to promote greater peace and security in the region,
i.e., for international relations purposes, then RTAs can be considered successful.  However,
if the RTAs have a trade agenda, then policymakers need to consider not just tariff
reductions, but also operational issues such as standardized documentation, the
harmonization of codes and transparency in customs clearance procedures.  While leaders
shake hands and sign agreements, the actual effect on trade can be minimal as businesses
need to overcome myriad exclusions and administrative hurdles to gain even a minor
reduction in costs.99
4.6. Conclusion
In the same week that leading United States auto makers were pleading for
a $25 billion bailout to save the industry from near collapse, the sixth Guangzhou
International Auto Show showcased new models that the same United States companies
were planning to roll out through their joint ventures in China.
18  For the whole of 2008, unit
sales grew at 7 per cent, compared with 20 per cent annual growth that was seen
throughout the decade.  In 2009, no growth or even a modest contraction was expected, but
in January 2009, China became the largest car market in the world, surpassing the United
States.
19  The growth of China’s automotive industry during the past two decades was not
only due to a growing wealthier population, but also policies that were carefully designed by
Beijing.
From a closed domestic market to wholly-owned foreign car manufacturers – initially
state-owned, then opening up by allowing privately-owned manufacturers, relatively high
tariff barriers that were reduced due to WTO accession, and the marketing of Chinese cars
to markets ignored by industry leaders – has resulted in an auto industry that will soon be
the second largest in the world.  Although RTAs have not contributed significantly to the
development of IPNs within the automotive industry in China, its future significance cannot
be ignored as Chinese-made parts, components and vehicles make their way into the global
market.
18 China Daily, 20 November 2008.
19 Wall Street Journal, 5 February 2009.100
5.  Trade liberalization and international production
networks: Experience of the Indian automotive sector
Biswajit Nag
5.1. Introduction
Globalization refers to the universal phenomenon of technological, economic and
cultural change, as brought about by expanding facilities for communication and
interdependency between traditionally different cultures.  The Government of India’s 1991
Statement on Industrial Policy brought about a major shift in India from a controlled policy to
liberal one.  Imports/exports were freed from most restrictions.  The subsequent one and
half decades of Indian experience is a story of perpetual growth emanating from strong
policy overtures and the unleashed potential of entrepreneurship.  Today, innovation, ability
to take risks and coping with the needs of the globalized world is the driving force of India’s
economy.  India’s automobile industry has evolved in a similar fashion in order to cater to
rising consumer demand, initially in the domestic market and recently in international
markets.
The Indian automobile industry, which is one of the world’s fastest growing
automotive industries, expanded at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of
approximately 17 per cent during the past five years (Society of Indian Automobile
Manufacturers, 2008).  It is now the world’s eleventh-largest manufacturer of passenger
cars, fourth-largest manufacturer of commercial vehicles and the second-largest
manufacturer of two-wheelers.  It now produces 13 times more cars than it did 20 years ago
(World Bank, 2005b), and is among the top 10 countries that have designed, developed and
mass produced their own cars.
The automotive industry in India has thus undergone a transition, from comprising
a few auto manufacturers, virtually no auto components makers and only low-quality auto
ancillary producers to the league of global auto manufacturers, competitive component
manufacturers and emerging ancillary producers.  Several studies have revealed that
previously the Indian automotive industry was not competitive enough for the global market
due to inferior quality, lower labour productivity and high cost of raw materials in India (e.g.,
Pradosh and others, 2006).  However, as in other markets, globalization has made the
automotive market very competitive and brought profit margins to a very low level.
Component suppliers are the strength of the emerging automobile industry.  The
Indian automobile component sector is relatively labour-intensive by global standards and is
in the transition stage as a low-cost base for exporting labour intensive products (Saripalle,
2005).  It is transforming itself from a low volume, fragmented market into an internationally
competitive industry, having the advantage of skill-oriented, labour-intensive components.
Indian component suppliers have displayed a growing capability to cater to the engineering
and production needs of some of the world’s biggest auto companies, and many of the101
automobile majors are now outsourcing several components from India.  The manufacturing
costs in India are 25 per cent to 30 per cent lower than in its Western counterparts.  Despite
its growth, the share of Indian exports in the global auto component market is very small.
The dynamics of the industry are undergoing a tremendous restructuring and tiering.
Various technological and non-technological innovations have been brought in by the
industry to capitalize on the opportunities.
Following the delicensing of the automobile industry in 1993 by the Government of
India, a rapid transformation occurred with the entry of many global players in the mid-1990s
onwards, making the Indian market increasingly competitive.  Hyundai has succeeded in
emerging as the second-most important car manufacturer after Maruti Udyog Ltd.
1 in a very
short period.  The arrival of these multinational corporations (MNCs) has boosted the
components sector.  The situation has been boosted further by the liberalization of
investment and import regime.  Hyundai set up a 100 per cent ownership subsidiary firm (its
largest investment outside the Republic of Korea) in 1998.  It initially brought in about 14
Korean component suppliers to the Hyundai plant, to supply components that were not
available in Chennai.  Hyundai has about 70 major component suppliers; of these, only 14
are Korean joint ventures and the rest are mainly Tamil Nadu-based firms.  Previously,
Suzuki also set up several joint-venture suppliers around the Maruti factory in Gurgaon, who
received advice from Suzuki on absorbing new technology and improving production
efficiency.
With the liberalization of policies and the high growth of domestic demand, several
other MNCs, such as Toyota, Honda and Ford, have also entered the Indian market.  Some
of them have full production facilities while some still import major components and
assemble them in India.  As the import duties on used vehicles and new completely built up
(CBU) units remained very high (100 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively), companies
found that setting up production facilities or importing cars in completely knocked down
(CKD) form and having an assembly plant in India was more cost effective.  Tariffs on
components declined from 35 per cent in 2001/02 to mere 10 per cent in 2008/09, with the
possibility of going down further in near future.  This has not only increased the production
possibilities of cars but also fueled international trade of components.  Exports and imports
of components have experienced somewhat similar growth patterns since 2000 (Nag,
Banerjee and Chatterjee, 2007).  The change of policy has infused new life into the
component sector as many original equipment manufacturers are increasingly buying from
domestic component manufacturers.
The efficiency of the Indian ancillary product sector has also provided the
opportunity to export or in other ways help them to become increasingly integrated with the
global supply chain of the automobile industry.  Although compared to countries such as
China and Thailand, India is far behind, and the catching up process is worth studying.  In
this context, the study proposes the analysis of the changing pattern of the supply chain in
the Indian automobile sector vis-à-vis trade liberalization.  How much potential regional
1 Maruti was set up in collaboration with Suzuki.  It remained as a joint venture company for long time.
Recently, Suzuki bought the Indian stakes converting Maruti into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Suzuki.102
trade agreements have for helping the component sector to become integrated with other
countries will also be studied.  To understand the dynamics of the sector, Indian automobile
policy and market structure have been briefly touched upon.  The current study is based on
inputs from company surveys, interviews with nodal persons in the companies and site
visits.  The choice of the companies is heterogeneous in nature, which includes, among
others, OEMs, joint ventures and MNCs on the one hand, and Tier 1 suppliers and SMEs
who are in the ancillary sector, on the other hand.  Discussions with policymakers in both
the Government and think-tanks were held to seek a conclusive dimension to the study.
5.2. Structure, market scenario and policy environment
5.2.1. Evolution of the Indian automobile industry
While the automotive industry in India began developing in the 1940s, distinct growth
only started in the 1970s.  Cars were considered ultra-luxury products, manufacturing was
strictly licensed, expansion was limited and a restrictive tariff structure was in place.  The
decade 1985 to 1995 saw the entry of Maruti Udyog in the passenger car segment, in
collaboration with Suzuki of Japan, and Japanese manufacturers in the two-wheeler and
commercial vehicle segments.  In the mid-1990s, following economic reforms in 1991,
India’s automotive industry started to open up.  Thus, the mid-1990s are characterized by
the entry of global automotive manufacturers through joint ventures in India.  Previously, the
automobile industry in India had been dominated primarily by Maruti-Suzuki, Tata Motors,
Hindustan Motors and Premier Padmini in the passenger car segment.  Ashok Leyland, Tata
Motors as well as Mahindra and Mahindra dominated the commercial vehicle segment while
Bajaj Auto dominated the two-wheeler segment.  After 2000, further policy changes were
introduced and exports became increasingly important.  In 2003, the Core Group on
Automotive Research and Development (CAR) was set up under the Ministry of Heavy
Industries and Public Enterprises to identify priority areas for research and development
(R&D).  In 1998/99, India’s automobile industry was employing, directly and indirectly, more
than 10 million people.  In the same year, the industry recorded a turnover of Rs360 billion
and contributed 4 per cent to gross domestic product (GDP), a marked increase from
2.8 per cent in 1992/93 (Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, 2000).
India’s automotive industry has therefore become a key driver of the economy,
having experienced robust growth during recent years.  Overall domestic sales have
recorded a 9 per cent CAGR during the past five years.  All sections of the industry have
been growing – passenger vehicles at 14 per cent CAGR, commercial vehicles at 17 per
cent, two-wheelers at 8 per cent and three-wheelers at 7 per cent.  Domestic vehicle sales
in 2007/08 stood at 9.6 million units, including 7.2 million two-wheelers, 1.5 million
passenger vehicles, 500,000 commercial vehicles, and 400,000 three-wheelers.  Exports of
vehicles have been growing even more rapidly, at a five-year CAGR of 27 per cent.  The key
drivers have been two-wheelers and commercial vehicles.  Overall exports of vehicles in
2007/08 totalled 1.2 million units (Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, 2008).
The size of the Indian market has provided the domestic automobile industry with
the opportunity to expand its export efforts.  On the demand side, India is now one of the103
world’s largest markets for small cars, with more than 8 million households that can afford
cars in the $5,000-$8,000 range.  With the introduction of cars in the $2,500-$5,000 range,
such as the Nano and similar vehicles being developed by players such as Toyota, Renault
and Suzuki, the number of households that can afford a car will triple.  That market already
supports a well-established pool of engineering skills as well as a large supplier base that
can engineer and manufacture cars suitable for export to other emerging markets.  The
favourable demographics have led to OEMs such as Suzuki and Ford looking at India as
a key R&D centre for their global operations.  The Indian market not only offers scope for
innovation, but in many ways mandates players to produce innovative products for market
penetration.  India’s components industry is well-placed to support growth in the automobile
market.  India has a strong supplier base that provides the entire range of components.
Scaling up further to meet international demand is no longer a distant possibility for the
country’s growing automobile sector.
Similar to the Thai model,
2 India must encourage investment in niche areas (such as
small cars) and actively promote small-car R&D by encouraging universities to participate in
the development of new technologies, components and materials, and by investing in
testing laboratories that could be shared among OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers.  Compared to
Western countries, India still has a relatively underdeveloped supplier base; without strong
suppliers, it will be much more difficult for OEMs in India to design and build the new
products needed to win in the export market.  The Government can help local suppliers
increase their capabilities and their capacity by (a) encouraging exports, (b) providing capital
to build on a globally efficient scale and (c) offering incentives to invest in new technologies.
It could further develop the local supplier base by encouraging foreign companies to enter
into joint ventures and partnerships with local companies.
5.2.2. Indian automotive market
The India automotive sector has a presence across all vehicle segments and key
components.  In terms of volume, two-wheelers dominate the sector, followed by passenger
vehicles.  Until the 1990s, the industry had few players and was protected from global
competition.  After the Government removed the requirement for licensing in 1993, the
arrival of global players has resulted in the sector becoming highly competitive.
Automobile manufacturing units are located all over India.  However, as noted by the
Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India (ACMA), they are concentrated
in some pockets such as Chennai and Bangalore in the south, Pune in the west, the
National Capital Region (NCR), which includes New Delhi and its suburban districts) in the
north, Jamshedpur and Kolkata in the east and Pithampur in the central region.  Following
global trends, most auto suppliers are located close to the manufacturing locations of
OEMs, forming regional automotive clusters.  In general, the three main clusters are centred
around Chennai, Pune and NCR.  Figure 5.1 provides a summary of automobile clusters in
India.
2 Despite its relatively small economy, Thailand is the second-largest market in the world for pick-up
trucks and the largest exporter of such vehicles.104
Figure 5.1. Regional automotive clusters
Source: Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India, 2008.
The Indian automotive component industry is highly fragmented.  There are nearly
6,400 players in the sector, of which only about 6 per cent is organized and the remaining
94 per cent comprises small-scale, unorganised players.  In terms of value-added, however,
the organized players account for nearly 77 per cent of the output in the sector.  Figure 5.2
shows that production has increased significantly in recent years, rising from around $4,000
in 2000/01 to $18,000 million in 2007/08.
Figure 5.2. Production in the auto component industry of India
Source: Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India; accessed at http://acmainfo.com/
docmgr/Industry_Statistics_Graphs/Industry_Statistics_Auto_Components_08.xls.




































































The automobile component industry is gaining significance.  Although globally it is
not very prominent due to the demographics and the maintenance of environmental
standards, the industry has attracted huge investment (figure 5.3) and thus holds an
important position in the domestic market.  Investment increased more than threefold
between 2000/01 and 2007/08.  Major players such Toyota recently invested some
$197 million in India in manufacturing transmission systems, gear boxes, axles, propeller
shafts and aluminium pressure die-casting products, both for the Indian and foreign
markets.
Figure 5.3. Investment in the auto component industry of India
Source: Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India, 2008; accessed at http://
acmainfo.com/docmgr/Industry_Statistics_Graphs/Industry_Statistics_Auto_Components_
08.xls.
Note: Estimated value for 2007/08.
The domestic market is diverse, with demand for all types of vehicles ranging from
two-wheelers to commercial vehicles.  Recently, the demand for multi-utility vehicles has
also been increasing.  Figure 5.4 shows the shares in the domestic market of the different
types of vehicles.  The domestic market share of two-wheelers is the highest at 75 per cent,
followed by passenger vehicles at 16 per cent.
5.2.3. Policy framework surrounding the Indian automotive sector
The Indian automotive policy has generally been in line with the prevailing industrial
policy framework.  During the period of British administration, India had no automotive
industry and all automobiles were imported from the global manufacturers such as General
Motors and Ford Motors.  In the 1940s, Hindustan Motors and Premier Motors were
established by Indian entrepreneurs, by importing know-how from General Motors and Fiat,
respectively.  In the 1950s, a few other companies such as Mahindra and Mahindra, Ashok
Motors (through technical collaboration with Leyland Motors) and Bajaj Auto entered the
market for commercial vehicles and two-wheelers.  Most of those companies either imported
































































an import substitution programme.  This development, followed by the L.K. Jha Committee’s
recommendations in 1960 to develop an indigenous ancillaries sector, resulted in the
evolution of a separate auto component sector.
From a pre-1980s highly-protected segment, the auto component industry in India
has gradually emerged as an important industrial sector.  Until 1991, the Phased
Manufacturing Programme, under which domestic OEMs had to increase their proportion of
domestic inputs over a specific period, laid the foundation for the Indian auto component
sector.  Subsequently, the sector became quite confident in facing competition from abroad.
The Government of India recognized that the automotive industry was a key to sustaining
economic growth and has, over the years, introduced a series of policy initiatives to support
the growth of the industry.  These initiatives have ranged from excise duty, concessions and
tax incentives for investment in the sector, to incentives for promoting R&D, measures for
export promotion and the reduction of import duties on components.  Apart from the central
Government, several state governments also have focused on attracting investments in the
auto sector.
The reforms of 1991, followed by the entry of global OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers in
India, paved the way for the expansion of a range of technologies and auto component
manufacturers.  This led to a major transition in the Indian auto industry, wherein the vehicle
manufacturers started outsourcing most of their components from auto component
manufacturers.  Since the de-licensing of the passenger car segment in 1993, the Indian
auto industry has grown bigger, with new international players entering the market.  Since
2000, there have been many significant policy developments such as the removal of
Quantitative Restrictions on auto imports and permission for 100 per cent FDI in the sector.
Figure 5.4. Domestic market share of major vehicles, classified by type
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Financial liberalization enhanced credit availability to consumers and that, in turn, led to
a boost for auto loans in India; this has been a key driver of demand for automobiles.
The auto policy of 2002 stressed the need to provide direction to the growth and
development of the automotive industry in India, which finally led to the reduction of duties in
the auto component sector to a large extent and the automobile sector to some extent, as
well as the extension of R&D incentives to the automotive sector.  The push for increased
R&D by the Government was a result of the increased R&D budget allocation for this sector.
In 2005/06, a few major policy developments relevant to the automotive sector took place.
The implementation of VAT has taken place in a few States.  The Euro III emission norms
have been introduced in 11 metro cities while the Euro II norms have been implemented in
the remaining cities.  These norms were delayed for diesel vehicles due to the unavailability
of fuel.  Therefore, the Government decided to implement these norms in a phased manner
in selected northern States.  As a result, automobile producers had to improve their
technology, which, in turn, had an impact on the component sector.  The Finance Bill, 2006
reduced excise duty on motor vehicles from 15 per cent to 12.5 per cent and the import duty
on raw materials from 10 per cent to between 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent.  This gave
a boost to the development of infrastructure, which is the key factor influencing the
automotive industry both as a driver of demand and as a facilitator of enhancing
competitiveness in manufacturing automotive products.
Much progress has been made towards the global integration of the Indian
automobile industry.  The bilateral and regional trade agreements are a significant step in
achieving this, the due benefit of which is expected when these agreements become fully
operational.  In this context, it must be noted that few components have been included in the
Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) of the India-Thailand FTA.  India’s gearbox exports to Thailand
(one of the EHS products) have increased significantly in the post-FTA period.  Imports of
other auto components in EHS, such as pistons, have shown a slow rising trend.  However,
the opinion of major stakeholders is that Indian component manufacturers are still not in
a position to compete with their counterparts in East and South-East Asia.  As a result, some
auto components (such as engines) may remain on the negative list of the India-ASEAN
FTA.  The industry has identified 77 items to be put in the negative list for all proposed
bilateral and regional agreements that India is currently negotiating.  Some items proposed
for the negative list include two-wheelers of 75-cc to 250-cc engine capacity, petrol and
diesel engines for all vehicles and all commercial vehicles.
Strict rules of origin (RoO) have also been proposed.  The industry is in favour of
product-specific RoO with ASEAN countries for the automobile sector as there is a high
probability of products from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea entering India through
the ASEAN region.  The industry’s proposals have been supported by the Ministry of Heavy
Industries and Public Enterprises (2008) in the Auto Mission Plan released at the end of
2007.
With regard to safety standards in India, the first state emission norms came into
force in 1991 for petrol vehicles and in 1992 for diesel vehicles.  From April 1995, fitting of
catalytic converters in new petrol-driven passenger cars was mandated in the four metro
centres and unleaded petrol was introduced.  Since April 2000, unleaded petrol has been108
available throughout the country.  In the case of road safety, numerous awareness
programmes have been arranged all over the country defining 2000-2010 as the “Safety
Decade”.
In developed countries, lead was phased out from petrol over a period of more than
10 years, while in India this was achieved in just six years.  The time gap between the
introduction of norms in Europe and India is gradually narrowing.  Euro I was introduced in
the European Union in 1983, while the same was introduced to India in 1996.  Euro II was
introduced in the European Union in 1996-1997.  Bharat Stage II norms, which are the
Indian equivalent of Euro II, were introduced for smaller passenger vehicles (gross vehicle
weight < 3.5 metric tons (mt) in 2000, and for heavier vehicles (gross vehicle weight
> 3.5 mt) from 2001 in the National Capital Region of Delhi.  For Mumbai, Chennai and
Kolkata, these standards were extended on different months in 2001.  These norms were
extended to the rest of the country in phases by 2005.  However, for some categories of
vehicles such as two-wheelers and three-wheelers, new generation norms have yet to be
announced.  Bharat Stage III norms have already been implemented in phases in many
Indian States (McKinsey, 2005).
In 2006, a draft Automotive Mission Plan Statement was released by the Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises (2006a), in consultation with the industry.  The
Government of India has drawn up an ambitious Automotive Mission Plan 2016, with the
following vision statement: “To emerge as the destination of choice in Asia for the design
and manufacture of automobiles and automotive components.  The output of India’s
automotive industry will be $145 billion, contributing to 10 per cent of India’s GDP, and
providing employment to 25 million persons additionally by 2016".  This document places
special emphasis on small cars, MUVs, two-wheelers and auto components.  Measures
suggested include setting up a National Auto Institute, upgrading infrastructure, cutting the
duties of raw materials and the provision of fiscal incentives for R&D.
In August 2006, the Working Group on the Automotive Industry, under the Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises (2006b), issued a report for the eleventh Five-Year
Plan.  This document stresses the need for speeding up the move towards VAT.  It also
mentions that labour regulations, the paperwork involved in government-related
transactions, internal trade barriers, infrastructure bottlenecks, raw materials, human capital,
increasing interest rates and threats resulting from RTAs are barriers to competitiveness.
The report notes that the effective levy is lower for a countervailing duty than for excise
duties locally, because excise duties include post-manufacturing expenses in the price,
while countervailing duty is levied on imported CBUs.  In addition, the document
recommends various other measures such as upgrading human resources, mandatory
inspection and control, and retirement of vehicles based on roadworthiness.
The Financial Bill for 2007/08 contained very few measures that affected the
automobile industry.  A cut in import tariffs to 10 per cent on commercial vehicles is expected
to induce further competition in the Indian commercial vehicles (CVs) sector.  Since CVs are
required in the development of infrastructure, duty reduction on CVs may boost
infrastructure improvement.  An increase in the total tax burden is certain to occur because109
of the increase in the education cess from 2 per cent to 3 per cent of total taxes.  For the
auto sector, the extension of R&D incentives for five more years, a reduction of the central
sales taxes and increased infrastructural expenditure are positive features of the budget.
The decline in tariff rates in auto components is being accompanied by the rapid
growth of this sector, although it had been widely feared that lower protection could harm
this sector.  However, the declines differ across segments.  Demand is partly driven by the
drop in prices due to customs and excise cuts for auto components as well as excise cuts
for automobiles; however, there are also other factors driving production such as rapid
income growth and the resultant expansion for demand.  Table 5.1 provides the tariff
phasing-out schedule from 2001 to 2009.  It is clear from the table that the tariff phasing out
for auto components is much higher than that for the automobiles.  Currently the debate is
centred on the import tariff on vehicles, which has not been reduced for some time.  Some
experts feel import duties, particularly on cars and motorcycles, should be rationalized in
a phased manner and only after ensuring that Indian automobile companies receive
comparable access to global markets.  Thus, the Indian automobile industry has come
a long way from a protected regime to a liberal environment.  However, the industry and the
Government feel that some protection is necessary to ensure the stability of the industry.
Existing strategic protection, in the form of higher tariffs in a few segments, stricter RoO etc.,
will also need to be relaxed in a phased manner.
Table 5.1. Basic customs duty structure for automobiles (in per cent?)
Vehicle Type of HS 2001/ 2002/ 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ 2008/
category  vehicle  code 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Used MUVs 8703 105 105 105 105 100 100 100 100
vehicles Cars 8703 105 105 105 105 100 100 100 100
Two- 8711 105 105 105 105 100 100 100 100
wheelers
Three- 8703 105 105 105 105 100 100 100 100
wheelers
New CBU MUVs 8703 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
vehicles Cars 8703 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
T w o - 8 7 1 1 6 06 0 6 06 06 06 06 06 0
wheelers
Three- 8703 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
wheelers
Completely MUVs 8703 35 30 25 20 15 12.5 10 10
knocked Cars 8703 35 30 25 20 15 12.5 10 10
down and Two- 8711 35 30 25 20 15 12.5 10 10
components wheelers
Three- 8703 35 30 25 20 15 12.5 10 10
wheelers
CVs 8702/04 35 30 25 20 15 12.5 10 10
Source: Calculation based on Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers data accessed at www.siamindia.
com/scripts/industrystatistics.aspx.110
5.3. Trade dynamics, RTA and data analysis
5.3.1. India’s trade in automobile and auto components
The growth of India’s automotive industry is driven by domestic demand.  India’s
share in world trade is quite small and international sales of vehicles have been increasing
gradually.  India has ambitious plans for achieving a target of $35 billion in exports by 2016
(Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, 2006a).  The Government is taking
measures to facilitate growth in the industry through the development of automotive clusters
that will serve as a base for automotive companies to produce and export from their
manufacturing facilities.
The industry is gaining worldwide recognition that is creating steady growth of
exports (figures 5.5 and 5.6).  Figure 5.6 categorizes four types of automobile exports, all of
which individually have an upward trend approaching or exceeding $1 million.  In total,
India’s automotive exports broke through the $1 billion level in 2003/04, and increased
further to $2.76 billion in 2006/07.  The industry exported 15 per cent of its passenger car
production, 10 per cent of commercial vehicles production, 26 per cent of three-wheeler
production and 7 per cent of two-wheeler production in 2006/07 (Ministry of Heavy
Industries and Public Enterprises, 2008).  The key exporters of passenger cars are Maruti
Suzuki, Tata Motors and Hyundai Motors, while the key exporter of MUVs is Mahindra and
Mahindra and the key exporters of two-wheelers are Bajaj Auto and the Hero Group.  India
exports mainly two-wheelers followed by small passenger cars.  In 2007/08, it exported
more than 800,000 two-wheelers and more than 200,000 cars (figure 5.5).  In terms of
Figure 5.5. Trends in the number of automobile exports from India
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, 2008; accessed at www.siamindia.com/scripts/
industrystatistics.aspx.
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Figure 5.6. Trends in the value of India’s automobile exports
Source: Based on India Trades, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Note: Y Axis: 8711, 8703, 8702, Secondary Y axis: 8704 measured 8702 – public transport-type
passenger motor vehicles; 8703 – cars and other motor vehicles for transporting persons
(excluding 8702), including racing cars etc.; 8704 – vehicles for transporting goods; and 8711
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value, India’s major gain has been in the passenger car segment since 2002 (figure 5.6).
Slow growth is observed in the commercial vehicle segment.  Although in terms of numbers,
India’s exports of two-wheelers have experienced a strong increase, it is not generating
large export revenue as export value growth in this segment is much less than that for car
exports.  Key export destinations are Western European countries, SAARC members, the
Middle East and North America.
Figure 5.7 depicts the trends in India’s global imports of automobiles in value terms.
Imports of cars for transportation of persons is highest followed by vehicles used for
transporting public goods.  Purchasing power is growing in parallel with the country’s growth
of GDP.  As a result, recent imports of passenger cars have increased significantly.
However, the export figures are much higher than those for imports in this segment.
Similarly, auto component exports have surged ahead as shown in figure 5.8.
Although there are still some barriers in terms of access to updated technological skills,
regulation of safety, maintenance of environmental standards etc., the export figures for the
auto component sector show that the sector has been developing at a rapid pace, especially
since 2004.112
Figure 5.7. Trends in value of India’s global automobile imports
Source: Based on India Trades, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Note: Y Axis: 8703, Secondary Y axis: 8704, 8711, 8702 measured. 8702 – public transport-type
passenger motor vehicles; 8703 – cars and other motor vehicles for transport of persons
(excluding 8702), including racing cars etc.; 8704 – vehicles for transporting goods; and 8711






















































































8703 8702 8704 8711
Figure 5.8. Trend in value of auto component exports by India
Source: Based on India Trades, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
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Figure 5.9. Trend in value of auto components imports by India
3 Auto component products as defined by ACMA are considered.  For the list of products refer to the
annex to this chapter.
During 2007/08, India’s total exports of auto components amounted to some
$3.3 billion (up from $700 million in 2000/01).
3  From 2000/01 to 2007/08, CAGR was
around 25 per cent.  India exports mainly chassis and body components, engine parts and
metal parts.
Imports of components have experienced a similar growth pattern.  In 2007/08,
imports of components amounted to some $4.9 billion.  During 2000/01-2007/8, CAGR for
imports increased by 30 per cent.  The main imports of components are from Asian
countries, the European Union and the United States.  Critical components are imported
mainly from Japan and Germany while non-critical components such as glass products,
locks etc., are imported from Thailand and China.  Body parts, engines and metal
components comprised the largest group of imported components.  The large increase in
exports and imports of components has ensured a thriving automobile sector in India.
Figure 5.9 indicates an increasing trend in imports of auto components by India from the
rest of the world.  Details of exports and imports by country are listed in the annex.
Source: Based on India Trades, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
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Like many other countries, India is slowly moving towards an over-capacity problem
and its move towards exports has been one step taken to deal with this problem.  As
a result, the entire sector is not geared up equally for exports; vehicle export growth has
been much higher than that of components.  During 2001/2-2007/8, exports of components
grew by 25 per cent, whereas export growth of vehicles was around 47 per cent.
The major export destinations for India’s exports of automobiles and components
are developed countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany as
well as developing countries such as those in the Middle East and SAARC members.
ASEAN has still not become a major destination for Indian auto component exports.
Exports to members of ASEAN are minimal, with the exception of Thailand which imported114
components from India valued at some $62 million in 2007/08.  In the case of vehicles, India
exports motorcycles, passenger cars, tractors, vehicles for transporting more than 10
persons and vehicles for transporting goods.  (Nag, Banerjee and Chatterjee, 2007).
On the other hand, India imports substantially from Japan (mainly high-technology
components), China and Thailand.  In 2007/8, Indian imports of components from Asia
(excluding the Middle East) amounted to some $2.4 billion (global imports totalled
$4.8 billion).  Imports from Japan and China totalled some $575 million and some
$484 million, respectively.  India’s imports from Thailand amounted to $234 million in
2007/08.  India also imports large amounts of safety components.  China and Thailand are
fast becoming major sourcing points for non-critical components such as metal parts, glass
materials, locks, steering systems, brakes, clutches etc.
However, the current financial crisis has led to a slowdown in the automobile sector.
Although detailed data are still unavailable, aggregate trade data for transport equipment
show that there was a decline in both exports and imports in 2008.  The decline in imports
was gradual and slow.  Exports experienced a sharp rise until May 2008 and thereafter fell
drastically.  The market contraction in the European Union and the United States was the
major cause of declining auto-component exports from India.
Figure 5.10. Monthly exports and imports of transport equipment by India
in the first nine months of 2008
Source: Data on principal commodities, India Trades, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.














































During the third quarter of 2008, sales of small and mid-sized cars as well as top-
end luxury cars remained steady, whereas the executive segment experienced a big
decline.  Companies such as Tata Motors, Maruti Suzuki, Hindustan Motors, Honda, and
Ford were in trouble, whereas Skoda and GM India did well.  Hyundai was more115
comfortable as it has always had an export market.  According to Mr. Ravi Kant of Tata
Motors, “given the slowdown in the third quarter, our key objective was to match production
with the demand for commercial vehicles to avoid build-up of inventory.  So we took limited
period closures at some of our commercial vehicles facilities.  To that extent, capacity
utilization has been less than normal, but it has served the important purpose of flexibly
managing inventory in our efforts to maintain the company’s profitability.  At present, our
plants are functioning normally.  Whether in good times or bad, our effort always is to
produce as per the market demand.”
4
Thus, because of the global recession, there has been a slowdown in sales in the
automobile sector due to a widespread lack of liquidity.  This occurred despite the fact that
the Indian economy is relatively insulated by the Government’s strong system of checks and
controls.
Table 5.2. Car sales in India, 2007-2008
Manufacturer 2007 2008 Per cent change
Maruti Suzuki 71 102 54 875 -22.8
Fiat Palio, 500 2 759 4 252 54.1
Ford Fusion 1 228 2 363 92.43
Chevrolet Spark 26 228 39 765 51.61
Hyundai Santro, Getz, i10, i20 166 960 210 307 25.96
Maruti Alto, Wagon R, Zen, Swift, A-Star 502 112 490 636 -2.29
Skoda Fabia 752 6 634 782.18
Tata India 142 435 110 361 -22.52
Total 842 474 864 318 2.59
Source: Business India, March 2009.
4 Business India, March 2009.
5.4. Indo-Thai FTA and expansion of Toyota’s IPN
India signed an FTA with Thailand in October 2003.  This was to be operated
through an EHS, covering 84 products including fruit, vegetables, wheat, diamonds and auto
components as identified for which the following accelerated duty reduction formula was to
be applied:
(a) By 31 March 2004, a 50 per cent reduction from existing rates;
(b) By 31 March 2005, a 75 per cent reduction from existing rates;
(c) By 31 March 2006, a 100 per cent reduction from existing rates.
Consequent to this trade agreement, India’s exports of helical springs, pumps, ball
bearings and lighting equipment to Thailand declined sharply.  Exports of gearboxes and116
parts for the spark-ignition internal combustion piston engines to Thailand were increased in
all of these product categories during the 2004 to 2006 period.  India has a positive trade
balance with Thailand only in gearboxes.  The FTA has served well as an indicator that
when India opens up trade with a country that is competitive in the auto industry, mutual
gains are possible; in this particular case, India is competitive with Thailand in certain
segments such as gearboxes.  Table 5.3 shows the bilateral trade of two auto components
under EHS between India and Thailand.  The growth of gearbox sales (HS 870840) is
noteworthy.  India exports of gearboxes to Thailand amounted to more than $30 million
annually from 2005/06 to 2007/08 compared with less than $1 million in 2003/04.
Table 5.3. India’s exports to, and imports from Thailand
(auto components under EHS)
(Unit: Millions of United States dollars)
Gearboxes Parts used for spark-ignition
HS Code in engine
870840 840991
Year Exports Imports Exports Imports
2001/02 0.01 0.44 0.01
2002/03 0.54 0.72 0.73
2003/04 0.33 0.01 0.89 6.8
2004/05 9.05 0.12 0.94 1.51
2005/06 31.53 1.35 2.05 2.52
2006/07 35.28 1.27 1.29 2.19
2007/08 30.24 0.75 0.32 3.06
Source: India Trades database, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Since 2004, Toyota’s Indian auto component joint venture company, Toyota Kirloskar
Auto Parts (TKAP), situated near Bangalore, has been producing gearboxes for its
assembly plants in different parts of the world, including in Thailand.  This is the main
reason for the rising exports of gearboxes.  TKAP thus has joined a select group of Toyota
manufacturing bases in the ASEAN region, South Africa and Argentina that, together,
manufacture components and vehicles for export to countries in Europe, Asia, and Central
and South America.  This is called the IMV-Project by Toyota; it is an attempt at setting up
an internationally coordinated production system by designating manufacturing bases in
India and South-East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
and Viet Nam.  Hence, TKAP is truly a part of an IPN.
However, it is difficult to prove whether the export growth of gearboxes is due to the
RTA, as Toyota decided to make India a sourcing platform around the same time that the
agreement was signed, although the plant actually started operating some months later.
The 100 per cent export-oriented unit of TKAP produces R-type gearboxes are exported to
Toyota worldwide.  Toyota is also considering sourcing automotive hardware such as forged117
parts, metal components and sub-assemblies produced by the Indian operations.  Sourcing
software from India is another possibility that Toyota will explore.  Toyota’s plan is to expand
the IPN in such a way that Toyota’s production facilities in India and the ASEAN region will
complement one another.
Toyota’s plans also include stepping up the production capacity in Thailand for diesel
engines and in Indonesia for gasoline engines.  The new drive for an expanded IPN is an
important Toyota strategy.  For example, as Toyota Indonesia is specializing in multipurpose
passenger vehicles it is natural for Toyota to integrate the production system of multipurpose
passenger vehicles (such as the Innova) in both India and Indonesia.  In this context, Indian
imports from Indonesia, especially critical components such as engines and related
components, may increase in the near future as a part of intra-company trade between the
two Toyota bases set up in India and Indonesia.  Moreover, the company is planning to
launch small cars in India with engines imported from ASEAN countries such as Indonesia
or Thailand.  The company wants to gain from any RTA that India is likely to sign with
ASEAN countries, which will allow it to import the products at zero duty.  However, other
members of the industry feel engine components should remain on the negative list, at least
for the time being.
5.5. Empirical analysis as a measure of involvement in IPN:
Intra-Industry Trade Index calculation
To understand the two-way trade in auto components, an attempt was made to
calculate the intra-industry trade (IIT) index by following the Grubel-Lloyd method.  The
index values lie between 0 and 1.  The higher the value, the higher is the extent of two-way
trade in similar products.  It was assumed that when a component crosses the border for
value addition, while the HS code of the product at the disaggregated level may change it
remains within the same product category.  For example, half-finished body parts go to
another location for value addition and then come back across the border as body parts (but
they may have a different HS code).  The higher IIT indicates the existence of an IPN
among the trading nations.
In this section, all 8-digit HS codes (as identified by ACMA) have been divided into
a few broader categories (table 5.4).  A group IIT
5 has been calculated, taking into
consideration India’s exports and imports with selected trade partners (with which India is
involved significantly in auto components trading).  This yields some interesting results.  It is
clear that IIT is high with Western countries in several product groups.  For example, in the
United States for ignition parts (under HS 73) and seats (under HS 94) it is as high as 0.55
and 0.57, respectively.  Similarly, for Italy the value of IIT is quite high rubber products
5 The following formula is used to arrive at the group level IIT, considering N observations (8-digit
level export-import) in the group IITGroup =   Σ 
N
     
                       
 X (GLi )  where GLi = 1 –
(GL = Grubel-Lloyd Index).
i = 1
Xi + Mi





(under HS 40) and metal products (under HS 73).  In chassis and body parts (under HS 87)
there is a high level of intra-industry trade between India and Germany.  In comparison, in
the case of the Asian countries the value of IIT is significant, with countries such as
Malaysia (rubber products under HS 40 and metal parts under HS 73), Japan (locks for
vehicles under HS 83), China (brake lining products under HS 68) and Indonesia (metal
parts under HS 73).  However, the value of the group IIT is not so significant
6 for Thailand
across all auto component products.  The highest IIT for Thailand is visible in products such
as taxi meters, tachometers etc.  The benefit of EHS, as mentioned in the India-Thai FTA
has barely been reaped as per the list, which constitutes two auto components products.
Thus, the Indian component manufacturers are more involved in trade with the Western
economies than with South and South-East Asian countries.  This raises the question of the
advantages of RTAs with Asian countries as well as the involvement of the auto components
industry as a whole in the production networks.  A counter-argument may be made that as
there is no trade agreement (in which India is a party) with a significant focus on auto
components, IPNs cannot spread into India.  The survey and interviews showed that Indian
auto-component producers have more joint ventures with Tier 1 suppliers from European
and United States companies, and perhaps will continue in that direction to enable them to
achieve a global link with automobile majors.  In that context, RTAs with South-East Asian
countries will increase India’s imports only.  Exports may not rise much unless some Asian
MNCs develop joint ventures (e.g., TKAP) with Indian producers to procure components.
Table 5.4. Group IIT of products traded between India and selected economies,
2007-2008
(Unit: Millions of United States dollars)
Products (No. of




Germany China Japan Thailand Indonesia Malaysia
HS level)
Rubber products under 0.33 0.51 0.54 0.29 0.29 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.67
HS 40 (13)
Brake-lining products 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.48 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.00
under HS 68 (5)
Glass materials under 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.13
HS 70 (7)
Metal parts under 0.42 0.51 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.50 0.68
HS 73 (13)
Locks for Motor vehicles 0.02 0.36 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.03 0.53 0.00
under HS 83 (3)
Ignition and other parts 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.21 0.26
under HS 84 (75)
Motor parts under 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.37 0.28
HS 85 (33)
6 A group IIT value below 0.4 is not considered significant.119
5.5.1. Qualitative analysis based on the survey, interviews and discussions
This section deals with various qualitative aspects that are considered important to
understanding the issues related to IPNs.  Detailed discussions were held with senior
managers from OEMs, Tier I and Tier II suppliers.  Inputs from automobile and auto-
component producers’ associations also proved useful for this purpose.  Several
government officials and researchers were also consulted with regard to India’s policy
towards FTAs and their impact on the industry.  OEMs were mainly questioned on their
global supply chain strategy, their views on competitiveness and its relation to procurement
as well as whether they were benefitting from RTAs and their expectations.  Follow-up
questions were designed for component suppliers in order to track the supply chain.
Component manufacturers were asked to explain how they were developing collaboration
with international players and whether or not RTAs were important for them.  Questions
were also asked regarding the current duty structure, non-tariff measures, technology
absorption, risk sharing with OEMs and the possibility of product diversification.  Industry
associations provided guidance on the formation of policies, the future direction and
potentiality of the Indian automotive industry as well as their views and lobbying strategy
used to influence the Government’s policy towards RTAs.  Government officials shared their
ideas on the negotiation strategy for RTAs.  The following sections summarize the
qualitative analysis of various issues pertaining to IPNs.
5.6. Indian automobile industry: Looking for an international
supply chain
India’s automobile industry has undergone significant changes in the context of
globalization, implementation of lean production and the development of modularization
have changed the relationships between automobile assemblers (OEM) and their suppliers.
Stiff competition among manufacturers has resulted in more mergers and acquisitions.  The
challenges facing automobile manufacturers and suppliers include improving quality,
meeting cost-reduction targets and improving the time taken for products to reach the
Table 5.4 (continued)
(Unit: Millions of United States dollars)
Products (No. of
United United




Germany China Japan Thailand Indonesia Malaysia
HS level)
Chassis and body parts 0.21 0.40 0.14 0.62 0.14 0.12 0.26 0.72 0.27
under HS 87 (38)
Other equipment under 0.05 0.09 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.13 0.00
HS 90 (5)
Instruments under 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HS 91 (1)
Seats under HS 94 (1) 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.00
Source: India Trades database, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Note: Calculation based on data for India’s exports and imports with the partner countries.120
market (time-to-market).  Thus, the organizations today are driven more towards greater
product differentiation, using cutting-edge R&D, innovative sales and marketing approaches,
and increasing their focus on boosting efficiencies in the manufacturing and supply chain.
Hence, in this age of global outsourcing, supply chain management (SCM) plays a crucial
role.
SCM helps in demand forecasting, taking orders, giving an accurate promised
delivery date, sourcing and manufacturing the right goods, positioning inventory properly,
and pick, pack and efficient trans-shipment; most importantly, SCM makes a world of





Product flow is the movement of goods from supplier to OEMs as well as customer
returns or service requirements.  Information flow covers updating the status of deliveries as
well as sharing information between suppliers and manufacturers.  Finance flow
encompasses credit terms, payment schedules, and consignment and title ownership
arrangements.
India’s automobile industry has achieved a global footprint.  While most global OEMs
and component majors are well-established in India, local OEMs, such as Tata Motors,
Mahindra and Mahindra and TVS Motors, suppliers such as Bharat Forge and Sundaram
Fasteners, have a significant global presence.





Tata Motors Global joint venture with Memorandum of Understanding to manufacture
Fiat, Italy, 2006. passenger vehicles, engines and transmissions
for Indian and overseas markets.
Marco Polo, Brazil, 2006. Manufacture and assembly of fully built buses
and coaches.
Hispano Carrocara, A 21 per cent stake in a leading bus/coach
Spain, 2005. manufacturer.
Assembly plants in Assembly of CKDs exported to these countries.
Malaysia, Spain, Ukraine
and Russian Federation.
Mahindra Mahindra Australia, 2005. Branch Office and assembly operations.
and Stokes Group, Auto-component manufacturer.
Mahindra United Kingdom, 2005.
Joint venture with Renault Export focused joint venture with Renault for
France, 2005. manufacture of Logan sedan, which was launched
in India in 2007.121
Apart from the large and growing domestic market, many OEMs are looking at India
as a significant global sourcing hub for auto components as well as specific products such
as small cars.  The manufacturing companies have adopted e-sourcing, which has helped
them to reorganize the purchasing process and provided support for aggregated buying
across business units compared to the traditional strategic sourcing process.  The process
reduces time spent on negotiating, accelerates information gathering, and speeds up
communication channels among buyers and sellers.  The rapid surge in global sourcing of
auto components has also become a challenge for manufacturers and suppliers, although
sourcing has reduced the cost of production substantially.  Exports are playing an increasing
role in India’s automobile industry with manufacturers such as Hyundai (which has already
made India the world source for the i10), Renault-Nissan (which is using India as a supply
hub for small cars) and Ford, Chevrolet, Honda, Toyota and VW, which are investing in new
capacity for supplying local and overseas markets.
The foreign sales of Indian automakers are also increasingly being made through
directly-owned or joint venture-based foreign operations, rather than exclusively through
exports from Indian manufacturing facilities.  Indian companies have bought capacity or
made alliances with other automakers in East Asia, South America, Africa and Europe.  For
example, TVS and Bajaj Auto have a strong presence in Asian and Latin American markets
where there is strong demand for two-wheelers.  Both companies recorded export growth of
more than 50 per cent in 2006 and have recently expanded manufacturing capacity in
Indonesia.
On the other hand, the Indian auto component industry has become the hub for
high-quality, low-cost products.  The reforms adopted by the Government have opened up
tremendous opportunities for investment and technology transfer, specializing niche
technology and for complementing the range of commodities with the world’s latest and best
products.  India’s low labour costs and high level of available management and engineering
skills have maintained the competitiveness of domestic auto companies and made the
country an attractive location for direct manufacturing investors.  This is a clear indication






Subsidiaries in Italy, Assembly and auto components.
South Africa and Uruguay.
TVS Motors Proposed Columbian Assembly of scooters/motorcycles from CKD
 joint venture in which units.
TVS Motors will have a
26 per cent stake, 2006.
Assembly plant in $55 million investment in one of the world’s
Indonesia. largest producer of two-wheeler parts.
Source: Company annual reports.122
export-driven component manufacturers now exist together with large-scale SMEs that
produce basic components.  However, India is still operating on a low scale of production
compared with China and has yet to move to the higher levels of the value chain.  In
addition, India does not have a clear policy on IPN formation.  The gradual move towards
a liberalized policy in the auto component sector has seen a large increase in exports and
imports of components.  However, companies are finding that the current policy regime is
more conducive than in the past with regard to international collaboration, thereby indirectly
connecting them to some form of IPN.
Table 5.6. Recent acquisitions by Indian auto component manufacturers
Manufacturer Acquisitions and investments abroad
Bharat Forge • FAW Corporation in China, 52 per cent, 2006.
• Imatra Kilsta, Sweden, 2005.
• CDP Aluminiumtechnik GmbH, Germany, 2004.
• Carl Dan, Germany, 2004.
Amtek Auto • Zelter GmBH, Germany, 2006.
• GWK, United Kingdom, 2004.
• Smith Jones Inc., United States, 2002.
Sundaram Fasteners • Peiner, Germany, 2005.
• Bleishtal, Germany, 2004.
Source: Company annual reports.
5.7. International production network: Maruti-Suzuki and Tata
Motors
Since the mid-1990s there has been a paradigm shift in the Indian production
process, with many domestic as well as international companies coming into play with the
surge in globalization.  The average life cycle of passenger car models is coming down
significantly, and product differentiation and customization have become key factors leading
to the emergence of a range of new car models.  In this context, the OEMs have had to
explore the segment of domestic consumers to which they are marketing in order to remain
competitive in the Indian market.  Hence, the modification of supply chain strategy was
inevitable and hard price negotiations have been needed, with suppliers passing more risk
to them.  The need for establishing joint venture suppliers has declined as a number of
competitive and matured suppliers are already present in the ancillary sector.
Sometimes an OEM brings the technology from its parent country and develops the
supply base through a local commercial relationship.  For example, in the case of windshield
glass, Maruti-Suzuki was proactive in introducing the technology of “zone-toughened”
glass.
7 Together with trade liberalization, the opportunity has arisen for importing even
7 When hit, zone-toughened glass leaves comparatively fewer scratches on the driver’s side, allowing
the car to be driven to the nearest service station.  It is expected that this technology will give Maruti an
edge over its competitors.123
bigger and much cheaper components from competitive sources.  In India alone, from
2001/02 to 2008/09 tariffs on components and CKDs decreased from 35 per cent to 10 per
cent.  Tariff reductions are also common in other countries.  In response to this change,
Suzuki has developed a global sourcing policy and tries to procure components from its
trusted suppliers throughout the world (e.g., Suzuki is procuring modules from Faurecia
8
through its presence in different countries).  Earlier, the focus was on localization; more
recently, however, policy has shifted to procuring from major Tier 1 suppliers of Suzuki
through “requests for quotations”.  As a result, Tier 1 suppliers of Suzuki now have the
opportunity to supply components and modules to Suzuki plants located in different parts of
the world.  Through this process, Suzuki is involved in developing its own IPN.  In Asia, its
network is expected to increase the two-way trade of components and modules among the
countries where Suzuki’s plants are located, such as China, India and Indonesia.  Due to
the differences in localization levels, exports of cars have been limited in the past.  However,
Maruti was able to penetrate the small-car market by keeping in view the market realities.
9
Recently, it has been observed that independent suppliers – particularly those in
Tier 1 – are developing IPNs with many automobile companies.  For example, Delphi and
Lumax are expanding their activities in India through green-field investment and have
developed tie-ups with many companies such as Tata Motors, Maruti, Toyota and GM.
10
Indian component manufacturers have tie-ups mainly with Japanese or European sources in
addition to domestic firms.  While expanding internationally or exporting to other countries,
Indian companies have to adhere to global standards.  Although Indian component
manufacturers are potentially capable of supplying quality products efficiently, slow
technology transfer sometimes prevents their full potentiality from being tapped.  As a result,
Indian companies (particularly the Tier 1 suppliers) sometimes have to participate in joint
ventures in order to enhance their exports.
11
According to Sigma Corporation, big OEMs in Asia made the first move in
developing joint ventures; however, in Europe there are already many powerful Tier 1 firms
and developing tie-ups with them helps Indian companies to supply major global OEMs.  In
contrast, Indian companies remain partly constrained if a joint venture partner is an Asian
OEM, as they end up mainly supplying the parent OEM and have limited scope of supplying
8 See www.faurecia.com/pages/products/modules.asp.
9 Maruti-Suzuki exports entry-level models to more than 100 countries, and the focus has been on
identifying new market opportunities.  Currently, Latin America and Africa constitute emerging markets to
which Maruti’s exports increased by at least 60 per cent in 2007. The company sold 53,024 units during
2007/08.  This is the highest-ever yearly export volume for the company, and represented a growth of
35 per cent over the previous year (see: www.marutisuzuki.com/exports.aspx).
10 For details refer to articles about Lumax and Delphi available at www.indiaautomotive.net/
2008_06_29_archive.html.
11 Discussions with Sigma Corporation (producing anti-vibration materials for supplying Indian OEMS
such as  Tata Motors in India and a huge export market in Europe, particularly Germany, as well as
companies such as GM and Ford).  Sigma has joint venture partners from Germany; however, it is
now developing partnerships with companies from other countries.  For details see www.
sigmacorporation.com.124
other companies.  As availability of the best technology and developing networks globally
are major issues, SKH Metals feels that government intervention, in terms of customer
participation and transfer of technical know-how, may be important for the healthy growth
and long-term success of Indian Tier 1 suppliers in international markets.
12
In looking at market reality, Indian companies such as Maruti have had to revise their
supply chain strategy, just like many other OEMs.  To survive in today’s highly competitive
world, Suzuki has focused on the “lean production” system where focus is put on the
reduction of inventory costs and testing time.  Globally, Suzuki requires its supplier(s) to be
located near its plants.  However, in a country such as India, some suppliers only assemble
the final parts or modules at their plant located near the Maruti factory, and produce
components at relatively distant plants.  Previously, quality checks of all delivered
components were only carried out at the Maruti factory.  Under the current system, quality
checking systems are installed at the suppliers and the reports are sent to Maruti
electronically.  The products are based on three major parameters; the critical parameter,
major parameter and minor parameter.  Accordingly, the products are produced and the
complete manufacturing controlled by a statistical process control chart that is monitored
and evaluated by Maruti, using the suppliers’ reports.  Thus the regulation of standards has
been centralized.  Maruti has devised the e-procurement system, which applies the “just-in-
time” delivery principle that requires the products to be supplied as soon as demand is
generated.  On average, the inventory stocks at Maruti are only sufficient for two hours while
at the suppliers’ assembly plants, stocks are sufficient for around two days.  If the suppliers
have a production plant in the south or the west of the country (in other automobile clusters),
transit time is around four days.  Factoring in this additional time, adequate stocks are kept
for seven days.
Moreover, Maruti is in the process of procuring parts from Tier 1 suppliers; the
company does not depend only on one particular supplier.  Normally, a “request for
quotation” is raised by the company for procuring a specific component for a specific model.
The lowest bid gets the order for that particular model.  For example, for manufacturing
headlamps there may be three to four potential suppliers, but the final order goes to only
one supplier.  For example, Lumax
13 is supplying headlamps to Maruti Swift.
In contrast, Indian companies such as Tata Motors have set a goal of building
low-cost cars.  The company is more vertically integrated and follows the model of
technology sharing together with risk-sharing with its suppliers.  It is linked with its suppliers
through the formation of its own set-up of segments from component manufacturing to the
final vehicle.  As such, the nature of the supply chain is different from that applied by Maruti.
With the launch of its new product, Nano, the company is encouraging entrepreneurs to
form small assembly units.  Tata Motors will provide training and oversee their quality
12 Discussions with SKH Metals (producing fuel tanks, exhaust systems and suspension parts for
Maruti).   See http://skhmetals.com.wbplanus5.onlyfordemo.com/.
13 See www.lumaxlighting.com, and for more news about Lumax, read the article, “Lumax to expand
capacity, set up three new manufacturing units in this fiscal year”, available at www.indiaautomotive.net/
2008_06_29_archive.html125
assurance, and will help them to develop satellite assembly operations.  Tata will remain
pro-active during the development process, and it will provide specifications to suppliers and
monitor the component development stage.
Tata’s relatively small team of engineers designed the Nano from the bottom up;
features were chosen that would meet the explicit needs of the target market, and
non-traditional suppliers were selected and co-located to be linked with Tata’s own
manufacturing.  Tata calculates the cost backwards for each model and fixes a direct
material cost target.  Then the company looks for the supplier who can provide consistent
supplies.  In terms of procurement, Tata creates its own village together with trusted
suppliers (around 60).  Vendors are asked to send materials in knocked-down form and Tata
fits these components on its many mid-assembly and feeder lines.  Tata uses a third-party
logistic system to ensure efficient delivery.  A logistics company coordinates vendors and the
OEM final assembly line.  The company maintains an inventory that is approximately three
times the production of a “shift”.  Tata therefore depends heavily on a localized supply chain
industry.  More than 95 per cent of its components are supplied by local firms, with a small
range of specific items being imported.  In some cases, when Tata believes that domestic
suppliers are pushing up prices, it imports the items involved in order to place pressure on
the domestic suppliers.  Tata has offices in a number of countries (e.g., China and Thailand),
which maintain supplies of stable and quality components.
Hence, the essence of the SCM solution lies in coordinating the flow of information
and goods between the customers and the network of suppliers, manufacturers and
distributors.  A comparative framework of the SCM model for Maruti-Suzuki and Tata Motors
is presented in figure 5.11.
Both Maruti and Tata keep a close watch on the protection of their technical
know-how.  Although it is easy to monitor joint-venture suppliers, this is not the case with
independent suppliers.  However, joint-venture suppliers are now allowed to supply other
OEMs and export independently.  Some joint-venture suppliers have been able to rise up
the value chain and reach a position where they can supply similar products to different




5.8.1. Do RTAs matter for IPNs?
A rise has been observed in intraregional trade in parts and components in East and
South-East Asia, and the auto component sector is expected to follow this trend.  However,
the challenge of whether the auto components sector can grow will come with final demand
from other continents.  In the case of the European Union and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the auto component trade is greatly influenced by domestic demand for
14 Source:  Discussions with SKH Metals.  See also http://skhmetals.com.wbplanus5.onlyfordemo.com.126
final goods.  In the case of Asia, demand for final goods is not from within Asia (except
Japan, the Republic of Korea and, to some extent, India and China); rather the demand is
from the European Union and the United States.  As discussed above, the export
destination of the components manufactured in India are the Western economies, whereas
procurement of auto components, i.e., imports of the auto component parts, are from Asia.
Although the successful implementation of the RTAs within Asia and the Pacific may boost
the auto components trade, the final demand is mainly in the United States and European
markets; therefore, the importance of regional integration may be reconsidered.  Obviously,
the RTA between Thailand and India has resulted in lower tariffs for specific components
listed under EHS, but whether that has really promoted trade in auto components between
Figure 5.11. Inventory and SCM model for Maruti-Suzuki and Tata Motors
Note: Discussions with company officials and Tier I suppliers were extremely useful.  However, this
illustration was prepared by the author.
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the countries remains a cause for concern.  A few companies such as Toyota have been
able to enjoy the benefits of the RTA, but Indian auto component manufacturers in general
have not received any substantial advantages.
China is a large exporter of auto components and it will reach close to its capacity
soon.  Non-wage costs are also increasing in China and the country’s weak IPR regime is
a cause for concern.  India is a natural choice for the next destination of high investment in
the auto component sector.  The country has already shown significant export growth of
critical auto components.  However, India and the rest of South Asia are still outside the
regional groupings of East and South-East Asian countries, which act as market access
barriers.  Since business in the auto component sector is based on low margins and high
volumes, further liberalization will definitely help countries to export more within the region.
However, a mere increase in exports does not necessarily mean that companies are directly
part of IPNs.  A special effort is required to connect players of each tier so that the supply
chain becomes smooth; until now, IPNs have been driven only by MNCs (such as Toyota’s
effort to produce and export gearboxes from India).  SME exporters remain at the bottom of
the value chain, supplying many players independently yet are only slightly connected with
production networks.  Unless investment and technology come from big companies or
MNCs, the SMEs will not be able to move up the value chain.  As mentioned above, in the
case of the India-Thailand FTA only companies such as Toyota’s joint venture TKAP in India
are able to reap the benefits.
In other potential RTAs, Indian companies are inclined to put many critical auto
components (as many as 76)
15 on the negative list due to apprehension that Chinese auto
components could enter the country through South-East Asia (even without having sufficient
value addition).  These 76 items have been identified as sensitive by ACMA, SIAM and
UNCTAD.
16  Reservations have also been expressed about possible RoO.  Therefore, the
auto component industry in India has made the following suggestions on preferential RoO:
(a) A change of customs tariff classification at the 4-digit level (from import to
export);
(b) A value addition (transaction value build-down method) minimum of 50 per
cent (including the value of subcomponent imports of parent assemblies);
(c) Non-qualifying processes – packaging, re-packaging, polishing, finishing, mere
assembly or disassembly, inspection, internal transport, freight, anti-rust
applications, oiling etc., or a combination of these processes.
From the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that with the existing trend of trade in
auto components between India and Asian countries, India expects a possible surge in
imports only.  India may not be able to export more from the SME segments to Asian
countries.  RTAs with East and South-East Asian countries may result in only one-way trade.
While India’s automobile industry is positive about SAFTA and RTAs such as that with Chile,
15 Working Group on the automotive industry’s eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012), and the
Department of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises; (August 2006).
16 Ibid, p. 19.128
the Gulf Cooperation Council etc., and is seeking market access in neighbouring countries,
it has serious reservations regarding RTAs with Thailand, BIMSTEC, ASEAN, China and the
Republic of Korea, among others.  Figure 5.12 shows that India is linked more strongly with
Western countries with regard to a possible circular flow of final goods and components
than with countries in East and South-East Asia, from which it is mainly importing.  Thus,
there is apprehension about including auto components in RTAs with Asian countries.
Figure 5.12. Direction of trade in India’s automobile sector
The current study concluded that IPNs must result in a two-way trade of auto
components, so that both countries involved benefit from increased intra-industry trade.
However, there is no guarantee that RTAs will ensure that result.  Favourable initial industry
environment and efficiency levels are necessary for reaping the benefits of RTAs, otherwise
the result may be only one-way trade.  SMEs may not be in a position to integrate with the
production network, which is mainly driven by MNCs.  Technological collaboration and the
capability to rise up the value chain with innovative management skills are necessary
requirements for an Indian auto component manufacturer to enter into a production network.
In the case of India, auto component exports are directed more towards the European
Union, the United States and Canada.  Technology absorption by domestic players is
helping them to become efficient but they are not fully prepared to face the competition from
South-East Asia.  Hence, there are reservations about fully opening the auto component
sector in India.  Moreover, duties on components have come down in recent years in India,
and this unilateral liberalization appears to have provided some opportunities for foreign
companies to expand their operations in India.  However, until now, most foreign companies
have been seeking local suppliers rather than depending on imported components, unless













































































































































































































































































































6.  Trade liberalization and international production
networks: Indonesia’s automotive industry
Mochamad Pasha and Ira Setiati
6.1. Introduction
The move towards product fragmentation in order to reduce costs in recent years
has prompted the expansion of international production networks (IPNs).  For the
automotive industry the move is more prevalent in East Asia, dominated by Japanese
automakers such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Suzuki.  In recent years, the region has
also witnessed the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), particularly in
South-East Asia.  Although it is widely recognized that the development of IPNs predated
the proliferation of FTAs, it is accepted that IPNs could be enhanced and strengthened
through RTAs.
Indonesia has taken an active role in the establishment of RTAs and other trade
agreements such as APEC, ASEAN+3 and ACFTA (ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement)
as well as the recent Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA).  This has
enabled the Indonesian automotive industry to gain a greater foothold in the development of
IPNs in the region.  Thus, the objective of this chapter is to examine the role of RTAs in the
establishment of IPNs in Indonesia’s automotive sector.
It was found that although the proliferation of RTAs has stepped up the “race to the
bottom” in tariff rates for Indonesia, the agreements have had a “noodle bowl” effect on
trade in East Asia, specifically in the case of overlapping rules of origin (RoO).  Classical
issues such as legal certainties still plague the Indonesian economy; this is affecting the
automotive industry, which needs to attract more local and foreign investment to enable
business expansion.  Logistics is also a key factor in establishing IPNs in Indonesia.  The
development of the logistics infrastructure is critical since product fragmentation needs
a steady flow of goods from one country to another.
The first part of this chapter addresses the profile of the local automotive sector,
followed by an examination of the policy environment for the sector.  The growth,
establishment, prospects and the relationship between IPNs and FTAs in the Indonesian
automotive sector are considered then followed by the conclusion.
6.2. Industry profile
The automotive industry (including auto components) is one of Indonesia’s key
industrial sectors, with Rp. 13.9 trillion of investment in 2006 and generating employment for
about 185,000 persons (table 6.1).132
Similar to several other countries in the region, Indonesia’s domestic automotive
manufacturers have been supplying, assembling and distributing foreign automotive brands
– mostly Japanese.  In the automobile industry, since the 1997-1998 economic crisis, many
brand-holding sole agents have switched their role to perform only as sole distributors of
Japanese car makers.  This was particularly the case with Indonesia’s largest homegrown
automobile companies, PT. Toyota Astra Motor and PT. Indomobil Suzuki International.
Toyota Motor Corp. took control (95 per cent) of its assembling division in 2001.  Similarly,
Suzuki Motor Corp. took over the manufacturing division of PT. Indomobil Suzuki
International.  The distribution business of Suzuki cars is now being taken care of by PT.
Indomobil Niaga International.  In the motorcycle industry, the big players are PT. Astra
Honda Motor (resulting from the merger between PT.  Federal Motor and PT. Honda Federal
effective from 1 January 2001), PT. Indomobil Suzuki International (49 per cent owned by
Suzuki Motor Corp.), PT. Yamaha Indonesia Motor Mfg. (100 per cent Japanese-owned,
with the majority held by Yamaha Motor and the minority share by Japanese trading
companies) and PT. Kawasaki Motor Indonesia (60 per cent owned by Kawasaki).  Again,
nearly all these companies represent Japanese brands – accounting for more than 99 per
cent of Indonesia’s total automotive production.  About 300 companies currently produce
and supply auto components to the above brand-holding sole agents (with extensive
product coverage, ranging from shock absorbers and brake systems to wiring harnesses.
Some of them are considered to be SMEs).
Indonesia is currently the third-largest car market in South-East Asia after Thailand
and Malaysia.  Figures from GAIKINDO show that up to September 2008, approximately
454,000 vehicles were sold.  When the Government raised fuel prices in May 2008, it was
predicted that demand for cars would decline.  It did not happen.  By October 2008,
GAIKINDO had already revised upwards its own projection for 2008 sales twice.  Currently,
the number stands at 600,000 (projected).  As the recent crisis in developed economies
unfolded, GAIKINDO predicted 2009 sales would decline by about 40 per cent.
Table 6.1. Profile of Indonesia’s automotive industry
Classification
Cars Motorcycles Components  Total
Total industry 37 (20) 77 350 445
Investment (Rp. trillion) 3.4 3.0 7.5 13.9
Annual capacity 855 000 6 575 000 150
Employment 35 270 30 000 120 000 185 000
Exports 255.0 28.9 1 482.7 1 766.2
(Million United States dollars)
Imports 1 327.2 21.1 2 814.1 4 162.4
(Million United States dollars)
Source: Gabungan Industry Alat-alat Mobil dan Motor (GIAMM/Indonesian Automotive Parts and
Components Industries Association).133
In Indonesia, domestic vehicle sales were dominated by passenger vehicles,
1
especially the 4x2 type, followed by pickups/trucks, which were categorized as commercial
cars together with buses.
In the case of motorcycles, domestic market sales increased significantly in 2008
(table 6.2).  This was partly due to the higher cost of fuel (the Government decision to
increase fuel prices in May and October 2008) that made consumers switch to cheaper
modes of transportation such as motorcycles.  Data from the Indonesian Motorcycle
Industry Association (AISI) showed that domestic motorcycle sales grew from less than
1 million units in 2000 to reach more than 4.7 million units in 2007 and 6 million units as of
October 2008.
The highest annual growth (60 per cent) was recorded in 2001 when the number
rose to more than 1.6 millions units.  In 2006, sales were slightly down from 5.086 million
units in 2005 to 4.47 million units due to higher fuel costs, but rebounded in 2007 (4.713
million units); this trend continued in 2008.  However, the sales target for 2009 was slashed
by 30 per cent (to 4 million units) in anticipation of the worsening global economic crisis.
Figure 6.1. Production process in Indonesia’s automotive industry
Source: Gabungan Industri Kendaraan Bermotor Indonesia (GAIKINDO/Association of Indonesian
Automotive Industries).
1 Passenger cars comprise three categories – sedans, MPV 4x2s and SUV 4x4s – each with
a different type of engine.  Commercial cars also comprise three categories – buses, pickups/trucks and
double-cabin 4x2s/4x4s, each with a different weight.134




Total motorcycles Total auto components
(Units) (Rp. billion)
2000 979 422 13 798.2
2001 1 650 770 14 384.3
2002 2 317 991 15 738.7
2003 2 823 703 21 747.7
2004 3 900 518 28 707.2
2005 5 086 617 46 210.3
2006 4 470 722 n.a.
2007 4 713 895 n.a.
2008
b 6 000 000 n.a.
Source: AISI.
a Excluding imported motorcycles from China.
b Estimated figure.
Following the trend (particularly that of motorcycle sales), Indonesia’s automotive
component market also expanded.
6.2.1. Production data
With foreign principals generally controlling ownership of automotive companies in
Indonesia, IPNs have become very important.  Indonesia has become the production centre
for the Suzuki APV and Toyota Kijang Innova, which are exported to markets in other
ASEAN countries.
Passenger and commercial car production increased from 2003 to 2005.  In 2006,
production declined by about 40 per cent to 296,008 from 500,710 units in 2005.  The figure
then continued to rise, and in September 2008 (table 6.3) domestic production of
automobiles reached 453,057 units, 69 per cent of which comprised 4x2 vehicles.
In the motorcycle industry, almost all domestic demand was met by local products
with high (90 per cent) local content.  The latest available data from 2005 and 2006 show
that when the annual domestic market sales reached 5.1 million units and 4.47 million units,
respectively, local production was recorded at 5.126 million units and 4.46 million units,
respectively.  This highlighted the fact that while most (if not all) automobile manufacturing
operations in Indonesia and ASEAN were suffering from the lack of economies-of-scale,
the region’s motorcycle industries were enjoying reasonable success and efficient
manufacturing operations due to their sizable markets.135
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P = petrol; D = diesel.137
6.2.2. Export-import
Export performance was quite robust up to the third quarter of 2008.  Compared with
2007, for which only 60,000 units were recorded, automobile exports were estimated to
have reached 90,000 units by the end of 2008.  Data from the Ministry of Industry showed
that up to October 2008, more than 80,000 units had been exported.
Table 6.4 shows the value of exports and imports by the automotive sector up to
2005.  Figures for the subsequent years are not yet available.
Table 6.4. Exports and imports, 2000-2005
(Unit: Thousands of United States dollars)
Year
Vehicles Motorcycles Auto components
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
2000 22 343 352 699 85 357 62 712 537 942 2 061 565
2001 25 777 422 050 58 597 26 620 552 654 1 863 788
2002 31 570 337 015 57 494 14 034 658 538 1 790 150
2003 47 471 517 516 65 165 13 197 815 911 1 855 952
2004 149 103 949 950 31 928 23 637 1 061 083 2 278 568
2005 255 000 1 327 200 28 900 21 100 1 482 700 2 814 100
Source: Ministry of Industry.
To anticipate the effect of the global economic downturn on automotive exports, the
Government planned to help local producers to penetrate non-traditional markets such as
Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Egypt, which had been importing second-hand
vehicles from Europe.  Nevertheless, a decline in exports of approximately 20 per cent was
projected due to expected sluggish demand.
6.3. Policy environment
Indonesia’s automotive sector started to expand as early as the 1960s when the
Government of Indonesia established it as one of the strategic/priority sectors for
development of import-substitution industries.  This action was justified because: (a) the
automotive sector was the main supplier of transportation needs; and (b) the sector
contributed significantly to domestic economic growth and employment, and had
high-technology exposure.  During 1970-1980, the Government applied a strict policy of
banning imports of completely-built-up cars (CBU), meaning cars that are imported as a final
good with no need for domestic assembly.  In addition, it prohibited foreign automotive
investors from direct assembling and distribution.  They had to establish joint ventures with
domestic partners, with the latter undertaking importing and assembling cars in completely-
knocked-down (CKD) form as well as the distribution of their products.  The Government
also protected the automotive sector by applying high tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as138
quotas and local content requirements.  It was expected that the automotive industry,
represented by several joint ventures, would be Indonesia’s manufacturing industry leader,
characterized by high-technology transfer and high local content.
At the same time, the Government attempted to encourage the growth of the auto
component industry by insisting on local content requirements.  In 1978, commercial vehicle
manufacturers were required to use glass parts.  In the following year, they had to use
locally-supplied chassis and, in 1984, domestically-produced engine blocks.  The
manufacturers who could not meet these requirements would be penalized by having their
import tariffs raised to 100 per cent.  Ultimately, however, the local content requirements
were considered unsuccessful; only small amounts of auto components were manufactured
locally, comprising items mostly characterized by low-technology exposure such as car
lamps and tyres.
The Government then implemented an incentive programme aimed at encouraging
automotive manufacturers to use locally-produced components.  Under the scheme,
automotive manufacturers who used higher proportions of local components in their
products were to be charged lower import tariffs.  In this programme, the tariff structure was
related more to the use of local components rather than to the type of vehicle manufactured
(passenger vs.  commercial).
A deregulation package was introduced in 1995 in which the Government offered
a zero per cent tariff on imported components for commercial vehicles with at least 40 per
cent local content and for passenger vehicles with 60 per cent or more local content.  The
package also permitted new foreign investment as part of Indonesia’s commitment to AFTA
and APEC.  However, in 1996, the Government launched the controversial national car
programme, which was severely criticized by heavyweight WTO members such as Japan,
the United States and European Union members.
The huge setback caused by the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 forced the
Government of Indonesia to revise its automotive (including components) policy.  A new
automotive policy that was in line with WTO recommendations was launched in 1999.  The
Government abolished the local content scheme, the lower tariff schedule for imported cars
and components, simplified the procedures and qualifications for imports, and encouraged
export market expansion for automotive products.  Under AFTA, in 2003 import tariffs for
many products, including those from the automotive sector, were cut to between zero per
cent and 5 per cent.  Car manufacturers only pay 5 per cent duty when sending products to
ASEAN members, if the products meet a minimum of 40 per cent local content in any of the
ASEAN member countries.  ASEAN members agreed to remove import duties by 2010 for
the five founding members and by 2015 for Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam.  The Government of Indonesia had
actually already abolished the import duty on spare parts and auto components for re-export
(Ministry of Finance Decree No. 79/PMK.010/2006).  Due to domestic producers’ objections,
the Government subsequently issued another regulation (No. 34/PMK.011/2007) that
reduced the import duty on basic materials for auto components to zero per cent, effective
for one year.  In anticipation of the recent global economic downturn, the Government
planned to extend the regulation to allow zero per cent import duty on raw and supporting139
materials for auto components.  The Government argued that the extension was required
due to weakening competitiveness of the automotive sector since the rupiah had been in
steady decline since October 2008.  Auto component imports in 2006 and 2007 were almost
the same at US$ 2.2 billion in both years.  In 2008, the number soared with imports soaring
during January-May 2008 to US$ 2.3 billion.
Some problems cited by the industry have lingered for some time, including poor
infrastructure, legal uncertainties (particularly local regulation and labour regulation) and the
lack of tax incentives.  All have been blamed for the low growth of foreign investment in the
sector.
6.4. IPNs, RTAs and Indonesia’s automotive sector
Before RTAs became prevalent in the region, IPNs had already been established at
the company level.  In Indonesia it was done through the involvement of Japanese auto
makers as mentioned in the previous section.  In taking part in IPNs, Indonesia gained an
early start, albeit on a small scale, in the region.  The Indonesian automotive sector dates
back to the early 1920s when Indonesia was still a Dutch colony.  During that period,
General Motors opened an assembly plant for passenger cars in Jakarta.  However, the
demand for passenger cars was very limited back then and production only catered for
Dutch colonial officers, foreign nationals and the small number of wealthy locals.  At the
outset of the Second World War, General Motors closed all of its operations in Indonesia
and the automotive sector went into a deep slumber until the early 1970s.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between IPN and RTAs at the
company level, several in-depth interviews as well as focus group discussions were
conducted during the current study.  The respondents for the in-depth interview were car
manufacturers and industry experts.  Meanwhile, the participants in the focus group
discussions comprised auto component manufacturers for passenger vehicles and
commercial vehicles (including trucks).  The interviews and the focus group discussions
were based on open-ended questions in order to give the respondents the opportunity to
address best-case examples, current issues and challenges in the Indonesian automotive
sector.  The highlights of the discussions are detailed below.
6.4.1. RTAs and the Indonesian automotive sector
Most of the respondents, from both of the focus group discussion, mentioned that
even without the proliferation of FTAs, IPNs had already been established in Indonesia,
mostly through the involvement of Japanese automobile manufacturers.  The respondents
had become aware of FTAs through industry associations such as GAIKINDO and GIAMM.
These organizations have special sections devoted to tracking the development of FTAs
made by the Government of Indonesia as well as other FTAs in the region.  However, the
two industry associations had never played an active role in trade negotiations.  The
Government only invited them to meetings at the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of
Industry, where they were asked to provide inputs to current trade negotiations.  Businesses
and the Government must realize that business advocacy is very important in FTAs140
negotiations.  Some of the factors that have made the business sector reluctant to deal with
trade negotiations are:
(a) Problems in identifying business implications of the complex FTAs;
(b) The uncertainty surrounding “returns” to the business sector on the
implementation of FTAs;
(c) The limited number of credible and well-informed business associations.
In addition, there is some specific information of which government negotiators have
no knowledge.  The failure to recognize this business-specific information
2 will lead to
implementation problems and, in some cases, even a need for some FTAs to be
renegotiated.  By working on business advocacy, both the Government and business
associations will minimize the risk of undertaking unworkable negotiations.  Collective
business advocacy sends a stronger message to the Government before the start of trade
negotiations.
The recently signed IJEPA does little for the Indonesian automotive sector.  Since
the deal was signed the sector has not experienced any dramatic effect and most of the
breakthroughs in the sector have come from firms’ own initiatives.  In the IJEPA
negotiations, the automotive sector was considered as one of the driver sectors that
stimulate economic growth in both countries.  The automotive sector has long attracted
foreign investments – especially from the Japanese auto industry, which has been operating
in Indonesia since the 1970s.  However, since the Asian economic crisis in 1997,
investments from Japan have declined for various reasons such as the lack of infrastructure
and weak legal certainty.  These two factors needed to be worked on by the Government,
while in the negotiations with Japan it focused on increasing export capacity by bringing
about technology transfers from Japan’s auto industry to its counterparts and the supporting
auto component industry in Indonesia.  Up to now, the so-called Tier 1 auto component
industry (which directly supplies the automotive manufacturing industry) has been able to
produce quality products to support Indonesia’s role as a production base for several
Japanese automobile manufacturers, including Toyota and Suzuki.  In the medium term, it is
expected that capacity-building activities included in IJEPA in the form of the Manufacturing
Industry Development Centre (MIDEC) will be able to improve product quality in the Tier 2
auto component industry, which consists mainly of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Through the establishment of MIDEC, the Government of Indonesia intends to increase the
use of local components in automobile manufacturing in Indonesia.  So far, the highest local
content used in automobile assembly in Indonesia is 76 per cent for the Suzuki APV and 65
per cent for the Avanza, which has the highest sales in Indonesia.
3
2 For example, the business sector knows best how to penetrate certain export markets and is usually
aware of the readiness of each subsector in their industry when market access is to be expanded etc.
3 Bisnis Indonesia Newspaper, 24 June 2008.141
The negotiations did not attempt to gain wider market access by lowering tariffs
since Japan was already applying a very low tariff rate
4 for all countries.  According to the
IJEPA documents, once it is implemented, Japan will lower tariffs on about 35 per cent of
products categorized as auto components from Indonesia; in return, Indonesia will lower
tariffs for some 85 per cent of products in the auto parts components category from Japan.
Table 6.5 lists the auto parts and components that are included in IJEPA.  Table 6.6 shows
the current import duty and luxury tax applied to automotive products in Indonesia.
4 Indonesia was applying MFN import duties between 5 per cent and 15 per cent.
Table 6.5. Auto components included in IJEPA
HS code Description
4009 Pipes and hoses of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber, with or without fittings
(for example, joints, elbows and flanges)
4010 Conveyor or transmission belts or belting of vulcanized rubber
4011 New pneumatic rubber tyres
4012 Retreaded or used pneumatic rubber tyres; solid or cushion tyres, tyre treads and
tyre flaps of rubber
4013 Inner tubes, rubber
4016 Other articles of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber
6813 Brake linings and pads
7320 Springs and leaves for springs, iron or steel
8407 Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines
8409 Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines (diesel or semi-diesel
engines)
8413 Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with a measuring device; liquid elevators
8421 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers; filtering or purifying machinery and
apparatus, for liquids or gases.
8482 Ball and roller bearings
8483 Transmission shafts (including cam shafts and crank shafts) and cranks, bearing
housing and plain shaft bearings; gears and gearing; ball or roller screws; gear
boxes and other speed changers, including torque converters; flywheels and
pulleys, including pulley blocks; clutches and shaft couplings (including universal
joints)
8484 Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined with other materials or of two
or more layers of metal; sets of assortments of gaskets and similar joints, dissimilar
in composition, put in pouches envelopes or similar packaging; mechanical seals.
8706 Chassis fitted with engines, for the vehicles under headings 87.01 to 87.05.
8708 Parts and accessories of vehicles under headings 8701 to 8705
840991 Parts used for spark ignition in engines
Source: Annex 1 – Schedules in relation to Article 20 in the Agreement between Japan and the
Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership.142
When asked about AFTA, the interviewed companies all agreed that it could further
the establishment of IPNs in the region by eliminating import duties.  Indonesian automakers
could optimally exploit AFTA by focusing on the market.  The automotive industry, like any
other industry, is driven by market demand, meaning that the market determines which
types of car to make.  In Thailand’s case, pick-up trucks and sedans are the big sellers in
that country’s market.  In Indonesia it is the multi-purpose vehicles or light commercial
vehicles such as Toyota’s Kijang Innova and Avanza that have high sales.  In this regard,
AFTA could be beneficial where companies focus on the products that the market needs.
Toyota, for example, has made Thailand its hub for the production of sedans, and Indonesia
for the Kijang Innova and Avanza.  Suzuki has also moved in the same direction with the
Suzuki APV in Indonesia.  Executives of both Toyota and Suzuki mentioned that selection
Table 6.6. Import duty and luxury tax
(Unit: Per cent)
Import duty Luxury
Category Remarks Completely built up
Completely knocked  tax
down
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008
Sedan cc ≤ 1.5 lt 50 50 40 15 15 10 30
type 1.5 lt < cc ≤ 3.0 lt 50 50 40 15 15 10 40
(P)/2.5 (D)
cc 3.0 lt (P)/2.5 (D) 50 50 40 15 15 10 75
4x2 type cc ≤ 1.5 lt (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 10
1.5 lt < cc ≤ 2.5 lt (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 20
2.5 lt < cc ≤ 3.0 lt (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 40
cc > 3.0 lt (P)/2.5 (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 75
4x4 type cc ≤ 1.5 lt 45 45 40 15 15 10 30
1.5 lt < cc ≤ 3.0 lt 45 45 40 15 15 10 40
(P)/2.5 (D)
cc > 3.0 lt (P)/2.5 (D) (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 75
Buses 5 ton < GVW ≤ 24 tons 40 40 40 15 15 10 10
(P/D)
GVW > 24 tons (P/D) 10 10 40 5 5 5 10
Pick-ups/ GVW < 5 tons (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 0
trucks GVW 5-24 tons (P/D) 40 40 40 15 15 10 0
GVW > 24 tons (P/D) 10 10 10 5550
Double GVW < 5 tons (P/D) 45 45 40 15 15 10 20
cabin All cc sizes
4x2/4x4
Source: GAIKINDO.
Note: P = petrol; D = diesel.143
depended on the country’s potential demand as well as government policies for the
automotive industry.
5
There was quite a significant shift in the Government of Indonesia’s strategy for
developing the national automotive industry.  Unlike during the New Order Government
(prior to 1998) – when development of the automotive industry was aimed at creating
a national brand without attachment to established brands from automotive giants from
Japan, the European Union and the United States – the current strategy looks set to
produce international branded cars in Indonesia with high local content.  The Government
(Ministry of Industry
6) has, for example, defined the Toyota Kijang as a national car since it
has high local content, a huge market in Indonesia and has been exported.  It was argued
that the automotive industry’s development needed huge investment and support from
high-technology facilities, strong research and development efforts, and skilled human
resources.  The Government preferred collaboration between existing automotive giants and
domestic partners to develop automobile production.
Along with their domestic partners, Toyota, Daihatsu and Suzuki aimed at
developing a “national car” – its construction and marketing would be controlled by each
joint venture.  While Toyota increased its investment in Indonesia by almost US$ 90 million,
Suzuki Motor Company invested almost Y 11.5 billion in improving its production facilities in
order to manufacture the Suzuki APV.  On the other hand, Honda Indonesia had a different
strategy; it decided to establish two auto component (automatic transmission and engine
valve) companies – 100 per cent owned by Honda – and to export the components to
Honda manufacturers.  The investment totalled almost US$ 201 million for both plants.
Since the Asian economic crisis in 1997, sales of the Toyota Kijang have shown
negligible growth.  Nevertheless, a market survey conducted by Toyota and Daihatsu
showed that demand for vehicles within the price bracket of Rp. 60 million to Rp. 100 million
was still growing strongly.  The survey also revealed that Indonesian consumers preferred
the commercial-type compact fuel-efficient cars with a good after-sales service network.
Following the survey, Toyota and Daihatsu launched the Toyota Avanza and Daihatsu Xenia.
Both Toyota and Daihatsu (as Toyota’s subsidiary in Indonesia) have manufacturing
facilities in Indonesia.  However, they agreed to manufacture the Avanza and Xenia at the
Daihatsu facilities with a targeted local content of between 60 per cent and 70 per cent,
combining Daihatsu’s renowned skills in producing compact cars with and Toyota’s high
quality standard.
As shown in table 6.6, they are subject to a luxury tax since vehicles except trucks
are considered luxury goods by the Government of Indonesia.  In terms of exports, the
Government currently promotes exports of CKD vehicles; however, one respondent was of
the opinion that the Government should concentrate on promoting the export of incomplete
knocked down vehicles instead of CKDs.  In practice, the export of incomplete knocked
5 See ASEAN Affairs at www.aseanaffairs.com.
6 Dirjen Industri Logam Mesin Elektronik dan Aneka.144
down vehicles is more profitable since their cost is cheaper than CKDs.  The transportation
cost for one container is lower since it can hold a larger amount of components.
Table 6.7 provides the tariff structure for the Indonesian automotive sector in 2004
and 2007.  The tariff structure is included for rubber products that are used in the automotive
sector, since rubber is one of Indonesia’s leading export commodities.  For auto
components zero per cent tariff basket, the tariff increased from 23 per cent in 2004 to
31.4 per cent in 2007.  There was also a significant increase from 16.7 per cent to 20.8 per
cent for products in the zero per cent to 5 per cent tariff basket.  These increases may be
explained by the significant reduction in tariff lines for the tariff baskets of 5 per cent to
10 per cent, 10 per cent to 20 per cent and above 40 per cent.  However, there was a very
small increase from zero per cent to 0.3 per cent for auto components subject to the tariff
basket of 25 per cent to 40 per cent.  Overall, in the span of three years, tariffs for auto
components have become lower.
In the case of buses, there was a reduction for the tariff lines in the 20 per cent to
25 per cent and 25 per cent to 40 per cent tariff baskets.  Surprisingly, there was a sudden
jump for the tariff lines in the 10 per cent to 20 per cent tariff basket, from zero products
subject to tariff rates in 2004 to 38.9 per cent of buses in 2007.  Most of the tariff lines for
passenger vehicles fell into the above 40 per cent basket, with rates of 60.1 per cent in 2004
and 59 per cent in 2005.  However, there was a huge reduction in the 20 per cent to 25 per
cent basket, from 36.5 per cent of total passenger vehicles in 2004 to zero per cent in 2007.
For motorcycles, the largest change took place in the 10 per cent to 20 per cent and
20 per cent to 25 per cent tariff baskets.  In 2004, the 40 per cent for motorcycle products in
the 20 per cent to 25 per cent tariff basket was reduced to zero per cent in 2007.  On the
other hand, there was a significant increase in the 10 per cent to 20 per cent tariff basket,
from zero products subject to tariffs of between 10 per cent and 20 per cent in 2004, to
45.2 per cent of tariff lines in 2007.  There was no major change in the tariff structure for
rubber products used in the automotive and auto component sectors, and the bulk of the
tariffs for that sector still fall within the 10 per cent to 20 per cent basket.
While most of the subcategories in the automotive sector have been opening up to
international trade, albeit at varying rates, the same cannot be said for trucks.  The tariffs for
trucks falling within the 25 per cent to 40 per cent tariff basket jumped from 33.3 per cent in
2004 to 41.2 per cent in 2007.  A similar trend occurred in the above 40 per cent tariff
basket, in which the tariff lines increased from 7.8 per cent to 11.8 per cent in 2007.
Overall, the tariff structure changes moved the automotive sector from a relatively
closed sector to a more open one, albeit at a relatively slow pace.  The slowest tariff
reduction was in the passenger vehicle subsector, where most of the tariffs in 2007 were still
in the more than 40 per cent tariff basket.  In contrast to the other subsectors, in 2007 the
tariffs on trucks in the 25 per cent to 40 per cent and more than 40 per cent tariff baskets
increased.145
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able 6.7. Comparison of the tariff structure in the Indonesian automotive sector
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Under the 2007 tariff structure in the automotive sector of Indonesia, the relatively
low tariffs on parts and components should make it possible for Indonesia to foster IPNs in
that sector.  The relatively more open regime for the auto components subsector should
promote faster growth in the sector’s assembly activity.  Nevertheless, that is not necessarily
the case.  One important aspect with regard to RTAs and IPNs is the rules of origin (RoO).
This is crucial, since RoO determine the products that are eligible for preferential treatment
in an RTA.  As argued by Kruger (1999), in RTA negotiations discussions on RoO provide an
opportunity for producers to lobby for restrictive rules on goods concerning them.  This
implies that RoO are a good instrument for trade protection if such rules enable high-cost
producers of intermediate goods such as auto components to gain access to the partner’s
market in preference to the other lower cost resources outside the RTA area.  Hence, RoO
serve as a hidden protection that creates trade diversion.
In determining origins, there are three approaches: (a) a change in tariff headings/
classification; (b) criteria for local value-added content; and (c) specific manufacturing
requirements.  Furthermore, other rules that are commonly included to determine origin are:
(a) cumulation; (b) the de minimis rule (tolerance); and (c) duty drawback.  Cumulation
specifies that input from preferential trading partners can be used in the production of final
goods without undermining the origin of the product.  The de minimis rule asserts that
a specific percentage of non-originating products are to be used in the production process
without affecting the origin status of the final goods.  Duty drawbacks waive applicable
duties on the non-originating input materials used in production; however, this is commonly
not allowed in many RTAs/FTAs.  Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007) noted that RTAs
in East Asia adopted a combination of the three approaches as well as a variety of
cumulation and tolerance rules.  Hence, in East Asia, there are numerous RoO that are
most likely to overlap one another.  Therefore, RoO add to the argument on the “spaghetti
bowl” effect of FTAs/RTAs.  Given the complex nature of RoO in the FTAs/RTAs in East
Asia, they are expected to have an adverse effect on Indonesia, and particularly the
automotive sector.  One way to curb the “spaghetti bowl” effect of RoO is to implement
substantially simpler RoO in FTAs/RTAs in East Asia.
Another related aspect is that of implementation of RoO.  As stated by Manchin and
Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007), the utilization of preferential treatment from RoO provisions
under AFTA has been low.  As such, the preference under AFTA is not optimally used.  In the
case of Indonesia, it may be due to the fact that manufacturers have difficulties in achieving
the RoO requirement for local value-added content.  As mentioned above in this chapter,
Indonesia has a history of difficulties in satisfying local content requirements; only a small
proportion of components are manufactured locally, the bulk of which have been low
technology components.  Clearly, with little or no R&D capabilities, Indonesia will continue to
have problems in meeting the local content requirements
Second, local companies find it difficult to export for three reasons.  First, shipping
costs are high, particularly for small and medium-sized firms.  Related to this issue is the
fact that when compared to other countries in East Asia, Indonesia is lagging behind in
developing a good logistics infrastructure, such as ports.  The argument is simple –
a reduction of shipping costs and improvement of the quality of logistics and transport147
system will improve international market access, and thus lead to increased trade.  For
MNCs such as Toyota or Honda, the decision to relocate or conduct product fragmentation
hinges on the service link cost, i.e., the services needed to link factories across borders.
The components of service link costs are transportation cost, telecommunications cost and
a variety of coordination costs between factories.  Carruthers and others (2003) stated that
high logistics cost in developing countries in East Asia was due to poor transport
infrastructure, underdeveloped transport and logistics services, and slow as well as costly
bureaucratic services procedures for dealing with export and import goods.  Although the
degree of these three factors differs between countries, they perfectly describe the current
status of Indonesia’s logistics infrastructure.  Carruthers and others (2003) implied that
Indonesia was lagging behind its neighbours in terms of accessibility.  As a result, service
link costs in Indonesia are higher.  Although based on 2002 data, the interviews and focus
group discussions confirm the results reported by Carruthers and others.  The business
sector mentioned that poor and yet expensive logistic services were one of the impediments
to attracting automotive MNCs.
Hence, the availability of a reliable and cost-effective logistics infrastructure is also
critical to attracting MNCs to invest in production facilities or to outsource production to
Indonesia.  Moreover, different customers have different standards of quality, thus making it
difficult to adjust from one form of standard to another.
Third, information on the trade rules of destination markets is minimal.
In the discussions, all of the respondents agreed that RTAs such as AFTA and IJEPA
could boost the local automotive sector.  However, they all noted that the potential benefits
from such agreements could only be realized if there were clear policies and an
environment that was conducive to enabling the automotive industry to grow and prosper.
6.5. Links between Indonesian automobile and auto component
manufacturers
The Indonesian car and auto components manufacturers are closely related.  The
relationship is a simple one: if car manufacturers cannot sell their cars, then auto
component manufacturers cannot sell their products.  However, there are exceptions;
components such as tyres, mufflers and batteries do not depend on that type of relationship,
since most manufacturers of such products are independent and have a huge aftersales
market.
Some components have been locally sourced by the auto manufactures, such as
seats, audio parts and batteries.  Most of the locally outsourced components require low
skills and low technology for production.  The car manufacturers produce components that
require some technical skill and in-house high technology.  However, in the past some
important components such as chassis, rear axles and brakes were sourced to local
companies.  Table 6.8 provides a list of GIAMM members and the components that they
produce.  Most of the companies concerned are foreign-owned or joint ventures.  Foreign
companies took an interest in the Indonesian automotive sector, particularly in the auto148
components subsector, even before the establishment of FTAs.  Indonesia is regarded as
being in a good position to benefit from the explosion of IPNs, given its location in a region
that has become the global growth centre of auto component production and assembly
(Arthukorala, 2006).
Table 6.8. Ownership structure of auto component manufacturers
Item PMA PMDN Total
Total GIAMM members 79 59 138
(Joint venture with Japan) (63)
Special components, two-wheelers 10 4 14
Components, four-wheelers/two-wheelers 20 10 30
Total manufacturers, two-wheelers 30 14 44
Engine components 30 18 48
Engine manufacturing 7 1 8
Special engines, two-wheelers 3 1 4
Filters 2 6 8
Batteries 3 3 6
Gaskets 4 2 6
Alternators/starter motors 5 0 5
Plastic parts 3 5 8
Radiators 2 2 4
Source: GIAMM.
Among the interviewees, company A provides a good example of the decision on
whether to produce components locally or to import them.  Their product comprises 30 per
cent local content and 70 per cent Japanese content.  Their decision process on when to
use local parts and when to import parts from the parent companies or other affiliates is
a complex one that is based on a set of formulae that produce an n-value.  The calculation
of n-values relies on several variables, such as the skill of local workers, access to suppliers
and the technology at hand.  Understandably, they remain secretive with regard to the
actual algorithm.  The decision mechanism is as follows: if the n-value equals one, that
means the cost of using components from Indonesia and from Japan is similar.  If the
n-value is greater than or equal to one, it is more cost-efficient to use local components.  In
special cases where the n-value equals seven, the use of local components saves costs of
up to 30 per cent.
The Indonesian auto component manufacturers serve two types of markets.  First is
the OEM market and second is the aftersales market.  The OEM market is quality- and cost-
oriented; whichever manufacturer can produce the best quality product for the least cost
possible is the clear winner.  Most of the local auto component manufacturers are already in
tune with the standards used in the auto industry (table 6.9).149
The aftersales market is more price-oriented; in other words, the product that has
the cheapest price, regardless of its quality, is the clear winner.  Thus the aftersales market
is tighter that the OEM market.  In this regard, the aftersales market faces serious
counterfeit problems and illegal imports.  In the Indonesian aftersales market, authorized
components account for some 30 per cent while the remaining 70 per cent of components
are not authorized or are sold on the black market.  This is a huge problem for auto
component manufacturers, as the supply of bogus products and illegally imported
components from China and Taiwan Province of China is becoming widespread.  This
problem first occurred during the 1997 Asian economic crisis, when components for the
aftersales market became quite expensive due to the deteriorating value of the rupiah and
cheap fake auto components began to flood the aftersales market.  Although this is
obviously an infringement of copyright and patents, no definitive and clear action has been
taken on the problem so far by the Government of Indonesia.  This is becoming a serious
issue as local auto component manufacturers export their products to supply the aftersales
markets in 90 countries.
As noted above, the Indonesian automotive industry can only reap benefits from
RTAs if there is a clear domestic policy and good infrastructure.  With regard to domestic
policy, labour regulation has been the main concern of the industry.  The new labour law is
more one-sided and biased towards labour.  This is seen through the high severance pay
requirement that is regulated under the labour law.  The high level of severance pay has
pushed the cost of labour replacement higher, thus reducing the flexibility of the labour
market.  As such, Indonesia no longer has a comparative advantage of low-cost labour,
which, in turn, could hamper the development of IPNs.  The survey respondents also
highlighted the fact that the Government needed to provide tax holidays or other types of tax
incentives in order to attract more investors.  Another complaint of the respondents was that
the Government never consulted them as part of the policy-making process.
Location-wise, most of the automobile and auto component manufacturers are
located in the Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi (JABODETABEK) area, which
means they are located close to one another.  Logically, there should not be a logistics
problem in the area, but the worsening traffic congestion has made it difficult for companies
Table 6.9. Quality compliance
No. Firms Per cent
Quality management:
 – ISO/TS 16949 32 23.19
 – ISO 9000 – 2 72 52.17
 – ISO 14000 – 1 26 18.84
 – QS 9000 26 18.84
 – No Certificate 34 24.64
Total GIAMM members 138 100.00
Source: GIAMM.150
to ship their products along the supply chain.  One respondent noted that previously one
truck could make two delivery runs in one day.  Now, with the traffic becoming seriously
congested, one truck can only make one delivery run per day.  Clearly, the available road
network is unable to keep up with the growth of vehicle numbers in the JABODETABEK
area.  This poses a serious problem in IPN establishment, for which a good logistics
infrastructure is necessary.
6.6. The way forward





(d) Simplification and harmonization of RoO;
(e) Development of the logistics infrastructure.
The automotive industry is capital-intensive and requires high start-up investment.
As noted above in this chapter, unclear and uncoordinated policies and legal uncertainties
are the main deterrents to attracting foreign investments.  Thus, the Government of
Indonesia needs to take steps to alleviate the problem since resolving the problem mainly
lies within its purview.
Indonesian companies also lack product development (R&D) capabilities.  The main
reason most auto component manufacturers in Indonesia fail to meet OEM demands is
because they lack this ability.  Most of the local auto component producers are Tier 2 and
Tier 3 firms that do not have the ability to design their own products.  Product design and
development capabilities are essential to enabling local companies to achieve Tier 1 status.
Since the automotive industry is a high-cost industry, economies-of-scale is a critical
aspect.  The industry needs a large volume of orders for it to be profitable, i.e., exports need
to expand.  Domestically, Indonesia itself is a big market, but it does not necessarily
translate into high demand.  In the case of the automotive industry, road networks are
critical in increasing the demand for passenger vehicles.  Since road networks are relatively
well-developed on the island of Java, most of the demand for vehicles comes from that
area.  However, if road network development becomes widespread in other areas such as
Sumatra, Kalimantan and the least-developed eastern part of Indonesia, then demand for
passenger vehicles may increase and larger volumes can be ordered.  Apart from Java, the
dismal development of road networks in other parts of Indonesia is also contributing to the
fact that the motorcycle industry is doing relatively better than passenger vehicle sales,
since it is easier to move around in such areas using motorcycles.
Another important aspect is the direction of development in the Indonesian
automotive sector.  Instead of focusing only on the assembly segment of the industry, the
Government should focus on policies for developing the auto component industry.  As one151
industry expert noted, the Japanese automotive industry consisted of a pyramid structure
with assembly plants at the top, and supported by Tiers 1, 2 and 3 auto component firms.  In
Indonesia’s case it is an inverted pyramid.  Thus, the focus on developing the automotive
industry should be directed at auto components, instead of the assembling industry.  Further
development in the auto components industry is needed for Indonesia to be able to take
a more active role in IPNs, as product fragmentation is the current norm.  Through the
development of parts and components, technology spillover can occur.
A simplification of the RoO procedure in RTAs across East Asia would allow
exporters to exploit the benefits of such agreements.  For example, the changes in RoO
provisions under AFTA, ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTAs allow
manufacturers to choose between a change in tariff heading or value-added content as the
method for determining origin.  Another important development towards simpler RoO is the
40 per cent local value-added content set by AFTA, which has been followed by the ASEAN-
China and ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTAs.  RoO in all RTAs across East Asia that overlap
one another should be harmonized to minimize the “spaghetti bowl” effect.  A survey carried
out by the Japan External Trade Organization in 2006 concluded that more that 60 per cent
of firms operating in East Asia felt that RoO across RTAs in the region should be
harmonized.  Clearly, improvements in RoO would be beneficial to the Indonesian
automotive sector.
As a step forward to the implementation of RoO, the Indonesian Minister of Trade
recently announced a new law, the Minister of Trade Decree No. 31/2009 on the Issuance
Fee for Obtaining Certificates of Origin (CoO).  The new law complements the previously
released Minister of Trade Decree No. 43/2007 on the Issuance of Certificates of Origin and
replaces the outdated Minister of Trade and Cooperative Decree No. 155/1980 on Fees for
the Issuance of Certificates of Origin.  The new law has established a new entity, under the
Ministry of Trade for the issuance of CoO as well as the collection of issuance fees.  The
new entity is called the Institution for the Issuance of Certificates of Origin (IICoO/Instansi
Penerbit Surat Keterangan Asal); it will process CoO applications as well as collect a low fee
of Rp. 5,000 (approximately US$ 0.50) after the certificate is issued.  Given the low fee,
bureaucracy efficiency also needs to be improved to ensure that the new regulation does
not create more problems and delays for exporters.  It is hoped that the new law will make it
easier for Indonesian automakers to exploit preferential treatment from RoO provisions.
As mentioned above, developing a sound logistics infrastructure is critical to the
reduction of service link costs.  Thus, Indonesia needs to improve its transport
infrastructure, develop better transportation and logistics services, and improve bureaucratic
efficiency in handling exported and imported goods.  It should also be noted that the term
“logistics” refers not only to ports, but also the whole network for delivering goods from
manufacturers to markets.  Thus, it also includes the land network that connects factories to
ports.  Since most Indonesian automotive factories are located in the JABODETABEK area,
the improvement of road networks from the industrial area to Tanjung Priok Port, in the
northern part of Jakarta, is crucial.  This is especially important in view of the growing traffic
congestion on the toll roads, which has begun to hamper the efficiency of the factories.152
6.7. Conclusion
Indonesia is currently the third-largest car market in South-East Asia behind
Thailand and Malaysia.  Indonesian production figures reveal an increasing trend, although
it is expected that production will decline in the wake of decreasing demand due to the
present global economic crisis.  The proliferation of FTAs is expected to improve Indonesia’s
position in IPNs.  However, certain conditions have to be met first.  Investment is one key
issue and existing legal uncertainties, as well as policy coordination problems, will have to
be addressed to enable more foreign investment to be attracted.
Indonesia is a big market compared to Thailand and Malaysia.  However, due to the
uneven development of the country’s road networks, most of the demand for passenger
vehicles comes from Java.  The focus of the Indonesian automotive sector should shift from
assembling to auto component production in order to exploit the trend towards product
fragmentation and the proliferation of IPNs.  Indonesia’s latest tariff structure provides the
opportunity to move in that direction.  Nevertheless, the numerous FTAs being signed
across the region are undermining the growth of IPNs because of overlapping RoO, which
are creating a “spaghetti bowl” effect.  To overcome the problem, RoO need to be simplified
and harmonized across FTAs in the region.  To keep pace with other countries in the region,
Indonesia should also develop more effective and efficient transportation and logistics
services.153
7.  Trade policy and international production networks:




International production networks (IPNs), i.e., the cross-border dispersion of
component production/assembly within vertically integrated product processes, is an
important feature of the deepening structural interdependence of the world economy.  In the
recent literature on international trade, an array of alternative terms has been used to
describe IPNs including international production fragmentation, vertical specialization,
slicing the value chain and outsourcing (Athukorala, 2006).  IPNs open up opportunities for
countries to specialize in different segments of the production process, depending on the
relative cost advantage and other economic fundamentals.  Consequently, parts and
components are now exchanged across borders at a faster rate than final goods.  In this
context, the decisions on how much to produce and for which market have to be combined
with decisions on where to produce and to what degree of intra-product specialization
(Athukorala, 2006).
A consensus in the recent literature
1 on international trade points to the increasing
importance of IPNs in East Asian economies, as opposed to North America and Europe.
They become an integral part of export dynamism in the region, which thus results in
a further impact on overall economic performance.  In addition, IPN trade tends to be far
more sensitive to cross-border barriers than is final goods trade, as goods under IPNs go
through border controls several times (Yi, 2003).  Hence, a low tariff rate on parts creates
considerably adverse effects on the international competitiveness of final goods.
Interestingly, policy initiatives and academic proposals have been made in the region on
formulating FTAs with a key objective of strengthening de facto economic integration in East
Asia.  Specifically, Baldwin (2006) put forward a case for “multilateralizing regionalism” in
Asia (a “New East Asia regional management effort” with a reinforced ASEAN+3), with
a goal of ensuring smooth functioning of the process of fragmentation-based specialization
(which he dubbed “Factory Asia”).
Most studies
2 that examine trade flows base their analyses on trade data at the
disaggregated level (e.g., 5-digit SITC) and shed light to a certain extent on the role of trade
policy.  Although they need to be supplemented by in-depth case studies that illustrate the
1 See, for example: Athukorala, 2006, 2008a and 2008b; Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2009; Borrus,
Ernst and Haggard, 2000; Dobson and Yeu, 1997; McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000; Naughton,
2007; and Ng and Yeats, 2003.
2 For a recent example of this type of study see Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2009, and works cited
therein.154
nature of cross-border transactions at the industry level, such studies remain sparse.
Against this backdrop, this chapter provides an in-depth examination of IPNs in the hard
disk drive (HDD) industry in Thailand.  Previous studies – for example, Berger (2005),
Hiratsuka (2006, 2007), and McKendrick, Doner and Haggard (2000) – have provided clear
evidence of the break-up of the HDD production process.  Yet, a question arises over the
industrial clustering in the HDD industry in Thailand that has occurred during the past
decade.
The HDD industry in Thailand was first established during the early 1980s.  By 2008,
Thailand had become the second-largest HDD exporter in the world, accounting for about
17.4 per cent of world exports.  Four out of six major HDD producers have affiliates in
Thailand, including Seagate (since 1983), Hitachi GST (since 1991), Western Digital (since
2002) and Toshiba (since 2008).
3 Thus, sufficient time has passed for an assessment to be
made of the development of Thailand’s HDD industry.
Section 7.2 discusses the research methodology employed in the study detailed in
this chapter.  Section 7.3 sets out the policy environment in the HDD industry, with emphasis
on the trade and investment policy regime.  Section 7.4 reviews the development of the
HDD industry and its current performance while section 7.5 describes the evidence gained
during the company interviews.  The conclusion and policy inferences are provided in
Section 7.6.
7.2. Research methodology
To gain an insight into IPNs in the Thai HDD industry, purposive rather than
probability sampling techniques were employed in the current study.  As defined by Patton
(1990), the latter technique refers to the method that obtains samples by random selection
among all units of the population and permits confident generalization for a larger
population.  In the former method, however, samples are purposively chosen from
information-rich cases for in-depth analysis related to the central issues under study.  In this
chapter, the main objective is a qualitative examination of IPNs of the HDD industry in
Thailand.  However, this cannot be achieved by probability sampling, which uses a variety of
sample characteristics to draw quantitative inference.  To gain a good insight, interaction
with interviewees is needed.
A flexible interview guide was used that allowed the respondents to relate their
experiences in their own words, based on their own sequence of the topics asked.  The
main advantage of this approach is that it minimizes the likelihood of missing important
aspects of the story.  The main disadvantage is that some respondents whose experiences
might be limited to a particular interest cannot always be asked all of the questions in the
interview guide (Morawetz, 1981).  Second-round interviews with different interviewees
could mitigate this disadvantage in several cases.
3 Fujitsu sold its production facilities in Thailand in early 2008 to Toshiba after ceasing HDD
production worldwide.155
The interview guide begins by establishing a general company profile, i.e., size, past
performance, ownership, production process, product destination, product cover etc.  This is
followed by a series of opening probes into the process of IPNs, starting with their general
perception of the industry’s development.  This is followed by their opinions about the
development of IPNs, input procurement and recent changes.  Then questions are asked
concerning opinions of the usefulness of RTAs and any potential obstacles such as rules of
origin (RoO) constraints and opportunity costs of applying RTA preferential tariffs.  Finally,
general questions concerning current problems, the role of government and future prospects
for the industry are addressed.  Interviews were held with top-level managerial staff from
five Thai enterprises and four government officers from the public sector from November
2008 to April 2009 (table 7.1).  All the interviews were conducted by the author.




3 Non-electronics parts + foreign firms
4 Electronics parts + foreign firms
5 Core parts + foreign firms
6 Ministry of Science and Technology
7 National Electronics and Computer Technology
Centre
7.3. Policy environment
During the past four decades, Thailand has created an investment climate that is
conducive, including domestic price stability, disciplined fiscal and monetary policies, and
a stable nominal exchange rate, to foreign investors.  Since 1960, the Government of
Thailand has maintained a firm commitment to private sector-led industrialization combined
with prudent public investment in infrastructure.
4 In addition, a “market-friendly” approach to
foreign investors in manufacturing has consistently been pursued since the early 1960s.
Foreign businesses can operate without any significant discrimination between local and
foreign entrepreneurs.  Foreign investors have been able to get involved in almost any
business.  There are legal restrictions on foreign ownership of commercial banks, insurance
companies, commercial fishing, aviation businesses, commercial transportation, commodity
exports, mining and other enterprises.  However, these restrictions are not generally applied
to foreign investors alone.  Even local investors frequently require permission from
government authorities to pursue these activities.
4 Government involvement has shifted from direct production via state enterprises to investment in
public infrastructure required for economic development, such as electricity and water supply, and
transportation facilities.  It virtually prohibited state participation in those commercial and industrial
activities that might compete directly with private enterprises (Akira, 1989).156
Under the Foreign Business Act, 1999 (better known as the “Alien Business Law”),
which replaced the 1972 National Executive Council Announcement No. 281, the
Government restricted certain types of businesses for Thai enterprises only.  Nevertheless,
most of the listed activities are related to non-manufacturing, such as newspaper publishing,
radio and television station operation, lowland and upland farming or horticulture, and
raising animals.
Foreign investors are usually guaranteed the same rights as domestic investors,
including guarantees against expropriation and nationalization.  The Government permits
freedom to export and to remit investment capital, profits and other revenue in foreign
currency.  Despite the presence of capital control measures during the pre-1990 period, in
practice repatriation of foreign capital related to direct investment (e.g., investment capital,
profit or dividends, interest and principal of foreign loans, royalties and payments on other
obligations) has not been restricted (Akira, 1989).
Some restrictions exist on land ownership and hiring of foreign migrants by foreign
investors.  In general, according to the Land Code (1954), foreign-owned firms are generally
not allowed to own land in Thailand.
5 According to the Alien Occupation Law, passed in
1973 and amended in 1978, foreigners require a work permit for any type of employment.
However, such restrictions have not been prohibitive and have not been applied to foreign
investors who receive investment privileges from Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI).
Thus, this has encouraged foreign investors to apply for BOI promotion privileges.
6
To ensure fair domestic competition, the Competition Act, 1999 (which replaced the
Anti-Monopoly Act of 1979) applies to all types of business operations except: (a) those of
central, provincial and local administrations; (b) state enterprises under the law on
budgetary procedure; (c) farmers’ groups, co-operatives or co-operative societies
recognized by law as businesses being operated for the benefit of the farmers; and
(d) businesses prescribed under the Ministerial Regulations.  Under the Competition Act,
1999 a criterion for justifying anti-competition action is based on industrial conduct such as
setting unfair prices for goods and services, setting unfair trading conditions, limiting
supplies of goods and services, and intervening in other businesses without proper reasons.
Nevertheless, anti-competition cases that have been tried so far have involved conflicts
between Thai conglomerates such as tie-in sales of whisky and beer, and the merger of two
cable television companies ( Kohpaiboon, Chantasakda and Tanasritunyakul 2010).
Trade policy and investment promotion policies have been used as a main
instrument to influence resource allocation in the private sector including the HDD industry.
5 Under the Thai-United States of America Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in 1966,
United States companies in Thailand are granted equal treatment to Thai companies.  This permits
100 per cent United States-owned companies to operate in sectors where other foreign companies are
generally allowed a maximum ownership level of 49 per cent.  In addition, United States companies are
allowed to own land up to 10 rai (0.16 hectares) with approval from the Ministry of Interior.  The Land
Code (1954) was amended in 1999 to relax this restriction.  Since 1999, qualifying foreign investors,
regardless of nationality, have been able to own up to 4 rai of land for residential purposes.
6 For more details, see Kohpaiboon, 2006.157
Where trade policy is concerned, Thailand – like other developing countries – implements
both tariff and quantitative restrictions as trade policy instruments.  However, historically,
there has been greater reliance on tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions (World Bank,
1988).  This is especially true for the manufacturing sector where tariffs were the main trade
policy instrument for influencing the country’s resource allocation, with a few exceptions.
One exception has been the automotive industry for which the Government has used both
tariff and non-tariff measures, i.e., local content requirements to encourage auto component
localization (see Kohpaiboon, 2006 and 2009).
A significant reduction and rationalization of the tariff structure and the dismantling of
most non-tariff barriers took place in Thailand in the second half of the 1980s.  As part of
Thailand’s commitments under WTO, a comprehensive plan for tariff reduction and
rationalization was proposed in 1990 and implemented between 1995 and 1997.  In
mid-1997, the reform process was temporarily interrupted by the Asian economic crisis of
1997-1998.  Tariff restructuring has received renewed emphasis as an essential part of
overall economic reforms aimed at strengthening efficiency and competitiveness (Warr,
2000; and WTO, 1999).  The Government of Thailand introduced tariff cuts in June 2003
(with implementation in October 2003), followed by a four-year period of tariff reductions
from 2004 to 2008.  Overall, during the past three decades, there have been significant
reductions in nominal tariff rates.  The simple average applied tariff rate declined sharply
from 40 per cent between 1985 and 1994 to 23 per cent from 1995 to 1996 and 17 per cent
in 1997 (table 7.2).  The downward trend in the average tariff was temporarily reversed
during the onset of the 1997-1998 economic crisis.  The average tariff rate was again
reduced to 13.3 per cent in 2003, and then to 12 per cent in 2004.  Since then, the rate has
been more or less stable at around 11 per cent.
By regional standards, Thailand remained a high-tariff country until the mid-1990s
(table 7.2).  During that period, Thailand’s simple average tariff rate continued to exceed
levels in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and even China by a wide margin.
Nevertheless, the utilization of non-tariff measures, represented by the coverage ratio of
non-tariff barriers, in Thailand has been low compared with most other East Asian countries
(table 7.3).  This makes tariffs virtually the sole means of border protection in Thailand.
Table 7.2. Simple average tariff rates in selected Asian countries, 1985-2005
(Unit: Per cent)
Rep. of Taiwan
China Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines  Province Thailand Viet Nam
of China
1985 n.a. 27.0 n.a. n.a. 27.6 26.5 41.2 n.a.
1986 38.1 31.5 n.a. 15.8 27.9 22.8 n.a. n.a.
1987 39.5 n.a. 22.9 13.6 27.9 19.4 n.a. n.a.
1988 n.a. n.a. 18.9 13 27.9 12.6 n.a. n.a.
1989 n.a. 25.2 14.9 17 27.6 9.7 40.8 n.a.
1990 40.3 20.6 13.3 n.a. 27.8 9.7 39.8 n.a.158
Table 7.3. Coverage ratio of NTBs in import trade
(Unit: Unweighted, Per cent)
Country 1984-1987 1988-1990 1991-1993 1997-2000
China 10.6 23.2 11.3 5.7
Indonesia 94.7 9.4 2.7 3.1
Republic of Korea 8.8 4.0 2.6 1.5
Malaysia 3.7 2.8 2.1 2.3
Philippines 44.9 n.a. n.a. 1.8
Thailand 12.4 8.5 5.5 2.1
Source: Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2007.
n.a.  = not available.
Note: Calculated as a percentage of the import value of HS 6 tariff lines affected by NTBs in total
imports.  NTBs include quantitative restrictions in the form of all types of licences and import
authorization, quotas, import prohibitions, advanced import deposits, foreign exchange
restrictions, fixed customs valuations and state trading monopolies.  Figures reported under
a given sub-period relate to a single year within that sub-period.
1991 n.a. 20.3 11.4 16.9 26 n.a. 38.7 n.a.
1992 42.9 20.0 10.1 12.8 24.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993 39.9 19.4 8.9 14.3 22.6 n.a. 45.6 n.a.
1994 36.3 n.a. n.a. 13 21.7 n.a. 23.3 n.a.
1995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 11.2 23.1 12.8
1996 23.6 13.2 13.4 8.7 14.3 9.7 n.a. n.a.
1997 17.6 n.a. 13.3 9.1 13.4 n.a. 17 13.4
1998 16.8 9.5 11.1 7.1 10.7 n.a. 20.1 n.a.
1999 n.a. 10.9 8.7 9.7 10.1 8.8 17.1 n.a.
2000 17.5 8.4 12.6 n.a. 7.5 7.8 18.4 16.5
2001 17.5 8.4 12.4 10.2 7.6 7.8 18.5 15.7
2005 9.95 6.9 11.2 7.2 6.2 5.8 11.1 16.8
Source: Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon, 2007.  Data for 2005 calculated by the author from official data
sources.
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In recent years, there has been a trade policy shift towards preferential trade
liberalization through formal trade agreements.  So far, there have been 14 FTAs
agreements involving Thailand (table 7.4), seven of which have come into force.  This
number is relatively high, compared with the Asian standard of around 10 FTAs per country.
7
Table 7.4. Free trade agreements involving Thailand
FTAs Signed
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 2003
ASEAN-India 2003
Thailand Australia FTA 2005
Thailand-New Zealand FTA 2005
ASEAN-China FTA 2006
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) 2007
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 2009
(BIMSTEC)
Thailand India FTA 2005
ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA 2010
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) 2010
East Asia Free Trade Area: EAFTA (ASEAN plus 3) UN
ASEAN-EU FTA UN
Thailand-Peru Closer Economic Partnership UN
Thailand-Mexico FTA UN
Source: Compiled from the official website of the Department of Trade Negotiation at www.thaifta.
com/ThaiFTA/?sub=3.
Note: Bold type indicates FTAs involving Thailand that have come into force.  UN = under
negotiation
7 This is based on the author’s calculations from data collected by Asia Regional Integration Centre,
Asian Development Bank (table 6), available at http://aric.adb.org/10.php.
Table 7.5 shows the tariff structure in Thailand’s HDD industry from 1995 to 2010.
The 1995 structure reflected the overall structure in the 1980s, whereas the 2002 structure
was a consequence of the major tariff restructuring implemented in 1997.  The 2003 and
2010 figures illustrate the current status of the tariff structure.
Two key inferences can be drawn from table 7.5.  First, the HDD industry is relatively
less restrictive compared to other industries.  Tariffs related to the HDD industry (for
intermediate and final goods) are generally lower than the average rates during 1995-2006.
Second, there is distortion in the tariff structure, in which tariffs on intermediate goods are
always higher than those on final goods.  For example, hard disk drives were tariff-free
during 2002-2006, whereas tariffs on inputs such as motors, bearings and aluminium plates
were not zero.160
Nonetheless, the distorted effect caused by such a tariff structure is offset by
investment promotion measures.  Since most HDD makers and their component suppliers
are foreign-owned and export-oriented (McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000), they are
eligible for BOI investment privileges.  One investment privilege was tariff exemptions that
were introduced in 1983.  This was very important during the mid-1980s for export-oriented
foreign investors as tariffs in Thailand remained high (tables 7.2 and 7.5).  In addition, the
timing of the introduction of such privileges was more or less in line with changes in the
global environment when many East Asian manufacturers began to lose their international
competitiveness in labour-intensive products.  This was instrumental in making Thailand an
attractive location for export-oriented, labour-intensive FDI from East Asian investors
(Kohpaiboon, 2006).
Most HDDs and components are subject to a zero tariff rate (table 7.5), so there is
no incentive for firms to use RTA preferential schemes.  The exception in table 7.5 is for
motors (HS 8501 and HS 8503), which are subject to an 8 per cent to 10 per cent tariff.
Therefore, to illustrate the relative importance of RTA trade preferential schemes as
opposed to tariff exemptions, the pattern of motor imports is examined.  Clearly, most motor
imports applied for tariff exemptions.  For example, in 2009, 63.4 per cent of motor imports
applied for available tariff exemptions.  Motor imports under RTA trade preferential schemes
accounted for about 2 per cent in 2009.
Table 7.5. Tariff structure in the Thai HDD industry, 1995-2010
Component 1995
* 2002 2003 2010
Hard disk drive (HS 847170) 9.8 0 0 0
Inputs:
Wafers (HS 3818) 11 0 0 0
Printed circuit boards (HS 8534) 14 8 4 0
Integrated circuits (HS 8542) 14 0 0 0
Semi-conductors (HS 8541) 14 1 1 0
Motors 14 9 8 8
   Finished motors (HS 8501) 14 8 7 7
   Parts for motors (HS 8503) 14 10 10 2.8
Ball bearings (HS 848210) 10 10 10 1
Aluminium plate (HS 7601) 19 1 1 0
Media (HS 852390) 14 9 7.4 0
Average tariffs 21 114.3 114.3 111.3
Source: Office of Fiscal Economics, Ministry of Finance.
* Represented by 2-digit HS 847170, e.g., HDD tariff in 1995 is represented by the average
tariff of HS 84.161
It is useful to clarify the difference between tariff exemptions granted by BOI and
alternative schemes.  While tariff exemptions and tax rebate schemes are administered
by the Department of Customs, the BOI offers a prior exemption scheme that is less
cumbersome than the two existing schemes.  After receiving approval from BOI, export-
oriented BOI-promoted firms are automatically allowed to access their imports without
a delay to calculate and pay levies.  This reduces custom procedures that, prior to 1997,
were considered unusually cumbersome and imposed costs on importers (Warr, 2000).
Since the early 2000s there has been a policy shift in Thailand towards
strengthening the supply-side capability of firms, e.g., promotion of human capital
development, financial support for R&D projects and strengthening linkages from MNEs to
indigenous enterprises.  Several government agencies are involved, such as the National
Electronics and Computer Technology Centre, Ministry of Science, Office of Industrial
Economics, Ministry of Industry, and BOI.  Most of policy measures are a result of close
consultations with the private sector.  For example, many R&D projects initiated by the
private sector are being co-financed by the Government.  The portion of the Government’s
financial contribution depends on the nature of each project’s outcome, i.e., whether it is
proprietary or common knowledge.  The more common the knowledge created by a project,
the larger the government contribution.
In addition, BOI extends investment privileges if foreign firms upgrade their existing
production.  For example, to be eligible for one additional year of the tax holiday, three
criteria must be met.  First, firms eligible for an additional year of the tax holiday must have
had average R&D or design expenditures for the first three years of not less than per cent to
per cent of annual total sales; or not less than Baht 50 million for HDD manufacturing, or not
less than Baht 15 million for HDD parts manufacturing.  Second, at least 5 per cent of the
total workforce in the first three years should have comprised science and technology
personnel with a minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree in science, engineering or other fields
Table 7.6. Motor imports in Thailand under tariff exemptions and
RTA preferential schemes, 2003-2009
2003 2004 2005 2009
Total import value (millions of United States 475.0 536.6 597.6 1 009.2
dollars)
Composition (%)
Tariff exemption schemes 54.2 54.5 49.0 63.4
FTAs 0.8 3.1 4.3 2.0
ASEAN Free Trade Area 0.8 3.1 4.3 1.5
Thailand-Australia FTA  n.a. n.a. 0 0
Thailand-New Zealand FTA n.a. n.a. 0 0
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.43
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related to technology, R&D or design.  Finally, the average cost of training Thai staff for the
first three years must have been at least 1 per cent of the total payroll costs.
7.4. Features of the HDD industry in Thailand
7.4.1. Fragmentation in HDD production
The HDD is by far the most complex component in a personal computer in terms of
moving parts, and its value chain is extremely differentiated.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the HDD
composition.  Generally, there are five main parts: head sub-assemblies; media; motors;
electronics; and other accessories.
8 Each has its own type of production process.  For
example, read/write heads, the single most costly component that has a direct impact on
drive performance, are manufactured in stages, beginning with highly automated and
technically complex wafer fabrication.  Wafers are then machined into sliders, which are the
tiny read/write elements.  Each slider is then attached to a suspension, a small arm that
holds the head in position above or beneath the disk.  This process is called head-gimbal
assembly (HGA).  Sets of HGAs stacked together for installation in a disk drive are called
a head-stack assembly (HSA), Modular units that include the required circuitry and
actuators; this process is also highly labour intensive.
Figure 7.1 Product fragmentation of a hard disk drive
Source: National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre, 2007.
8 McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000.163
Electronic parts in HDD include semiconductors and discrete components (including
those designed specifically for disk drives), printed circuit boards (PCBs), and the flexible
circuits or flex circuits that connect PCBs to the rest of the HDD.  The semi-conductors
include a read channel to store and retrieve data bits, and a read/write preamplifier
(preamp) that amplifies the strength of the signals so that chips on PCBs can convert
electrical impulses to a digital signal.  Spindle and actuator motor controller electronics
ensure that the platters spin at the correct speed.  The actuator arms place the read/write
heads over the precise spot on the platter.  Interface electronics communicate with the
system’s central processing unit in the proper format.  A microprocessor and associated
memory chips oversee drive operations.  For high-performance drivers, an additional digital
signal processor is required.  All of these electronic components are typically mounted
(“stuffed”) on to PCBs in highly automated procedures.
Each part is brought together for final assembly in clean-rooms.  They are brought in
a base casting or base plate – a single piece of aluminium that also provides a mounting for
a PCB – which houses the electronics.  A gasket between the base casting and the top
cover acts as a seal to provide a contamination-free operating environment for the
read/write heads.  Once the HDD is assembled, it moves to a station for servo writing, an
electromechanical technique to control the positioning of the head.  The finished HDD then
undergoes functional testing, which is automated, and manual reworking if necessary.
7.4.2. Integration and industrial clustering
Hard disk drive production in Thailand began in 1983 after Seagate Technology
moved its HSA, the most labour intensive segment in HDD production process, out of
Singapore.  The import content of HSA exports was about 80 per cent.  Despite high tariffs,
HDD makers were eligible for input tariff exemption schemes as their products were for
export.
From then on, Seagate Technology expanded its production capacity and added
new activities, and since then numerous newcomers have set up production in Thailand,
including part suppliers and other HDD makers.  In 1987, Seagate Technology expanded its
existing capacity as well as started high-volume production of head-drive assembly in
Thailand.  This demonstrated net gains from HDD production in Thailand to other HDD
firms.  In addition, Seagate Technology provided training for numerous technical workers
and enhanced the availability of skilled labour (McKendrick, Doner and Haggard, 2000).
This, in turn, had a positive effect on attracting other key players in the HDD industry to
Thailand.  This process is in line with what the MNE literature postulates as the general
tendency for MNE affiliates to become increasingly entrenched in host countries the longer
they are present there, and the more conducive the overall investment climate of the host
country becomes over time (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999).
In 1991, IBM formed a joint venture with the Thai conglomerate, Saha Union, and
started manufacturing HDDs in Thailand, followed by the launch of its own production facility
in 1997.  By the end of the 1990s, IBM affiliates in Thailand accounted for approximately
two-thirds of the company’s global output.  Other companies that have set up facilities in164
Thailand include Fujitsu, which began producing desktop disk drives in 1991, and Western
Digital, which took over 3.5-inch HDDs from Fujitsu in 2001 and purchased the shares of
Read-Rite Corporation in 2003.  In 2004, Hitachi Global Storage Technologies shifted its
production base from the Philippines to Thailand.  In 2008, Toshiba started producing HDDs
in Thailand, using the production facilities of Fujitsu as a joint investment in manufacturing
HDDs by both companies.
9
A number of parts suppliers also began production Thailand.  In 1988, NMB, a large
Japanese producer of bearings and other metal products in Thailand for several years,
began motor production for HDDs.  Nidec, a major Japanese motor producer, set up its first
Thai plant in 1989 and a second one in 1991. K.R. Precision and Magnetric began their
operations in 1988 and 1992, respectively, to service Seagate Technology’s requirement for
suspension parts. T.P.W., a precision-machining firm based in Singapore, shifted its
operations to Thailand in 1989 to manufacture actuators and base plates for motors.
The expansion of the Thai HDD industry continued in the 1990s when industrial
clustering was observed.  While HDD makers introduced several new production activities,
many other parts suppliers started manufacturing in Thailand.  Seagate Technology
expanded its spindle motor capacity in 1994.  Expansion induced parts suppliers such as
Eiwa, Habiro, Nippon Super, Thai Okoku Rubber and Shin-Ei Daido, whose main products
are motor hubs and related parts for spindle motors, set up affiliates nearby.  Each of the
three largest HDD assemblers manufactured HDD head sub-assemblies for internal use
during that period.  Magnetric and Read-Rite, two independent HGA and HSA firms, also set
up Thai operations in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  A few producers of PCB and PCBA, and
flex circuits established Thai operations in the mid-1990s.  The trend continued with the
number of firms in the Thai HDD industry increasing from five during 1981-1985 to 74
between 2001 and 2006 (table 7.7).
9 Interview with Bloomberg, 14 January 2009.  See www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601204
&sid=adfHko5e4yk4#.165
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Numbers in parentheses indicate additional establishments per period, other numbers are cumulative.167
7.4.3. Economic performance
The HDD industry is the most important industry in the electronics sector of
Thailand, accounting for more than 70 per cent between 1988 and 2006, and experiencing
rapid growth in the past two decades.  Its annual (real) growth rate averaged about 16 per
cent from 1988 to 2006.  This outperformed the growth of other industries and its share in
manufacturing value-added increased from about 1 per cent in 1988 to more than 10 per
cent in 2006 (figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2. (Real) value-added of Thai HDD industry, 1988-2007









































































































































































HDDs comprise one of the most important electronic exports by Thailand.  Figure
7.3 illustrates export value and its relative importance in information technology (IT) exports
during 1988-2008.  Between 1999 and 2003, there was a slight downward trend in export
value because of the crisis in the global IT industry.  The export value dropped to an
average figure of US$ 3,400 million during 1999-2003.  From then on, HDD exports grew at
a phenomenal rate, reaching US$ 8,214 million in 2005 and US$ 15,493 million in 2008.  As
a result, HDD exports by Thailand accounted for 45 per cent of total IT exports and a 15 per
cent share of total exports in 2008 (figure 7.3).
Note that the export value reported in this chapter is far lower than that reported in
official documents such as the Annual Report of the Hard Disk Drive Institute.  Specifically,
in 2003-2005, the export value shown in this chapter is, on average, about 55 per cent of
what is reported in the official document.  This is due to the different sources of data.  Here,
exports of HDDs are based on actual trade data (SITC 75270, equivalent to HS 847170)
whereas the figure in the official document is extrapolated from annual reports of
BOI-promoted firms.  The latter approach appears to be problematic as it is likely to be
subject to double-counting.  Export value consists of two parts, HDDs and components, the168
export value of which is reported by HDD makers and related components suppliers,
respectively.  The first part is regarded as finished HDDs whereas the second part is
components.
10 In fact, the second part comprises indirect exports as these components are
assembled as finished HDDs and then exported.  Hence, adding them together is simply
double-counting.
Figure 7.4 presents the market shares of major HDD exporters.  Three inferences
can be drawn from this figure.  First, these six major exporters, which include Thailand,
accounted 70 per cent of global trade in 2007, reflecting the international division of labour
and the relative importance of East Asia in supplying HDDs to the rest of the world.  Second,
according to the export shares, Thailand is the second-largest HDD exporter, accounting for
17 per cent in 2008, behind only China at 35 per cent.  Interestingly, Thailand’s market
share increased continuously from the start of the new millennium, except in 2008.  The
country’s market share went hand–in-hand with that of China.  In other words, there was no
crowding-out effect on Thai HDD exports from the increasing importance of China’s share.
In order to gain a better understanding of the market positioning of these major
exporters, the export unit values of four East Asian countries are shown in figure 7.5.  The
downward trend of export unit values during various periods simply reflects price deflation in
HDDs because of technological advances.  In addition to the deflation trend, the clear
pattern is that HDD exports from Singapore always have the highest export unit value
whereas China recorded the lowest figure between 1996 and 2008.  The export unit values
Figure 7.3. HDD exports from Thailand, 1992-2008
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from United Nations Comtrade database.
Notes: Information technology (IT) includes categories of SITC 75-77, manufacturing is SITC 5-8 net
of 68 and HDD is HS 847170.







































































































































































































































































Figure 7.4. Market shares of major HDD exporters, 1990-2008
Sources: Author’s compilation from the United Nations Comtrade database.
Notes: HDD refers to HS 847170; the six major exporters are China, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Ireland and the Philippines.
Figure 7.5. Export unit value of major HDD exporters in East Asia
Source: Author’s compilation from the United Nations Comtrade database.
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of Thailand and Malaysia are between those of Singapore and China.  This is consistent
with resource endowment dispersion in these four countries.  That is, HDD MNCs have
located relatively high-tech HDD production in Singapore, which is relatively capital-
intensive, whereas they use China as a production base for simple HDDs.  The HDDs
manufactured in Thailand and Malaysia are, to a certain extent, similar in their quality range,
although the export unit value of Malaysia is slightly higher than that of Thailand.
Table 7.8 illustrates HDD trade flows and their major components from 2001 to 2007.
Export destinations and import sources are grouped into three main regions, i.e., East Asia,
North America and the European Union-15.  This has been done in order to contribute to the
fallacy of the “decoupling thesis”, the notion that the East Asian region has become a
self-contained economic entity with the potential for maintaining its own growth dynamism
independent of the economic outlook for the traditional developed market economies.
11
In addition, the East Asian region has been disaggregated further into ASEAN-10
and China for the debate on regional economic integration, i.e., ASEAN plus 3.  It is clear
that international trade involving the HDD industry is intraregional.  For example, East Asia
accounted for nearly 61 per cent of total HDD exports by Thailand between 2005 and 2007,
increasing from 51 per cent during 2001-2003.  North America and the European Union-15
accounted for only 22.1 per cent and 13.1 per cent, respectively, of Thailand’s HDD exports
during 2005-2007.  Interestingly, half of the HDD exports (34.4 per cent) were to China
during 2005-2007.  This was a sharp increase from 12.5 per cent between 2001 and 2003.
In contrast, ASEAN-10 has become less important as an export destination for
HDDs from Thailand.  This reflects the role of China in IPNs in East Asia, which relies
heavily on inputs from other countries in the region for extra-regional exports.  The degree
of regional dependence is even larger where sources of inputs are concerned.  More than
70 per cent of PCBs, ICs, semi-conductors, transistors, resistors, media and wafers were
sourced in the region.
12
7.5. Company-level case studies: IPNs versus industrial
clustering in Thailand
HDD makers (e.g., Seagate Technology, Western Digital, Fujitsu and Hitachi Global
Storage Technology) utilize international production networking to enhance their
international competitiveness.  This reflects the corporate strategy evolved during the past
three decades.  Currently, the fragmentation goes beyond the manufacturing process as
many companies have set up testing facilities abroad, particularly in East Asia.  In addition,
a few companies have established R&D centres outside their home countries.
13 HDD
11 This theory was popular in Asian policy circles in the 2000s until the onset of the recent financial
crisis.  See Yoshitomi, 2007, and Park and Shin, 2009 as well as the works cited therein.
12 The import value of these electronics products is an aggregate one, and not exclusive to HDDs. Of
course, the value might exceed what is actually used in the HDD industry. Unfortunately, disaggregated
data are not available.  Since the purpose here is to illustrate the broad picture of trade flows in
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s compilation from United Nations Comtrade database.172
makers also outsource their peripheral activities (motors and PCBs) to third parties while
concentrating on their core business activities (media, sliders, heads) (Western Digital,
2008; and Seagate Technology, 2008).  Thus, both intra- and inter-company transactions
are observed.
While HDD makers use IPNs to enhance their international competitiveness, this
does not constrain them from also benefiting from economies obtained through
agglomeration.  In fact, evidence from the Thai HDD industry suggests the coexistence of
IPNs and industrial clustering.  Nevertheless, it began with international outsourcing.  When
affiliates reach a certain level of technological capability, industrial clustering begins as HDD
makers and Tier 1 suppliers are located nearby to harness agglomeration economies.
Thailand was first integrated into the global production network of HDD MNEs as
a result of the entry of Seagate Technology in 1983.  It started with a simple assembly task,
assembling HDD heads with actuator arms and read/write heads for export.  Most
components for assembly came from Singapore and Malaysia.  The Seagate Technology
entry was primarily motivated by cheap labour costs.  While there was concern about
developmental impact of being the so-called screwdriver assembly base of MNEs (i.e.,
industry footloose) at the early stage of the industry’s development, the evidence in the
previous section clearly suggests the opposite.  The HDD industry in Thailand experienced
industrial deepening during that period and Thailand became one of the major exporters.
Over the years, the affiliates in Thailand gradually acquired more technological
capability as workers gained knowledge from their work experience.  As Sample 7 taken in
this study revealed, after receiving prototypes/blueprints developed by the parent company,
several tasks must be undertaken before the manufacturing process can begin.  Workers in
the affiliates need to develop basic and detailed designs for the production processes.
Production facilities, tools, moulds and other equipment are then designed and ordered.
Task details are prepared for production line workers.  Additional tasks include pilot runs,
during which the production processes undergo final checks in readiness for mass
production (sample 2).  This is where detailed knowledge is needed.
In the early stage, Thai workers acquired such knowledge so that only mass
production was undertaken by Thailand’s affiliates (samples 1 and 2).  This is what is
referred to as the labour-intensive stage.  Over the years, workers gained more experience
and accumulated skills so the affiliates started undertaking more complicated tasks.  It is
very difficult to show from the interviews any particular examples illustrating successful
movement up the quality ladder of these affiliates.  However, the fact that the HDD industry
has been able to grow continuously, despite increasing wage levels during the past two
decades, supports the existence of such success.  Currently, the affiliates in Thailand can
convert prototypes/blueprints into action plans for manufacturing.  At this stage, the affiliates
require more engineers and scientists.  This is especially true nowadays as the HDD
industry has transitioned from the use of longitudinal magnetic recording (LMR) head
13 Most R&D activities are in the United States, i.e., Colorado, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts (Seagate Technology, 2008).173
technology for the head writer function to perpendicular magnetic recording (PMR)
technology.  Sample 1 revealed the presence of an increasing number of engineers and
scientists in the factory to overcome engineering problems that can emerge in the
production process on a daily basis.  Such a developmental stage is referred to as the
“engineering stage” by Takayasu and Mori (2004).
After reaching the engineering stage, industrial clustering develops since intensive
cooperation between HDD makers and suppliers is needed in order to establish effective
coordination and achieve “virtual integration of the entire system”.  Nonetheless, while the
industry is clustering, it does not completely rule out making use of globalized production.  It
depends on what layers of the process are fragmented and what parts are under
consideration.
Consider, for example, an HDD production network where HDD makers are at the
centre.  There are at least two layers.  In the first layer, HDD makers interact with Tier 1
suppliers.  The second layer is where Tier 1 suppliers participate with their suppliers,
referred to as Tier 2 suppliers.  Industrial clustering is observed in the first layer with few
exceptions as several customized parts and components are traded in this layer.  Hence,
inter-personal participation is required in order to create effective and efficient coordination
(samples 1 and 2).
14 Despite the continuing improvement of telecommunications technology,
that still cannot substitute completely for inter-personal contact in terms of several aspects
such as the speed of solving problems and the effectiveness of trial and error experiments.
In other words, distance still matters when it comes to establishing effective coordination.
In the first layer, HDD makers usually request their suppliers to assign a few staff
members to work with the HDD makers’ staff as intercompany teamwork for exchanging
information about production efficiency and cost-effectiveness as well as to make necessary
changes (samples 1, 2 and 7).  As revealed by sample 3, several staff members are
assigned to work with each customer on a daily basis in exchanging production-related
information, matching production and delivery schedules, assessing and reporting on certain
performance measures.  Sometimes, HDD makers request suppliers to exchange certain
components (i.e., Tier 2 suppliers) in order to improve the performance of finished HDDs.
This can even occur at very short notice.  Sample 4 provided the same impression.  Speed
in responding to such requests is one of the performance indicators that HDD makers
monitor, based on which they rank their Tier 1 suppliers for deciding on future order
volumes.
Through such close coordination, HDD makers also benefit from overseeing their
suppliers’ capability and productivity.  Since the former are at the network’s centre and
therefore has better information of all components used in assembly in the last stage, they
are in a better position to provide sensible solutions for improving the performance of their
suppliers.  Sometimes, a problem occurs with a particular component but needs cooperation
from other component suppliers in fixing it.  Even though there are no restrictions requiring
14 The proximity was also found by Kimura (2001), who studied Fujitsu’s HDD production in the
Philippines.174
Tier 1 suppliers to serve only one HDD maker, these suppliers need to have a separate
production line for each customer.  Even a relatively generalized component used by all
HDD makers cannot be manufactured for all customers by a single production line.  For
example, sample 3 supplied more than one HDD maker and has individual product lines to
serve each customer.  This is necessary given the extremely short product lifecycles and
highly volatile market demand.
Leadership position cannot be taken for granted, and HDD makers must therefore
be ready for the emergence of new and untested market opportunities.  Hence, firms in such
an industry usually have slightly excess capacity while their suppliers must have the
capacity to respond to any immediate changes that might occur, e.g., innovations resulting
from R&D.  Even though HDD makers outsource peripheral parts to third parties, that
relationship is far different from the arms’ length transactions with a loose patchwork of
stand-alone affiliates, joint ventures and suppliers.  Hence, efforts are made by HDD makers
to network their own operations and inter-company relationships, across both functions and
locations (Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000).
In contrast, it is the second layer where international fragmentation takes place.
Intermediates used for supplies from Tier 2 to Tier 1 suppliers are less customized as
opposed to the first layer.  This is especially true for electronic components.  As sample 4
revealed, intermediates traded in the second layer such as PCBs, integrated circuits,
resistors and semiconductors are used not only by the HDD industry but also by other
industries.  This is reinforced by the digitalization phenomenon where electronic elements
play an important part in determining the performance of manufacturing goods.  In addition,
a number of MNEs such as Celestica, Flextronics, Jabil Circuit, Sanmina and Solectron
specialize in manufacturing these components and thus play an important role in global
trade (Lakeman, Boyd and Frey, 2001; and Yusuf, 2004).
15 More importantly, these MNEs
have their own production networks around the world.  For example, Flextronics, the largest,
had 87 plants in 27 countries and a turnover of US$ 146 billion in 2002 (Yusuf and Evenett,
2002).  Celestica have 50 production facilities around the world, most of which are in
developing countries in East Asia.  The same production network is found in the case of
Solectron (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).  Hence these companies make their own decisions
on how to serve their clients (either by setting up another affiliate geographically close to
their clients or by exporting from their existing production facilities).  The longer lead time
required in the second layer is another factor, possible as a result of the fact that first- and
second-tier suppliers are not necessarily located nearby.  As argued by Kimura (2009), from
the experience of machinery industries, it can be inferred that the first layer’s lead time is
15 Sometimes they are referred to as contract equipment manufacturers (CEMs) (Lakeman, Boyd and
Frey, 2001).  The emergence of these manufacturers was partly related to changes in the business
environment of high-tech industries, such as business consolidation strategies and an increasing
number of common components across products (i.e., a certain type of chip can be used not only in
computers but also in other electrical appliances).  In this environment, business opportunities for CEMs
are even greater. They can quote the lowest prices because of their high turnover and capability of
offering a wide range of electronic items to customers. They can switch production from one category to
another, and can pool their inventories for several customers, thereby reducing individual inventories.175
usually a high-frequency, just-in-time system (i.e., 2.5 hours) as opposed to 1-7 days
required in the second layer.  In addition, since most components used in HDD production
are small and have high values per weight, they can be sent by air transportation (sample 4;
and Kimura, 2001).  Hence, Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers can be located in different countries.
Sample 4 revealed experiences in internationally sourcing parts in the second layer.
The company imports bare PCBs from Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, and
integrated circuits from Singapore and the United States; it then customizes the PCB
assembly for HDD makers.  Components used for sub-assembly must be sourced from
approved vendor lists provided by HDD makers; interestingly, most of these imported
components usually come from East Asia.  However, intermediate trade in the second layer
is not necessarily done internationally.  In some cases, it can be done domestically
(sample 3).  What is argued here is that the option of international sourcing is economically
feasible.
The exceptions in this layer are wafers, media, and other minor and small
components, which are usually imported from the HDD makers’ affiliates abroad.  Their
quality tends to be standardized so that geographical proximity is not a necessity.  Wafers
and media play a very important role in determining business competency and their
production is likely to be in-house.  This is especially true for media.
16 Both Seagate
Technology and Western Digital import them from affiliates in Johor, Malaysia (samples 1
and 7; Seagate Technology, 2008: and Western Digital, 2008).  Both these types of
components are capital-intensive and huge costs are involved in their production.  For
example, Showa Denko set up its new plant in Singapore in 2006.  The factory cost about
Y 60 billion and employs about 600 workers.  Hence, once a factory is located in a given
location, it takes time to establish a new factory.  There are numerous metallic components
used in linking several major parts in HDDs, including spring wire, bottom VCs, top VCMs,
TG clamps, top cover assys, top cover seals, positional seals and window clock seals.
These components are physically small and economies-of-scale are important in their
production processes.  Hence, supplying them to a specific factory is economically
worthwhile.
Overall, evidence from the HDD industry in Thailand suggests the possibility of
coexistence between industrial clustering and IPNs.  MNEs can complement them to
enhance their competitiveness.  While industrial clustering is present in the first layer, MNEs
can still manage to harness benefits from the dispersion of resource endowments in the
second layer (figure 7.6.).
With regard to the proliferation of FTAs, HDD makers and component suppliers have
no plan to utilize such agreements.  There are no problems related to tariffs in their
production process.  The output tariff is zero per cent in accordance with the Information and
Technology Agreement under the WTO framework, so that tariff concessions under FTAs
are zero.  Notwithstanding the non-zero tariffs on several inputs listed in table 7.5, firms in
16 When HDD makers employ PMR technology, media plays an important factor in determining HDD
performance in terms of areal density (Western Digital, 2008).176
the Thai HDD industry are unlikely to be negatively affected because of the presence of tariff
exemption schemes, especially those offered by BOI.  Such schemes cover both direct and
indirect export activities.  The latter means firms that import raw materials for manufacturing
intermediates to be used in export-oriented activities are eligible for tariff exemptions.
7.6. Conclusion and policy inferences
This chapter examines the nature of IPNs at the industry level, using the HDD
industry in Thailand as a case study.  The research methodology was based on interviews of
selected samples in order to reveal how firms make use of IPNs.  The key finding concerns
how MNEs in the HDD industry manage their IPNs, making use of both domestic and
international fragmentation.  Domestic fragmentation is used in the first layer of the
production network between HDD makers and Tier 1 suppliers to overcome any
coordination failure that might occur.  At the same time, when parts are less customized as
found in the second layer, enterprises in the HDD industry internationally source their
intermediates to maximize benefits from the existing dispersion of resources around the
world.  In other words, based on the example of the Thai HDD industry, industrial clustering
and IPN can coexist.
Figure 7.6. IPNs and industrial clustering in Thailand’s HDD industry
Source: Developed by the author.177
Three policy inferences can be drawn from this analysis.  First, the coexistence of
industrial clustering and IPNs suggests that any observed industrial clustering is not
a synonym for complete localization.  Local content might increase as a consequence of
industrial clustering, but by how much is based purely on cost-benefits.  As long as the
benefits from geographical proximity exceed any possible costs of concentration, firms will
prefer local sourcing.
Second, industrial clustering can be regarded as a proxy of development indicators
of a given industry.  It must occur naturally only after the affiliates reach a certain level of
technological capability.  It cannot be forced by any policy measures such as tax incentives.
In fact, it largely depends on supply-side capability.  Recent policy initiatives such as joint
programmes between the private and public sectors in education and training would be
a prudent policy for increasing the pool of qualified engineers and scientists for the HDD
industry.
Third, while tariffs in the HDD industry appear to form a non-binding constraint,
further trade liberalization is needed to encourage potential indigenous enterprises to learn
and benefit from technological advances associated with MNEs in the HDD industry.  Even
though tariffs do not matter to existing firms in the HDD industry, they create a cost burden
for enterprises and ever indigenous ones that are not yet ready but have the potential to
participate in IPNs in the future.  In addition, as electronics are commonly used in a wide
range of products, tariffs on common parts could limit spillovers that might be associated
with the entry of MNEs in the HDD industry.178
8.  Development of the value chain in the textile and
clothing sector of Bangladesh: Is there a role for
regional trade agreements?
Khondaker Golam Moazzem and Md Tariqur Rahman
8.1. Introduction and objectives
During the past few decades the remarkable change in the pattern and trend of
international trade has increased the interconnectedness of production processes in
a vertical trading chain that has expanded across different regions, with each specializing in
particular stages of a production process (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001; and Umemoto,
2005).  Consequently, trade in intermediate products and, more specifically, trade of
components between countries has substantially increased compared with the rise of trade
in final products.  The development of global value chains and international production
networks (IPNs) strengthens the links between various domestic and international
enterprises operating in different territories in producing or delivering goods and services.
More importantly, these networks ensure the involvement of the most efficient enterprises in
the value chain, thus providing an optimum level of return for enterprises, high quality and
reasonable prices for consumers, the efficient allocation of resources, for example.
In the textiles and clothing (T&C) sector, a strong value chain exists between
suppliers of raw materials and intermediate products in different countries, and
manufacturers and buyers of these products at the retailers’ level, both in developed and
developing countries.  In the initial stage of development of the T&C sector, outsourcing was
mainly based on locational advantage, i.e., close geographical proximity of the final market
to the producing countries; due to its highly capital-intensive and automated nature
particularly of the textiles industry, the T&C industry is less flexible in adjusting locational
choice or position in the global value chain (Nordås, 2004).
In the gradual liberalization of the T&C industry, fragmentation decisions have been
influenced by (a) the level of skill and flexibility of the workforce, (b) the availability of capital,
(c) the level of technology, transportation and communication infrastructure, and (d) to some
extent, supportive domestic policies.  Poor developing countries have entered the
manufacturing process by giving entrepreneurs special incentives and facilities to set up
backward and forward linkage industries, together with various incentives offered by the
developed countries in the form of preferential market access for various textile and clothing
products.  Since the production process of garments is still dominated by the one
machine-one operator technique, developing countries with their available supply of
low-cost labour are able to take advantage of production fragmentation.
1
1 According to Jinmin and Wei (undated), the rapid expansion of China’s exports of T&C products has
been linked to the phenomenon of industrial clustering of T&C firms at the Yangtze River delta, Pearl
River delta and Bohai Rim since the 1990s.  This industrial agglomeration has important economic and
social implications with the creation of a large number of enterprises, entrepreneurs and employment.179
In Bangladesh, the T&C value chain has been developing gradually since the early
1980s.  Initially, the low cost of production due to very low wage levels motivated foreign
firms to shift the relatively labour-intensive part of the production process to Bangladesh.
The opportunity to supply apparel under the quota facility to the markets of the developed
countries, particularly in the United States of America and the European Union, has also
played a major role in the relocation of production units from developing countries.
2
Entrepreneurs from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong, China
invested in export processing zones (EPZs) during the early 1980s.  Later, the sector
developed under local entrepreneurship where various domestic policies (i.e., easy bank
loans, availability of ready-to-operate factories for rent, effective low-cost technology and
back-to-back letters of credit facilities) as well as international policies, (i.e., the quota facility
under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) until 2004, duty-free, quota-free market access in
the European Union under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative since 2001) have
contributed substantially to the development process.
Nonetheless, the role of foreign firms in filling the gap in marketing and management
skills, together with a good technological base was also vital, particularly in the initial
development phase of the sector in Bangladesh.  At present, foreign-owned companies
account for a share of less than 5 per cent of total companies operating in the T&C sector.
Available information shows that these companies do not maintain a strong production
linkage with their parent companies.
The objectives of the study detailed in this chapter were to clarify value chain
development in the export-oriented T&C sector of Bangladesh and the factors responsible
for its development since its inception in the early 1980s.  An in-depth analysis was carried
out that covered: (a) the pattern of trade in T&C products between Bangladesh and other
countries, (b) the dynamics and changes of the trade pattern and (c) the role of trade
policies that focus on regional trade agreements (RTAs).  Based on the analysis, the study
makes policy suggestions for effective IPN operation in the T&C sector of Bangladesh.
8.2. Literature review: Role of regional trade agreements in the
development of global value chains and international
production networks
Although a liberal trade policy is considered a major instrument for enhancing trade
and investment, its role in the development of the value chain and IPNs is not substantial.
According to Baldwin and Martin (2004), if trade among the regions was free, then firms
would be indifferent when deciding whether to agglomerate.
3  This view was supported by
2 Under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, less-developed countries including Bangladesh have enjoyed
the quota facility for duty-free exports of apparel to the United States and the European Union.  This is
evident from the fact that Daewoo of the Republic of Korea has relocated its textile and clothing factories
to Bangladesh in order to enjoy the duty-free market access facility.
3 Referring to the models of geography and growth, the study concluded that the cost of moving
capital across borders (capital mobility) and the cost of moving ideas across borders (learning spillovers)
are important aspects of economic integration, which can also mitigate or extenuate de stabilizing
aspects of freer trade.180
Rajan (2005) and Lorena (2005), as multilateral trade liberalization has a more profound
effect than RTAs do on growing international production fragmentation.
4  On the other hand,
Yeung (2008) opposed the above views regarding the role of RTAs on the value chain and
IPNs, and noted that on the broader regional scale, industrial clusters could be fostered
through bilateral or trilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).
The literature includes more than a few reports on attempted empirical investigations
of the role of RTAs and import tariffs in the decision to fragment production internationally.
Yi (2003), using a two-country dynamic Ricardian trade model, disagreed on the role of tariff
reductions in influencing IPNs and added that the standard models had difficulty in
generating non-linear features of IPN development.  According to Yi, worldwide tariff barriers
had only decreased by about 11 percentage points since the early 1960s.  He noted that
tariff declines were much larger prior to the mid-1980s than after, yet trade growth was less
during the former period.  However, according to Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), vertical
specialization may be large within regional trading blocs because of tariff preferences and
geographic proximity.
Based on the European Union’s situation, Navaretti, Haaland and Venables (2002)
attempted to define the relationship between multinational corporations and production
networks in economic activities.  They reached the conclusion that restrictive trade policy at
any stage of a production network (intermediates or final products) would hinder its
development.  Fragmentation of production mostly takes place between areas with low trade
barriers and/or transportation costs.  They cited the example of the phenomenal increase of
European networking in Central Eastern Europe, followed by the Europe Agreement or the
United States-Mexico Agreement after the implementation of NAFTA.  Thus, they concluded,
liberalization of international trade, geographical proximity among the trading partners and
differences in factor costs in the trading countries could individually or jointly provide strong
incentives for multinational corporations to fragment their production process in different
geographical regions.
With regard to the effect of regional trade arrangements in the ASEAN region, Ando
and Kimura (2003) stated that if the scope of such arrangements were limited to tariff
removal, the results would also be limited, as simple tariff reductions only provide
a competitive environment for import-substituting industries.  However, they also noted that
the reduction of cross-border tariffs was not sufficient to promote the formation of
international production/distribution networks and that, in terms of welfare effects, their role
was controversial.  In a general equilibrium setting, Arndt (2004) found that an FTA that
incorporated production sharing raised the likelihood of welfare improvement since, with
improved market access due to trade liberalization, both the volume of trade and the
fragmentation of the production process increased; as a result, final products were traded in
4 Based on a study on Croatia, Lorena (2005) pointed out that although according to the economic
theory removal of trade barriers through bilateral and multilateral negotiations had positive impacts on
IIT, the results did not support the hypotheses, especially where IIT decreased as the integration process
proceeded. However, in the same study, Lorena mentioned that with low transaction costs, similar
culture, history, language or some other important element, the integration process that reduced the
trade barriers could strongly influence IIT.181
different countries.  According to Johansson and Quigley (2004), one of the distinguishing
features of the development of regionalism in recent times was the sharp rise of
agglomerative economies and their spread through network building across different
geographical areas.
Kharas and Gill (2007) found that the most dynamic production networks and value
chains were sectors where tariffs were lowest.  According to Kimura (2006a), in East Asia,
most production network-related components were already being traded without any tariffs
because of the removal of tariffs on semiconductor-related parts in the late 1990s as well as
extensive usage of various duty drawback systems.  Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa
(2007) gave the same example of the APEC-led trade liberalization initiative on electronic
parts and components to indicate its crucial role in successful fragmentation of IPNs in the
ASEAN region.
By using the O-Ring Theory of production, Umemoto (2005) found in his empirical
analysis that trade in components of machinery industries was highly sensitive to the level of
trade facilitation measures; thus, with the improvement of trade facilitation measures,
fragmentation of production internationally could be encouraged.  In this regard, a common
regional approach to improving the regional trade facilitation system is considered to play an
important role in the East Asian region to fragment production processes among different
geographical boundaries.
Although liberal trade polices play a positive role in the development of IPNs, the
role of RTAs in that development is ambiguous.  In the literature, there are a number of
examples of factors determining the development of IPNs in specific sectors, such as
machinery components and equipment, in South-East Asia.  However, not many studies
have found this to be the case in the development of IPNs in the T&C sector.  Therefore, a
thorough analysis is required in order to understand the role (if any) of RTAs in IPN
development in that sector.  Bangladesh is taken as a sample case because of the
increasing importance of T&C sector IPNs.
8.3. Methodology
In order to understand the development of the T&C sector of Bangladesh, a trend
analysis of selected raw materials and components traded with major trading partners was
carried out by using data available in the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
The analysis provides a comparison of historical trade patterns of major T&C related
products in different years, such as 1995, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.  This trend analysis
has been extended to 2008, based on the data collected from the Bangladesh National
Board of Revenue (NBR).  Intra-industry trade (IIT) indices for selected products of raw
materials as well as intermediate and final products of the value chain have been calculated
to appreciate the nature and extent of the relationship of IIT in these products with major
trading partners.182
An attempt was made to carry out a gravity analysis to identify the nature and extent
of the influence of different factors responsible for IPNs, using the IIT index as a dependent
variable.  Since the value of the IIT index in most instances is very low, particularly for major
importing countries, the results were not particularly significant; therefore the analysis was
not concluded.
In-depth interviews were conducted with seven entrepreneurs who have a great deal
of experience in manufacturing knitted and woven products; a structured questionnaire was
used for the survey.  Major issues highlighted in the survey included the nature of changes
in production, sourcing of raw materials, export and destinations of various products, the
development of backward linkages in textile units, and factors responsible for the growth
and development of the T&C sector of Bangladesh.
8.4. Bangladesh’s trade policy and participation in various
bilateral, regional and multilateral trading arrangements
Bangladesh is currently following a liberalized trade regime with very limited
restrictions on imports in terms of tariff rates and the list of restricted products.  Under
Import Policy Order (IPO) 2009-2012, import restrictions have been further relaxed on all but
nine items compared with 25 in the previous IPO.  The restricted items include health,
environmentally hazardous items and items that may hurt the religious sentiment of the
people.  On the other hand, Export Policy 2009-2012 announced nine highest priority
sectors in order to boost their production and export, such as: agro-products and agro-
processed products; pharmaceutical products; software and ICT products; home textiles;
sea-bound ship building industries; and toiletries products.
It should be noted that the current liberal trade regime was arrived at only after
a long process of reform and restructuring.  After independence in 1971, Bangladesh
followed a public sector-led, import-substituting industrialization strategy.  During the early
1980s, Bangladesh started to take various reform measures with the objectives of improved
competitiveness, enhanced economic efficiency, and the dismantling of state interventions
in order to create conditions for promoting export-led growth.  As a part of this process,
significant reforms have been implemented in terms of liberalization of external trade and
foreign exchange regulations as well as the introduction of deregulatory measures to
facilitate increased participation of the private sector.  Tariff and non-tariff barriers have been
reduced together with the dismantling of quantitative restrictions on imports and the
deregulation of import procedures.  Since the early 1990s, the process of liberalization has
continued with the objective of achieving adequate export growth and employment
generation; this is expected to have a direct impact on poverty alleviation.  Under this
changing scenario, private sector-led development has taken place, particularly in the T&C
sector.
Bangladesh is actively involved in various bilateral, regional and multilateral trading
arrangements (table 8.1).  The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is the most recent
trading arrangement under which Bangladesh, together with other South Asian countries,
has started trading goods under a duty-free arrangement, although on a limited scale.183
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Other important initiatives include: the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC); the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) (formerly
known as the Bangkok Agreement); the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP); the
Framework Agreement on Trade Preferential System among the Member States of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (TPS-OIC); and the Preferential Tariff Arrangement –
Group of Eight Developing Countries (PTA-D-8).  Of these initiatives only PTA-D-8 is
currently not in operation.
8.4.1.  SAFTA
Bangladesh was actively involved in establishing the SAARC Preferential Trading
Arrangement (SAPTA) and thereafter, SAFTA, which became effective in July 2006.
According to the SAFTA accord, developing country members will reduce their tariffs to
0-5 per cent in 7 years, while Sri Lanka will reduce it in 8 years, while member least-
developed countries (LDCs) will reduce it in 10 years.  With regard to duty-free market
access, the minimum content requirement is fixed at 40 per cent and for LDCs at 30 per
cent.  However, three years have passed since the enforcement of SAFTA with no major
shifts in the size and volume of intraregional trade except for that with India.  It is important
to note that Bangladesh’s trade with India has accelerated in recent years, rising from US$
89.3 million in 2004 to US$ 304.6 million in 2010.  A large part of this rise is perhaps related
to the reduction of import duty on related products as per the SAFTA accord along with
export demand for diversified products.
One of the major limitations is the inclusion of major tradeable items in a member
country’s sensitive list.
5 SAFTA members have reduced the number of products on the
sensitive list in order to make the accord meaningful.  India’s sensitive list for LDCs contains
101 items while Bangladesh’s sensitive list for non-LDCs and LDCs contains 1,233 items
and 1,241 items, respectively.  The number of products on the sensitive lists of other
member countries include (for LDCs): Sri Lanka, 1,065; Pakistan, 1,191; and Maldives (an
LDC), 671.  Under the special and differential treatment facility of the SAFTA accord, India
has provided an annual tariff rate quota of 8 million pieces for apparel from Bangladesh.
6
This could have a long-term positive impact on the efforts of the T&C sector of Bangladesh
to enter the large Indian market.
8.4.2. BIMSTEC
Bangladesh is a member of BIMSTEC, another regional trading initiative, together
with Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.  A number of sectors have
been identified for preferential trading between BIMSTEC member countries, such as
textiles and clothing, drugs and pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, horticulture and
floriculture, processed food, automotives and components, rubber, tea and coffee, coconuts
5 Despite these limitations, exports from Bangladesh to India will increase in the future as India has
agreed to provide a special and differential treatment facility to Bangladesh and will import 8 million
pieces of clothing without any duty.
6 India has recently decided to extend the quota to 10 million pieces.  However this amount is highly
insignificant considering Bangladesh’s total yearly export of about 5,570 million pieces.187
and spices.  As per the BIMSTEC agreement, developing country members will reduce their
tariff rates by 2012 while LDC members will reduce them by 2017.  At present, the member
countries are negotiating their negative lists.
BIMSTEC also places emphasis on trade facilitation between member countries;
thus, individual member countries have been assigned specific projects related to trade
facilitation, such as customs procedures (Bangladesh); standards and conformity (Thailand);
banking arrangements (Sri Lanka); e-BIMSTEC (India); intellectual property rights (India);
mobility of business people (Sri Lanka); and promotion of intra-BIMSTEC investment (India).
However, trade between the member countries of BIMSTEC is not so encouraging; this
could be partly attributed to the dividing of sectors and subsectors of cooperation, which
may no longer fit current global circumstances.
8.4.3 APTA
Formerly known as the Bangkok Agreement, APTA is another regional trading
initiative of which Bangladesh is a member together with India and China.  As an LDC,
Bangladesh enjoys tariff concessions in other member countries, such as tariff concessions
on 48 products (HS 6-digit level) in the Indian market with a margin of preference ranging
from 14 per cent to 100 per cent.  Under APTA, a minimum local content of 45 per cent is
necessary in order to enjoy preferential market access, and 35 per cent in the case of LDCs.
However, member countries are currently negotiating the expansion of the existing base of
products that enjoy preferential tariffs.  After the third round of bidding, the number of
products under the preferential scheme totalled 4,270, compared with the previous total of
1,721 products (table 8.2).
8.4.4. GSTP
Bangladesh signed the GSTP in 1994 together with 49 other countries.  Under the
trade preference scheme the agricultural sector was provided with special preferences.
Current applied tariff rates in GSTP countries are significantly lower than the WTO bound
Table 8.2. Number of products under APTA preferential schemes
Number of products under Number of products under
Country Preferential Scheme Preferential Scheme
(before third round)  (after third round)
Bangladesh 129 209
China 902 (18) 1 697 (161)
India 188 (33) 570 (48)
Republic of Korea 214 (29) 1 367 (306)
Sri Lanka 288 (32) 427 (72)
Total 1 721 (112) 4 270 (587)
Source: ESCAP, Bangkok.
Note: Figures in parentheses are additional special concessions for LDC members only.188
rates.  The local content requirement for non-LDC members is 50 per cent and 40 per cent
for LDC members.
Under the different preferential schemes, various types of T&C – related products
are taken into account by member countries for preferential tariffs (table 8.3).  Under APTA,
India offered preferential tariffs to other countries on 11 products, of which LDCs receive
a special preferential tariff on one product.  Under SAFTA, India is currently providing tariff
rate quota (TRQ) to Bangladesh’s T&C related products.  Similarly, China offered special
preferences on 20 T&C – related products, while the Republic of Korea offered preferential
tariffs on 17 products and a special tariff for LDCs on one T&C – related product.  However,
such offers only cover a limited number of products, and the markets are not large
compared with the preferential market access offered by developed countries and the huge
volume of products imported under these schemes every year.
8.4.5. Bilateral FTAs
Slow progress in effective operation of RTAs led Bangladesh to negotiate bilateral
trade agreements within and outside the region.  Bangladesh is currently discussing various
aspects of bilateral FTAs with India and Pakistan.  Bangladesh’s participation in various
regional and subregional trading arrangements with special preferences for being an LDC
has made it advantageous, at least from a trade point of view.  Effective operations of these
arrangements would make regional investors consider investing in Bangladesh to target
intraregional and extraregional markets.
8.4.6. Multilateral trading initiatives
Bangladesh, together with other LDCs, has duty-free market access to the European
Union, Canada, Japan, Australia and several other countries.  After the end of phase out of
Mult-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2005, Bangladesh has no preferential market access for
its apparel products in the United States market.
7 Under WTO, if the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration is finally enacted, LDCs will get duty-free market access for 97 per cent of their
products in the markets of developed countries.  This access will not fulfill the interests of
Asian LDCs, and especially Bangladesh with its very narrow export base as the remaining 3
per cent may cover most of Bangladesh’s exportable items.  It is therefore important to
include some of Bangladesh’s major exportable items in the 97 per cent listing.  However,
negotiations on NAMA under WTO will have a negative impact on Bangladesh’s exports
since major exportable products will face the problem of preference erosion, mainly in the
European Union market.  On the other hand, the TRIPs agreement exempts LDCs from
following certain obligations regarding the pharmaceutical industry until 2016, which will help
7 After the MFA phase-out in 2005, the United States Congress created a Bill called Tariff Relief
Assistance for the Developing Economies (TRADE) in 2007 in order to provide preferential support in
trade of developing countries with the United States.  However, the bill was later revised and titled “New
Partnership for Development Act (NPDA) 2007” but was not passed in the previous sessions of the
United States Congress.  A revised version of the Bill titled “New Partnership for Trade and Development
2009” is now under consideration.189
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Bangladesh to develop its own pharmaceutical industry.  Since various facilities have been
mentioned in different trade agreements, foreign investors should find it worthwhile to invest
in various types of projects to enjoy those facilities.
Most market access schemes are less effective from Bangladesh’s point of view;
these are mostly at different stages of negotiations in regards to tariff concessions and
product identification for preferential schemes (table 8.4).  The share of total exports by
Bangladesh under these various schemes did not even pass 5 per cent, and there has been
no improvement over time under these preferential schemes.  However, a large proportion
of imports have been from within these trading areas.  Bangladesh imported about 32 per
cent of its total imports from the APTA region in 2007, particularly China and India; its share
of imports from this region is increasing.  On the other hand, Bangladesh imported about
17 per cent of its total imports from BIMSTEC and 15.6 per cent from the SAFTA region
during 2007, and the volume of imports from these regions has been increasing.  A large
volume of imports has been from the APTA region in the form of various types of raw
materials and intermediate items for the T&C sector.  Likewise, a relatively large volume of
imports from BIMSTEC and SAFTA, which are not mutually exclusive to APTA, has also
comprised T&C related items; in fact, Bangladesh’s imports from within these regions
substantially increased by about three times from 1990 to 2007.  However, it is important to
examine to what extent such imports were due to RTAs between member countries.
Table 8.4. Pattern of Bangladesh exports and imports under different RTAs
Exports (as percentage Imports (as percentage of
Region of world exports)  world exports)
1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007
APTA 3.37 1.32 3.38 12.54 21.88 32.38
BIMSTEC 2.32 1.64 1.91 5.91 12.98 17.03
SAFTA 3.66 1.66 2.35 6.83 11.71 15.57
World (millions of 1 670.50 5 589.60 12 717.10 3 656.10 9 000.80 18 476.03
United States dollars)
Source: Computed based on data from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics
2008.
Note: Export data taken at F.O.B. value and import data at C.I.F. value.
8.5. Global textiles and clothing market: Position of Bangladesh
The global market for textiles and apparel is increasing, mainly because of growing
imports by developed countries.  The United States and Canada as well as members of the
European Union accounted for 70 per cent of total world imports (table 8.5) comprising
some US$ 193.6 billion worth of knitwear (HS 61) and woven-wear (HS 62) products during
2000; this figure increased to US$ 361.1 billion in 2007.  Although the United States has
continued to account for the largest share of knitwear and woven-wear imports, its share of
total imports has been declining compared with that of the European Union, which192
Table 8.5. Trend in global imports of textiles and clothing products
HS 61 (articles of apparel HS 62 (articles of apparel
Region/country
and clothing accessories, and clothing accessories,
knitted or crocheted) not knitted/crocheted)
2000 2004 2007 2000 2004 2007
World imports 87.16 116.03 150.58 106.40 134.89 165.48
(billions of United
States dollars)
Canada (%) 1.67 1.86 2.22 1.69 1.87 2.15
European Union-25 (%) 36.73 42.48 44.60 37.43 43.73 46.15
United States (%) 31.56 28.47 26.33 32.17 27.38 23.73
Source: Computed based on data from WITS.
Table 8.6. Trend in global exports of textiles and clothing products
HS 61 (articles of apparel HS 62 (articles of apparel
Region/country
and clothing accessories, and clothing accessories,
knitted or crocheted) not knitted/crocheted)
2000 2004 2007 2000 2004 2007
World exports 77.26 112.55 155.66 96.29 131.15 155.54
(billions of United
States dollars)
Bangladesh (%) 1.55 2.67 3.00 3.03 2.46 2.87
China (%) 17.38 22.93 39.40 19.59 22.10 30.42
India (%) 2.35 2.20 2.65 4.00 2.80 3.37
Viet Nam (%)
Turkey (%) 4.78 5.56 5.15 2.58 3.46 3.50
Sources: Computed based on data from WITS; Bangladesh data for 2007 from the National Board of
Revenue, Dhaka.
maintained a share of 44.6 per cent in the case of knitwear and 46.2 per cent in the case of
woven-wear imports during 2007.  Although not large, Canada’s textile and apparel imports
(knitwear, 2.22 per cent and woven-wear, 2.15 per cent in 2007) are increasing, albeit at
a slow pace.  Thus, these three markets are considered to be the most important export
destinations for T&C manufacturing countries.
The composition and structure of manufacturing sources of T&C products has
changed over time.  China alone maintained export shares of 39 per cent of knitwear and
30 per cent share of woven-wear products in 2007, up from 17 per cent and 19 per cent,
respectively, in 2000.  China’s huge manufacturing T&C base has been used at
a substantially higher level since the end of the quota regime in January 2005; as a result,
its export share has shown a rapid and substantial rise (table 8.6).  Several other countries193
have also been able to increase their export shares of T&C products, including Bangladesh,
India and Turkey.  Increasing export shares among a limited number of countries indicates
higher market concentration with better competitiveness in the production of various types of
textile products.
Bangladesh is one of the world’s top manufacturers and exporters of knitwear and
woven-wear products.  In 2008, Bangladesh exported some US$ 5.53 billion worth of
knitwear and US$ 5.17 billion worth of woven-wear products, mainly to the European Union
and the United States.  However, export destinations have not remained constant (table
8.7).  The United States was the single largest destination for Bangladesh’s apparel exports
in 1990 at about 65 per cent of knitwear and 59 per cent of woven-wear products.  This was
mainly due to Bangladesh having an MFA quota facility for its exports to the United States.
Bangladesh’s exports to European Union countries have increased gradually, mainly
because of the inclusion of new European Union members in which Bangladesh has a GSP
facility.  However, the country’s exports to the European Union jumped after the
implementation of the European Union-EBA scheme under which Bangladesh, together with
other LDCs, has duty-free market access.
Table 8.7. Trend of textiles and clothing exports by Bangladesh
(Unit: Per cent)
HS 61 (articles of apparel HS 62 (articles of apparel
and clothing accessories, and clothing accessories,
 knitted or crocheted)  not knitted/crocheted)
Country 1990 2000 2008 Country 1990 2000 2008
Germany 10.17 17.57 20.94 United States 58.61 53.51 47.36
United States 65.39 26.38 15.16 Germany 9.22 11.40 14.05
France 6.68 12.41 10.81 United Kingdom 6.34 7.78 8.58
United Kingdom 6.09 9.32 11.00 France 7.66 5.60 4.42
Spain 0.00 1.84 6.72 Canada 3.21 2.30 4.75
Sources: Computed based on data from WITS and, for 2008 data, the National Board of Revenue,
Dhaka.
Bangladesh exports a limited number of products under the knitted and woven
categories.  Just five products – shirts, trousers, jackets, T-shirts and sweaters – account for
about 80 per cent of the total exports of knitted and woven products (table 8.8).  However,
there have been some changes in the relative importance of individual items.  Shirts were
a major export item in the 1990s, with a share of more than 50 per cent of total exports;
however, that share steadily declined to 20 per cent in 2002 and 13.4 per cent in 2006.
Faster increases in exports of other categories in conjunction with a declining unit value,
especially of shirts, is perhaps one reason for the increasingly lower share of shirts in overall
exports (Rahman, Bhattacharya and Moazzem, 2008).  On the other hand, the share of
trousers had increased to 27 per cent by 2005/06 while the share of sweaters was 13.2 per
cent in 2005/06, a significant rise from 7.8 per cent in 1999/2000.  Changes in the relative
importance of various types of ready-made garments indicate growing intra-ready-made194
garments diversification of products.  In the United States, of 10 apparel products, nine are
from the woven category, which reflects the predominance of woven products in
Bangladesh’s export basket to the United States (table 8.9).
Table 8.8. Main items of apparel exported by Bangladesh
(Unit: Millions of United States dollars)
Total Share of
export top five Main apparel items
earnings items
Year






1994 805.34 80.56 126.85 225.90 …. 1 238.65 317.14 1 555.79 79.60
2001 1 073.59 656.33 573.74 597.42 476.87 3 377.95 1 481.90 4 859.83 69.50
2005 1 053.34 1 667.72 430.28 1 349.71 893.12 5 394.17 1 023.90 6 418.07 84.00
2006 1 056.69 2 165.25 389.52 1 781.51 1 044.01 6 436.98 1 462.80 7 900.80 81.50
Source: www.bgmea.com/data.htm; accessed 6 January 2007.
Note: RMG = ready-made garments.




6203424051 Men’s shorts of cotton, not knitted, NEOSI 230.77
6203424016 Men’s trousers and breeches, cotton, not knitted, 193.88
NEOSI
6204624021 Women’s trousers and breeches, cotton, not knitted, 189.90
NEOSI
6205202051 Men’s shirts, cotton, two-colour warp/fill, not knitted, 152.93
NEOSI
6203424011 Men’s blue denim trousers and breeches, cotton, 114.07
not knitted
6205202066 Men’s shirts, cotton, not knitted, NEOSI 111.68
6203424046 Boys’ trousers and breeches, cotton, not knitted, 109.21
NEOSI
6203424061 Boys’ shorts, cotton, not knitted, NEOSI 104.35
6110202069 Men’s/boys’ pullovers, cotton, 36 per cent flax fibres, 100.01
NEOSI
6203424036 Boys’ blue denim trousers etc., cotton, not knitted, 85.54
NEOSI
Source: United States International Trade Commission, 2009.
Note: NEOSI =195
8.6. Bangladesh’s linkage with textiles and clothing global value
chain
Bangladesh’s involvement in the value chain of the apparel sector is presented in
figure 8.1.  Thus far, Bangladesh has specialized, at least to some extent, in a component
network by manufacturing yarn, textiles and accessories, and more prominently in a value
chain by manufacturing garments.  It does not have specialization in a raw material network
since it has to depend on imported materials.  Similarly, Bangladesh is predominantly
dependent on buyers and their buying agents for exporting and marketing manufactured
products.
Figure 8.1. Value chain of the textiles and clothing sector of Bangladesh
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8.6.1. Raw material network
Major raw materials used in preparing fabrics, natural fibres and cotton fibres are
either imported or manufactured in apparel- and textile-producing countries.  These raw
materials are cotton, wool and silk (in the case of natural fibres), and natural gas and oil (in
the case of synthetic fibres).  The apparel-producing countries get the required raw
materials from various sources based on price, quality and lead time etc.  In view of the
quota phase-out, some apparel manufacturing countries have changed their sources of raw
materials.  Bangladesh is highly dependent (about 80 per cent) on raw materials suppliers196
for its apparel manufacturing process; therefore, any shortage of cotton in the international
market may affect overall production in Bangladesh.
8
Four major raw materials (at the HS 2-digit level) were taken into consideration when
analysing the import pattern based on their importance in the backward linkage of the textile
industry.  These items included: an inorganic chemical compound of rare-earth and precious
metals (HS 28); tanning/dyeing extract, tannins and derivates (HS 32); cotton (HS 52); and
plastics and plastic articles (HS 39).  In the analysis, a group of countries was identified
based on their relative shares of overall imports; however, South Asian countries were
added to this list in order to understand the importance of RTAs in the sourcing of raw
materials.
Bangladesh’s major source of cotton is Uzbekistan; about 50 per cent of
Bangladesh’s total cotton imports originate from this single source (table 8.10).  India is the
next most important source of cotton.  Together, these two countries provide more than
70 per cent of total cotton demand in Bangladesh.  It is interesting to note that during the
1990s and even in early 2000, Uzbekistan was not the major source of cotton for
Bangladesh; instead, India, Pakistan and China were the main suppliers.  A number of
crucial factors are involved in making major shift in sourcing cotton.
Table 8.10. Trend of cotton imports (HS 52) by Bangladesh from selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Uzbekistan 0.00 2.19 6.71 21.00 36.10 48.60
India 13.20 9.80 24.45 14.36 20.80 23.81
Pakistan 13.60 6.77 4.06 5.04 8.67 2.79
China 13.10 20.84 13.89 20.76 8.58 0.20
United States 3.74 5.65 8.18 4.97 3.42 6.68
Republic of Korea 5.18 1.86 2.66 1.86 0.96 0.20
United Kingdom 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.07 0.04 0.13
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
8 Some entrepreneurs in Bangladesh claimed that the supply of cotton during early 2005 was
inadequate because China accepted a large volume of advanced booking of cotton from major cotton
suppliers.
First, the price and quality of cotton is considered.  Uzbekistan’s cotton was
considered to be better compared to that of other countries (according to the entrepreneurs
who were interviewed).
Second, the availability of the required standard of cotton on a large scale is
considered.  During the early 1990s, while the backward linkage textile sector in Bangladesh
was at the rudimentary stage, a small amount of the required level of cotton was procured197
from neighbouring countries such as India, Pakistan and China.  After about two decades,
when the demand for cotton had substantially increased from the large domestic-based
backward-linkage textile sector, those countries could not meet the increased demand of
Bangladesh after meeting their domestic requirements.  However, it is important to examine
whether geographical proximity still needs to be considered as a major determinant in cotton
imports from India.
In sourcing of raw materials for T&C items, such as HS 39 (plastics and plastic
articles), Bangladesh mainly imports from Thailand, China, India and the Republic of Korea,
which together previously comprised about 46.9 per cent of the total imports of these items
(table 8.11).  However, some of these sources are becoming increasingly more important,
such as India and China.  In 1995, the shares of these two countries were only slightly
higher than 2 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively; in 2008, their shares had risen to 11.7
per cent and 10.9 per cent, respectively.  A similar situation prevailed in the case of imports
of inorganic chemicals as well as tanning (HS 28) and dyeing materials (HS 32) (tables 8.12
and 8.13).
Table 8.11. Trend of imports of plastics and plastic articles (HS 39) by Bangladesh
from selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Thailand 4.16 10.70 14.56 13.81 12.34 13.09
India 2.01 2.58 10.86 13.37 11.65 11.67
Republic of Korea 19.22 16.17 10.91 12.12 9.35 11.25
Singapore 15.20 13.78 13.23 6.88 8.44 3.28
Malaysia 0.74 7.90 6.77 6.36 7.25 6.12
China 4.07 2.37 2.48 3.83 6.55 10.86
United States 0.67 1.24 0.93 1.76 1.36 1.85
United Kingdom 1.23 1.07 1.37 1.01 0.43 0.40
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
8.6.2. Component network
Local textile mills are able to supply only 20 per cent of factories’ fabric requirements
for woven products, while local spinning and knitting mills can supply about 70 per cent of
the yarn for spinning and 95 per cent for weaving textiles (Gherzi, 2002).  In contrast, India
and China are reaching self-sufficiency level in manufacturing these components, which
clearly places them in a favourable position in terms of dealing with leading apparel
importers with full package.
9 Countries that have a low level of self-sufficiency, such as
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, are forced to depend on imported fabrics.
9 China and India import about 40 per cent of their fabric demand, but that figure is decreasing.
Under China’s immediate past 5 years plan, the intention was for the industry to be 80 per cent self-
sufficient in woven finished fabrics by 2005 with a very large modernization and expansion programme.
(Gherzi, 2002)198
Table 8.13. Trend of imports of tanning/dyeing extract – tannins and derivatives
(HS 32) by Bangladesh from selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
India 24.70 21.40 28.87 25.15 22.19 31.09
China 6.81 8.98 9.51 12.61 18.36 23.30
Republic of Korea 1.69 5.28 5.55 4.84 7.33 3.98
Germany 14.46 11.93 8.84 6.92 6.96 5.46
Singapore 4.99 12.43 12.14 8.48 5.59 1.88
United Kingdom 10.44 5.86 5.11 4.93 2.74 0.98
United States 0.39 0.81 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.39
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.12. Trend of imports of inorganic chemicals and compounds of precious
metals (HS 28) by Bangladesh from selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
China 24.32 37.11 38.48 35.24 45.24 48.79
India 9.78 15.87 24.75 28.40 16.70 13.30
Philippines 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 5.49 0.00
Germany 10.80 3.75 2.66 3.20 3.06 2.31
Republic of Korea 6.09 6.03 4.99 4.87 2.92 1.10
United States 1.19 2.06 1.35 0.63 0.93 1.30
United Kingdom 2.59 3.34 2.31 2.00 0.90 0.16
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
In the case of imports of man-made filaments (HS 54), China is now the single
largest source, accounting for some 50 per cent of total requirements of the country (table
8.14).  The other important sources are India and Thailand.  However, the Republic of Korea
was the single largest source of man-made filament during the 1990s, but has since lost its
importance.  The reasons for the focus being on China in recent times are not only related
to price and availability of required types of filaments, but also because it is able to meet
buyers’ instructions regarding the use of specific types of filament for particular types of
fabric.
In the case of imports of man-made staple fibres, the largest amount originates in
the United States (24.8 per cent of total imports), India (23.1 per cent) and Thailand (17.9
per cent) (table 8.15).  There has been a structural change in import sources; for example,
the Republic of Korea, which in the 1990s was considered a major source of man-made
staple fibres, has since lost its importance.  Similarly, for knitted and crocheted fabrics, the199
Table 8.14. Trend of imports of man-made filaments (HS 54) by Bangladesh from
selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
China 7.29 14.24 15.82 25.79 29.41 49.34
Republic of Korea 41.38 22.37 19.32 15.08 12.09 6.90
Thailand 1.54 2.72 2.79 6.82 9.39 12.65
India 2.61 3.06 3.43 3.20 5.48 14.36
Japan 0.30 0.57 3.50 3.12 5.38 0.43
United Kingdom 0.01 0.10 0.45 0.91 0.46 0.00
United States 0.20 0.26 0.82 0.61 0.29 0.20
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.15. Trend of imports of man-made staple fibres (HS 55) in Bangladesh
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006
China 11.97 23.31 24.33 32.23 70.09
India 2.80 3.02 8.17 5.84 5.56
Republic of Korea 36.04 10.42 11.12 9.85 3.82
Thailand 3.33 4.70 6.61 9.48 3.79
Indonesia 7.33 6.14 8.23 5.19 3.03
United States 1.34 0.74 1.17 0.98 0.64
United Kingdom 0.07 0.07 0.82 0.33 0.53
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.16. Trend of imports of knitted or crocheted fabrics (HS 60) in Bangladesh
from selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total imports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006
Republic of Korea 5.65 5.17 4.26 5.13 37.17
China 6.20 9.40 7.69 31.16 32.60
Hong Kong, China 32.09 34.52 48.60 23.30 17.63
Thailand 0.34 0.90 0.62 1.42 1.80
Malaysia 0.50 0.97 0.96 0.43 0.76
Pakistan 1.78 0.72 0.40 0.62 0.71
India 10.92 0.62 14.75 4.33 0.22
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.200
Republic of Korea, China and Hong Kong, China are the major sources of imports by
Bangladesh, while imports from Thailand and India are sources on a limited scale.
An analysis of the raw material and component networks of the Bangladesh T&C
industry revealed that the sources of imports had changed over time.  The countries that
were considered as major sources in the 1990s and early 2000s have gradually lost their
importance as major suppliers.  In the case of the raw material network, supplies of cotton
mainly originated in Uzbekistan, while a major share originated in India.  On the other hand,
although China was a major source of various components for the T&C industry, a number
of other countries were considered important.  Although in most instances they were Asian
countries, that scenario has changed.  A number of important reasons are behind this
shifting of sources, such as price and quality of products, availability of adequate supplies of
large volumes of products, buyers’ specifications in sourcing raw materials and components,
and geographical proximity.  However, regional trading arrangements are not considered as
major determinants in the changes in sourcing patterns; however, the lack of effective
implementation of RTAs, due to various reasons, is a related issue in this case.
8.6.3. Production network
Of the four stages in the production process, i.e., outward processing traffic (OPT),
original equipment manufacturing (OEM), original brand manufacturing (OBM) and original
design manufacturing (ODM), Bangladeshi manufacturers are currently involved only in
OPT and OEM.  Manufacturers’ involvement in a particular stage depends on the level of
development of their enterprises in terms of technology, skills profile, expertise in fashion
and design etc.  Initially, a buyer supplied cut fabrics, threads, buttons, zips and trims, with
everything to be assembled according to the design prepared by the buyer, for re-importing
after assembling (i.e., OPT).  However, production technology has improved in Bangladesh,
and most of the entrepreneurs are now involved to a considerable extent in the second
stage of production (OEM).  Thus, manufacturers undertake additional tasks within the
production process, including cutting according to the patterns supplied by buyers, or
preparing and grading the patterns according to prototypes supplied by buyers, or even
purchasing the inputs for OEM production.  This stage involves different steps: cut and
make (CM), and cut, make and trim (CMT).  Bangladesh has almost no expertise in OBM
and ODM.  In a more advanced stage, manufacturers develop their own brand (OBM) and
sell it in domestic, regional and international markets.  In the final stage of achievement,
manufacturers influence global fashions (ODM) by developing their original designs rather
than imitating global trends, and transform themselves into well-known and recognizable
worldwide brand-manufacturers.
With regard to exports of finished T&C products, the major markets for Bangladesh
are the United States and some large economies in Europe (tables 8.17 and 8.18).  Here, in
case of market dynamism for export items one remarkable feature is that Germany, as
a single country importer, is becoming more important.  In contrast, although the United
States still accounts for the highest amount of imports from Bangladesh, its share is falling
gradually.201
Bangladesh was able to improve its production techniques, which allowed it to move
up from the early stage of production (assembly) to OEM.  Under the OEM stage,
Bangladesh has gradually improved its position from CM to CMT.  After the phasing out of
quotas, under pressure from competition, Bangladesh has increasingly moved towards the
F.O.B form of production where buyers and retailers place their orders directly by contacting
the manufacturers.  With the development of networks between retailers and manufacturers,
especially in recent years, manufacturers in many countries can work as major contractors
or subcontractors of overseas major contractors.
8.7. Trend of intra-industry trade in textiles and clothing-related
products from Bangladesh
An intra-industry trade (IIT) analysis of a selected number of products was carried
out in order to understand the nature and extent of the relationship between exporting and
Table 8.17. Trend of exports of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or
crocheted (HS 61) from Bangladesh to selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total exports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Germany 17.42 17.57 17.57 24.40 24.69 20.94
United States 30.24 26.38 27.28 15.46 16.70 15.16
France 13.54 12.41 11.94 13.00 11.34 10.81
United Kingdom 12.43 9.32 11.01 11.93 10.20 11.00
Spain 0.49 1.84 4.04 6.35 7.23 6.72
China 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.18. Trend of exports of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted/
crocheted (HS 62) from Bangladesh to selected countries
(Unit: Percentage of total exports)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
United States 52.30 53.51 52.82 41.66 49.58 47.36
Germany 9.41 11.40 11.75 18.51 16.23 14.05
United Kingdom 9.66 7.78 9.25 10.50 8.25 8.58
France 7.09 5.60 5.68 5.93 4.84 4.42
Canada 2.70 2.30 1.91 5.41 4.47 4.75
China 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.07
India 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.15
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.202
importing countries, and to examine the possible reasons for linkages between countries.  A
selected set of countries was chosen based on their importance in overall trade of specific
products with Bangladesh.
8.7.1. Raw materials
Bangladesh has a very low level of IIT in raw materials used in manufacturing T&C
products (tables 8.19 to 8.22).  IIT in raw materials such as inorganic chemicals, organic or
inorganic compounds of precious metals, rare-earth metals, radioactive elements or
isotopes (HS 28) and organic chemicals (HS 29) is relatively higher for several countries
such as India (0.87) and Thailand (0.43).  In the case of HS 29, IIT with Belgium, France,
Germany, the Netherlands and Pakistan is relatively high.
On the other hand, countries that are major sources for Bangladesh’s imports, such
as India and China, have a low level of IIT in all the products mentioned above.  This is due
in particular to the unidirectional nature of trade between Bangladesh and its trading
partners.  Thus, there is no strong relationship between those countries that are the major
source of Bangladesh’s imports and which are important in terms of IIT.  In most instances
no specific trend was observed in IIT trade of raw materials with those countries.
Table 8.19. Trend of IIT Index for raw materials (HS 28)
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
India 0.696190 0.705385 0.467016 0.918458 0.716144 0.871704
Germany 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.172037 0.000000
China 0.000000 0.000000 0.000887 0.000000 0.000000 0.078371
Thailand 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.434702
United Kingdom 0.000000 0.000000 0.014069 0.000000 0.000000 0.025391
United States 0.000000 0.000000 0.000200 0.008716 0.000000 0.011929
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, from the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.20. Trend of IIT Index for raw materials (HS 29) for selected countries
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Pakistan 0.003931 0.000000 0.456288 0.225335 0.959774 0.864962
Germany 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.044189 0.000000
Thailand 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.010991 0.000000
India 0.000000 0.078189 0.000000 0.000619 0.008440 0.000175
Singapore 0.000000 0.000000 0.000367 0.000941 0.006502 0.005050
Republic of Korea 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.003510 0.005719
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.203
Table 8.22. Trend of IIT Index for raw materials (HS 52) for selected countries
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Italy 0.050269 0.240022 0.136600 0.841550 0.962215
United Kingdom 0.000000 0.261198 0.077219 0.933793 0.908764 0.789992
Sri Lanka 0.134422 0.357506 0.509374 0.988260 0.677864 0.001852
Germany 0.107801 0.305418 0.700793 0.292941 0.466425 0.244317
France 0.281065 0.197901 0.276994 0.164420 0.443802 0.821886
China 0.000316 0.004381 0.003313 0.001487 0.264676 0.974236
India 0.000099 0.011477 0.002141 0.012671 0.009538 0.016233
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.21. Trend of IIT Index for raw materials (HS 39) for selected countries
Country/area 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Netherlands 0.086330 0.412565 0.410093 0.455904 0.914252 0.712430
Belgium 0.000000 0.082110 0.119682 0.885331 0.852703 0.869349
Turkey 0.000000 0.252285 0.197513 0.229949 0.726365 0.001264
Germany 0.277372 0.113216 0.074196 0.290792 0.584552 0.772569
France 0.812929 0.324961 0.187472 0.738885 0.535184 0.894211
Sri Lanka 0.000000 0.907327 0.110053 0.743489 0.424658 0.044120
Hong Kong, China 0.000000 0.003160 0.011204 0.204714 0.421604 0.464254
Pakistan 0.000000 0.045618 0.003962 0.192533 0.381980 0.832713
China 0.000000 0.014130 0.032700 0.727692 0.366326 0.330931
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
8.7.2. Intermediate products
The IIT indices for major intermediate T&C products with major countries are
increasing.  However, countries with which Bangladesh has a high value of IIT are not the
same countries from which Bangladesh procures the highest level of intermediate products
(tables 8.23 to 8.25).  However, those countries that are major sources for imports by
Bangladesh are very gradually increasing their IIT value.  Among the South Asian countries,
Sri Lanka – which is not a major source or destination for trading of intermediate items with
Bangladesh under HS section 55 – appears to be the country with which most IIT happens.
8.7.3. Finished products
The level of the IIT Index for finished items, such as HS 61 and HS 62, is increasing,
although, not with the countries where most of the exports are directed (tables 8.26 and
8.27).  A part of this rise is associated with increasing demand for imported apparel in the
domestic market.  These products are sourced mainly from neighbouring countries because
of ethnic similarity, proximity and affordable price.204
Table 8.25. IIT Index trend for intermediate products (HS 60) for selected countries
Country/area 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Singapore 0.000000 0.614724 0.451611 0.636578 0.534985 0.802340
Hong Kong, China 0.000000 0.014148 0.002399 0.012531 0.468070 0.000906
Germany 0.000000 0.000000 0.030371 0.000000 0.390031 0.000000
France 0.000000 0.000000 0.000655 0.000000 0.350675 0.000000
Indonesia 0.000000 0.000000 0.137650 0.000000 0.301709 0.714849
Canada 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.183034 0.225698 0.000000
China 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000554 0.004869 0.001825
India 0.000000 0.171983 0.003622 0.037233 0.000000 0.020209
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.24. IIT Index trend for intermediate products (HS 55) for selected countries
Country/area 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Sri Lanka 0.000000 0.053001 0.037388 0.238803 0.516653 0.001125
United States 0.784107 0.030747 0.105382 0.348803 0.055394 0.085163
Singapore 0.000000 0.009149 0.000000 0.030713 0.044295 0.997773
Italy 0.444661 0.081271 0.057281 0.000000 0.036901 0.031380
Hong Kong, China 0.000931 0.008558 0.005986 0.018100 0.027222 0.075981
China 0.000390 0.003664 0.004254 0.003082 0.000438 0.062766
India 0.000000 0.004863 0.005286 0.001980 0.000393 0.018327
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, from the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.23. IIT index trend for intermediate products (HS 54) for selected countries
Country 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Canada 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.649072 0.857608 0.000000
United States 0.332448 0.597200 0.096867 0.097310 0.552459 0.163672
France 0.000000 0.000000 0.072308 0.000000 0.343498 0.000000
Italy 0.000000 0.000000 0.075115 0.000000 0.296198 0.482017
India 0.000000 0.012935 0.000000 0.004978 0.085412 0.047331
China 0.000000 0.000333 0.009691 0.015386 0.028005 0.000000
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.205
8.8. Factors responsible for the development of the value chain
in the textiles and clothing sector of Bangladesh
8.8.1. Gravity analysis
A gravity analysis was carried out in order to examine the nature and extent of the
influence of different factors in the development of the value chain in Bangladesh by using
the IIT Index as a dependent variable.  However, the results of this exercise were found to
be less satisfactory than expected, possibly due to very low IIT index values among the
major trading partners of Bangladesh, resulting from having unidirectional trade.  On the
other hand, most of the countries that have high IIT index values were not major trading
partners of Bangladesh.  Hence, the results of this analysis were not taken into
consideration.
Table 8.26. IIT Index trend for finished products (HS 61) for selected countries
Country/area 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
China 0.000000 0.982563 0.023435 0.200522 0.983171 0.586335
Philippines 0.000000 0.000000 0.000054 0.140565 0.751471 0.407686
Hong Kong, China 0.103917 0.736360 0.810382 0.873374 0.452032 0.077973
Nepal 0.000000 0.000000 0.402718 0.102992 0.436672 0.209252
India 0.000000 0.036400 0.095115 0.121529 0.368073 0.623799
United Kingdom 0.032687 0.025183 0.013868 0.004068 0.001466 0.000394
Canada 0.000000 0.027359 0.000143 0.000017 0.000016 0.000005
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.
Table 8.27. IIT Index trend for finished products (HS 62) for selected countries
Country/area 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Pakistan 0.536423 0.968767 0.008004 0.880643 0.911993 0.941641
Malaysia 0.000000 0.190787 0.840105 0.729440 0.762875 0.140152
China 0.031216 0.083312 0.077965 0.117008 0.397944 0.838240
India 0.014691 0.339452 0.171544 0.411135 0.291698 0.889874
Japan 0.136151 0.353359 0.170269 0.322751 0.267263 0.000156
Hong Kong, China 0.501157 0.163142 0.131839 0.070455 0.227216 0.107460
United Kingdom 0.008924 0.017560 0.018519 0.005330 0.003164 0.000779
Canada 0.001933 0.005550 0.000442 0.001881 0.002132 0.000300
United States 0.000164 0.012469 0.003220 0.000834 0.001385 0.000073
Source: Compiled based on data from WITS and, for 2008, the National Board of Revenue.206
8.8.2. Findings from interviews with sample entrepreneurs
Interviews were carried out with seven entrepreneurs with knitwear and/or
woven-wear manufacturing units either in DTA or EPZ areas (see annex to this chapter).
Enterprises having experience in manufacturing and exporting T&C products for more than
20 years were selected in order to gain a good understanding of the dynamics and changes
in the T&C sector of Bangladesh.  A structured questionnaire was prepared that focused on:
(a) Changes in production and exports since the 1980s;
(b) Major sources of raw materials and intermediate products used by these
enterprises;
(c) Factors responsible for production decisions of firms together with
procurement of raw materials from different sources;
(d) Export destinations of finished products;
(e) The entrepreneurs’ perception of Bangladesh’s competitiveness in the global
T&C market;
(f) The importance of various domestic and international policies, including RTAs
in the development of IPNs in Bangladesh;
(g) The possible adverse impact of the global financial crisis on production
networks or value chains.
The interviewed entrepreneurs also identified five external factors that influence the
development of value chains in Bangladesh.  The most important factor is the preferential
market access facility under which Bangladesh’s T&C sector emerged in the 1980s and
developed thereafter.
Second is a long-term relationship with business partners, both in the backward and
forward linkages of the industry.  Most importantly, a long-term relationship with the buyers
substantially contributed to maintaining a steady business linkage, especially at times of
critical transitions such as the MFA phase-out in 2005.
Third is trade facilitation at the domestic and international levels.  A gradual
improvement of the physical infrastructure for facilitating trade, especially at Chittagong
seaport, has substantially contributed to the development of value chains.  At the same time,
the infrastructure at cross-border points of trading partners needs to be improved.
Entrepreneurs complained about: (a) the poor condition of offices at the border, with
inadequate space for loading and unloading products; (b) the lack of adequate officers and
staff in those offices; and (c) the lack of modern equipment for checking consignments,
which increased transaction costs substantially.
Fourth, geographical proximity is considered vital in the procurement of raw
materials and intermediate products from different sources in order to maintain timely
supplies of materials to factories and timely deliveries of finished products.  However,
geographical proximity appears to be less important in the case of low-end, less fashionable
products exported from Bangladesh, possibly because of having a predictable time line for
such goods.207
Fifth, tariff structure is also considered important.  Given today’s highly competitive
markets and the continuous pressure to decelerate CM, low levels of duty on raw materials
and intermediate products used by the T&C industry is always an important issue.  In recent
years, the Government of Bangladesh has reduced duties on imported raw materials;
currently, such duty is fixed at zero per cent for export-oriented industries.  Interestingly,
“service links” comprising costs of transport, telecommunications etc., were not identified as
significantly important factors, possibly because of the relative advantage of low-cost labour,
which accounts for a substantial part of total production costs.
Foreign investors who invest in the T&C sector of Bangladesh are mainly attracted
by the availability of adequate labour at low wages as well as GSP facilities.  According to
the foreign entrepreneurs interviewed, weak enforcement of environmental regulations was
considered an added advantage in establishing factories in Bangladesh.  EPZs are
considered as areas for investment by foreign entrepreneurs mainly because of having
various fiscal facilities (such as tax holidays, duty drawback, duty-free imports of raw
materials and capital machinery) and other facilities (internal security, dedicated utility
services and simplified customs procedures).  According to the entrepreneurs, trade
union-related activities, if allowed, would have a negative impact on business activities at
EPZs.
8.9. Impact of global financial crisis on the textiles and clothing
sector of Bangladesh
Since mid-2008, the global economic crisis has adversely affected Bangladesh,
particularly its external sector.  During 2008/09, overall export growth slowed down,
compared with the same period in the previous year, and declined to 10.3 per cent.  Most of
the export-oriented industries experienced negative growth: frozen food (-19.7 per cent),
leather and leather manufactures (-19.1 per cent), raw jute (-13.4 per cent) and jute goods
(-6.2per cent).  However, a robust growth of ready-made garments exports (17.4 per cent)
for knitwear and 13.2 per cent for woven garments) was recorded.  Still, the textiles and
ready-made garments sector remained in a vulnerable situation due to buyers’ demands for
further reductions of CM as well as discounts on, and deferment of orders.  Focus group
discussion with entrepreneurs (conducted as a part of another study carried out by the
Centre for Policy Dialogue) revealed that some factories had closed down (47 knit factories
and 66 woven factories) and workers had been retrenched in the recent past.  However, it is
still not clear whether that was due to the global financial crisis or was a general
phenomenon of exit and entry in the sector.  Nevertheless, factory owners reported that
fresh recruitment of workers had slowed down significantly since mid-2008; if the recession
continues, entrepreneurs will be compelled to consider job cuts.
A significant number of textile and spinning mills in Bangladesh have experienced
difficulties because of the global financial crisis.  This is highlighted by the existence of large
yarn stockpiles in recent months.  Earlier information showed that as many as 12 out of the
341 operational spinning mills had shut down; most of the mills currently in operation have
reduced their level of operation by about 30 per cent.  This has resulted in workers being208
retrenched or underemployed.  Large subsidies provided by the Government of India to that
country’s yarn sector have resulted in Bangladesh losing its competitiveness vis-à-vis India
in yarn sales (Centre for Policy Dialogue, 2009).  This has induced many Bangladeshi
ready-made garments factory owners to import yarn from India rather than procure supplies
locally.
8.10. Policy implications
The T&C sector of Bangladesh has come a long way in the past three decades and
has reached its current stage after a long process of restructuring in technology, operation
and management.  The domestic export-oriented T&C sector has strengthened its links with
major manufacturers of raw materials and intermediate products in other countries.  This
development is attributable to the availability of low-cost labour, favourable policies,
development of an entrepreneurial class and preferential market access facilities in
developed countries in favour of LDCs.  In the initial phase, the various types of policy
support by the Government of Bangladesh, together with market access facilitation in the
developed countries, was critical to the emergence of the sector (back-to-back letters of
credit, a duty drawback facility and bonded warehouses); later, access to the markets of
developed and developing countries became more important to expansion and graduation
to higher stages of development of this industry.  The role of trade polices in general also
contributed to the development of the T&C sector of Bangladesh.
Although Bangladesh is a member of a number of RTAs, it has yet to receive any
substantial benefit under these agreements.  SAFTA, which is currently in operation, is less
contributory to the development of the value chain.  Although India has allowed Bangladesh
to export 8 million pieces of apparel annually under the special and differential treatment
clause of SAFTA, in view of the huge production and export capacity of Bangladesh such
opportunities are not significant.  The development of the value chain in raw material
networks, component networks and finished product networks is attributable to various
non-RTA factors.
The development of the value chain in the T&C sector of Bangladesh is largely
unidirectional.  Although backward linkages of the textiles sector in Bangladesh have
developed over time, the industry remains largely dependent on imported raw materials,
particularly in the case of woven-wear products.  Some product-specific trends can be seen
in imports of raw materials and intermediate products from different sources; however, these
have changed over time.  Some of the countries that were earlier considered major sources
have since become less important, while others have become important at a later stage.  At
the earlier stage, a large part of the required raw materials and intermediate inputs were
imported from the Republic of Korea, India and the United States, whereas at present
a large share is being imported from India and China.  Uzbekistan, which is at present the
major source of cotton for Bangladesh, was not considered as an important source earlier.
Changes in the sources are attributable to geographical proximity, adequate
supplies, long-term relationships, price and quality of products, and buyers’ specifications.
Sources of raw material imports by Bangladesh are, however, not the destinations of final209
products.  The analysis described above shows that RTAs have either had minimal or no
influence in the selection of sources for importing of various T&C-related products.  Thus,
the importance of RTAs to the development of value chains is less evident.  However,
Bangladesh’s exports have largely benefited from various preferential schemes provided by
developed countries, such as quota facilities under MFA until 2005, duty-free market access
under the Europe Union’s EBA, GSP facilities in Australia, Canada and Japan, and a tariff
rate quota in India.
Since different sources have been chosen by entrepreneurs for the procurement of
raw materials and intermediate products, a network between major sourcing countries can
be strengthened through an integrated initiative between those countries, with product-
specific issues being kept in mind.  A commodity-specific trade agreement can be signed
where countries in the network will take the initiative in reducing the cost of imports by
reducing duties, and by developing trade facilitation measures aimed at reducing
transportation costs and the time required for raw material procurement and the shipment of
products.
A number of other issues need to be taken into consideration in order to strengthen
the value chain network between countries.  First, member countries should take measures
to simplify customs procedures between each other in order to speed up the trading
process.
Second, long-term, multiple-entry business visas should be provided and visa
formalities simplified for businessmen.
Third, the cross-border trade infrastructure at border points needs to be improved.
In particular, those countries that share a border with Bangladesh should take adequate
trade facilitation measures (such as speeding up and modernizing customs clearance
procedures, providing adequate areas for product transfers and ensuring availability of
officers at border points).
Fourth, non-tariff barriers often hinder trade between two countries.  Therefore,
countries working within the value chain should jointly identify non-tariff barriers and take the
necessary measures to eliminate those barriers.
At the domestic level, the business environment is considered less conducive to
T&C sector entrepreneurs; therefore, the business environment needs to be improved on an
urgent basis.  First, steps should be taken to reduce the interest rates on long-term project
loans and working capital.  Second, the Government of Bangladesh should introduce
measures for ensuring adequate supplies of electricity and gas for industrial units.  Third,
both the public and the private sectors jointly need to take the initiative to develop the
logistic facilities required for the T&C sector of Bangladesh (such as the development of
human resources and R&D facilities, and improvement of worker compliance with standards
at the factory level).210
The Government of Bangladesh has announced stimulus packages for the jute,
leather and frozen food industries, among others, which have been adversely affected by
the global financial crisis.  Although the T&C sector has not been included in the
Government’s additional support package because of its robust performance, entrepreneurs
have demanded support in the form of low-cost financing for their businesses.  About 25 per
cent of the respondents who participated in the Centre for Policy Dialogue’s survey for
another study urged a reduction of the interest rate on working capital, while 21 per cent
wanted the provision of credit facilities at a subsidized interest rate.  Financial institutions
have since agreed to reduce the rate of interest on working capital and long-term loans to
not more than 13 per cent.  However, immediate and effective implementation of this
agreement is needed in order to ensure support for the affected industries.211
ANNEX
Profile of sample enterprises
Major factors
 Major raw Major identified for
Sample Total Major materials markets for development
No. employment products used and finished of T&C
their sources   products industry in
Bangladesh
1 6 000 Sweaters • Synthetic  • European • GSP facilities
fibres Union 95% • Low wage
• Local • Canada 5% costs
sources • Government
incentives
2 Woven • Woven • North • Low wage
(formal shirt)  fabrics 90% America 50% costs
Casual shirts • Imported • European • GSP
Ladies’ from Far-East Union 50% facilities
wear • Accessories • Tariff
Knitted 50% local structures
garments
3 1 000 Knitted • 15% • Sell to the • Low wage
garments, imported local market costs
various  • Yarn from • Lead time
items India • GSP facilities
4 2 000 Sweaters • 25% yarn • European • Low wage




5 Terry towels • 95% from • North • Low wage
local America 70% costs
sources (United • Product
States 65%) quality
• European • Long-term
Union 30% relationship
6 6 500 Knitted • 20% from • European • GSP
(both flat China Union 75% facilities
and fine) • North • Low wage
America 25% costs
7 55 Weaving • Yarn from • European • Low wage
local Union 100% costs





9.  Making regional trade agreements more relevant




The extent of intraregional trade in the region has increased rapidly in the past two
decades.  In parallel with this growth, IPNs emerged and have become a special feature of
intraregional trade, especially in East Asia.  There are a number of definitions of IPN;
however, a common theme from those definitions is product fragmentation, in which
production processes are split into separate parts that can be undertaken by companies
in different locations and countries, yet are interconnected by a network.  IPNs have
developed and expanded in East Asia as a result of improvements in transportation and
communications technology, electricity and water supplies, the creation of industrial clusters
and the implementation of liberalization policies.
The objective of this chapter is to identify several key aspects related to the
incidence of IPNs in East Asia and the Pacific, and their relationship to trade policies
connected with discriminatory or preferential trade agreements resulting from the growing
number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) signed by East Asian and Pacific countries.
The chapter concludes with several policy recommendations.
Numerous studies have been carried out that provide evidence of the existence of
IPNs in East Asia, as summarized in table 9.1.  It is clear from table 9.1 that the common
feature from these studies is the rising importance of trade in components in the region
compared to other regions of the world.  That rise indicates product fragmentation, where
production processes by different companies take place in different locations for use in the
manufacturing of one final product.  In addition, the trade in components is not on a one-way
trade basis, but rather as back-and-forth trade.  This could mean that the final product is
assembled by several manufacturers in different locations, thus giving rise to the emergence
of IPNs.
Another interesting finding from existing studies is that trade in components has
become an important factor in formulating trade policies, particularly with regard to the
transition from low-level skills and low-level technology product markets to high-level skills
and high-technology product markets.  The studies have also highlighted the growing
incidence of companies undertaking outsourcing activities in East Asia due to their flexibility
and higher-capacity for de-internalizing.  This trend reflects the reduction in service links
costs, which makes it easier for a company to coordinate its activities within the network.
Such reductions in service link costs stem from: (a) lower tariffs that translate into less costly
back-and-forth transactions; (b) better port infrastructure; and (c) the existence of industrial
clusters to facilitate the management activities of parent multinational companies (MNCs),216
especially the coordination of production processes with surrounding suppliers in clusters.
However, of all the existing studies, only Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) devoted more
detailed attention to the linkages between IPNs and RTAs, as elaborated on later in this
chapter.
Table 9.1. Evidence of East Asian IPNs in existing literature
Author Region/country/area Major findings
Athukorala and AFTA, China, Japan, The extent and importance of trade in
Yamashita, 2006 Republic of Korea, components within East Asian region
Hong Kong, China, increased substantially from 1992 to 2003,
Taiwan Province of China, exceeding the increases in other regions
CER, European Union, of the world.
EFTA, MERCOSUR, CEEC,
NAFTA and ANDEAN.
Kimura and China, Indonesia, Philippines, • Export share of machinery and
Ando, 2005a Singapore, Thailand, machinery components for many East
Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Asian countries had reached more than
Taiwan Province of China 40 per cent and 20 per cent,
and Hong Kong, China. respectively, by the end of the 1990s.
• The extent and incidence of outsourcing
activities is very large among Japanese
firms investing in East Asia, compared
with Japanese investments in North
America and Europe.
• Companies investing in East Asia find it
easier to conduct outsourcing activities
than in the other regions.  The reason is
that investing in East Asian business
appears to be more flexible and with
more capacity for de-internalizing.
• Multinationals’ affiliates in East Asia tend
to gradually substitute their intra-firm
transactions with other companies within
their immediate area.*
• More than 90 per cent of the affiliates’
purchases come from other companies
in the East Asian region.
Ng and Yeats, Brunei Darussalam, • Trade in components accounts for more
2003 Cambodia, China, Indonesia, than one-fifth of all intra-trade in
Republic of Korea, manufactured goods.
Lao People’s Democratic • High technology and skilled labour-
Republic, Malaysia, intensive products dominated the list of
Mongolia, Philippines, the fastest-growing exports in East Asia
Singapore, Taiwan Province between 1985 and 2001.217
9.2. Liberalization, incentive policy and their linkages with the
development of IPNs in East Asia
Looking back, the existence of IPNs in East Asia can be attributed to two factors.
The first is the so-called “hollowing out”
1 of the Japanese economy in the 1980s, i.e., the
relocation of Japanese firms to neighbouring countries (Baldwin, 2007).
2  The second is the
“dual track” strategic approach employed by developing countries in East Asia for promoting
import substitution and export promotion at the same time, in particular among ASEAN
countries.  These two factors complement each other as the “hollowing out”, driven by
increasing unit labour costs in labour-intensive processes in Japan, fits well with the dual
track approach that promoted labour-intensive industries.  Thus, production activities are
then fragmented.  High-tech components were produced in Japan and then exported to
developing East Asian countries for further labour-intensive production stages, such as
assembling.
Naturally, the fragmentation approach adopted by Japanese MNCs set in motion
competition between the developing countries to attract FDI not only from Japan, but also
of China, Thailand, • Trade in components is an important
Viet Nam and Hong Kong, factor in the strategic trade policies of
China, several countries, often serving as
a means of penetrating markets for
items produced with high technology
and skilled labour.
Ando, 2006 Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, • The share of one-way trade in many
Philippines, Republic of East Asian countries declined
Korea, Singapore, Thailand significantly and was replaced by
and Hong Kong, China. (two-way) vertical IIT trade.
• Indicates a rapid expansion of “back-
and-forth” transactions/trade, where
countries import (expensive) capital-
intensive intermediate inputs, use them
in local production and then export the
produced goods, either as final products
or other intermediate inputs that have
higher value-added.
* Transactions between companies from different countries.
Table 9.1 (continued)
Author Region/country/area Major findings
1 The shrinking of the manufacturing sector has sometimes been thought to have resulted from
international trade or outsourcing.
2 The ”hollowing out” also occurred in some other more-developed East Asian countries/areas at that
time (for example, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China).218
from other developed countries/areas such as the United States, European Union member
States, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China.  The competition drove
competing ASEAN countries to unilaterally reduce their tariffs (the so-called “race to the
bottom”).  Those tariff cuts were in the form of duty drawbacks and duty-free treatment for
the establishment of export processing zones (Baldwin, 2007).  However, it is not clear
whether the unilateral tariff reductions were the result of the competition to attract FDI or the
adoption of the Washington Consensus.
3 Nonetheless, what is clear is that average applied
tariffs for East Asian countries have declined.  Regardless of what caused the unilateral tariff
reductions, the five country case studies in this publication reveal that policy initiatives are
still being implemented to attract foreign MNCs.
3 Baldwin (2007) provided anecdotal evidence but no direct evidence that competition to attract FDI
caused unilateral tariff reductions.
Table 9.2. Policy initiatives implemented in the country case studies
Country Policy initiatives
China • For completely built up vehicles and engines, the Chinese partner must own
at least 50 per cent of the equity.  The limit can be relaxed if the intention is
to export and to locate the business in an export processing zone.
• Reduction of tax rates when making fixed asset investments, favourable
conditions for bank loans, priority approval when listing on stock exchanges,
and easier access to capital from abroad and government loans.
• Research and development expenditure is tax deductible provided it
complies with technological policy.
• Measures against local protectionism exist, under which local governments
cannot implement discriminative policies on automobiles that are not
produced locally nor adopt measures that may result in discriminative
consequences.
India • The provision of excise duty concessions, tax incentives for investments in
the sector, incentives for promoting research and development, and
measures for export promotion and reduction of import duties for
components.
• Removal of quantitative restrictions on auto imports and permission for
100 per cent FDI in the sector.
• Reduction under Finance Bill 2006 of excise duty on motor vehicles from
15 per cent to 12.5 per cent and import duty on raw materials from
10 per cent to between 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent.
Indonesia • Incentive programme implemented for automotive manufacturers to use
locally-produced components; manufacturers who use a higher proportion
of local components in their products will pay lower import tariffs.
• The deregulation package introduced in 1995, under which the Government
offered a zero per cent tariff on imported components for commercial
vehicles and passenger vehicles with local content of 40 per cent or more219
These policy initiatives are an essential part of each country’s strategy to attract
MNCs for relocation of their production facilities.  In addition, there are policies that develop
and nurture the existence of IPNs in East Asia and the Pacific, in particular policies that
promote trade in components.  Such policies also corroborate the finding by Ng and Yeats
(2003) that trade in components is an important factor in formulating strategic trade policies,
often serving as a means of penetrating markets for products manufactured using high
technology and skilled labour.  The case study of the HDD industry in Thailand is a good
and at least 60 per cent, respectively.  In addition, new foreign investment
allowed as part of Indonesia’s commitment to AFTA and APEC.
• New automotive policy was launched in 1999, providing a lower tariff
schedule for imported cars and their components, simplified procedures
and qualifications for imports, and encouragement of export market
expansion for automotive products.
Thailand • The simple average applied tariff rate declined sharply from 40 per cent
between 1985 and 1994 to 23 per cent from 1995 to 1996, and 17 per cent
in 1997.  The rate was further reduced to 13.3 per cent in 2003 and
12 per cent in 2004.  Since then, the rate has been more or less steady
at around 11 per cent.
• Most hard disk drive (HDD) manufacturers and their parts suppliers are
foreign-owned and export-oriented.  They are eligible for investment
privileges offered by Thailand’s Board of Investment.  One investment
privilege is tariff exemptions, which was introduced in 1983.  Companies
that import raw materials for manufacturing intermediates for further use
in export-oriented activities are eligible for tariff exemptions.
• Research and development projects initiated by the private sector are
co-financed by the Government.  The amount contributed by the
Government depends on the nature of the project’s outcome, i.e.,
whether it is proprietary or common knowledge.  The more common the
knowledge created by the projects, the larger the Government’s contribution.
• The Board of Investment will extend investment privileges if foreign
companies upgrade their existing production.
Bangladesh • Both tariff and non-tariff barriers have been reduced together with the
dismantling of quantitative restrictions on imports and deregulation of import
procedures.
• Under the Export Policy of 2006-2009, nine sectors were declared as
special development sectors in order to boost their production and exports.
These sectors include: finished leather products; frozen and processed fish;
handicraft items; electronic products; fresh flowers and foliage; jute products;
hand-woven textiles from hill areas (pahari taat bostro); uncut diamonds;
and herbal medicine and medicinal plants.
Source: Compiled based on the country case studies.
Table 9.2 (continued)
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example.  During the 1980s, Seagate capitalized on cheap labour costs in Thailand to
conduct simple assembly tasks.  Soon afterwards, other MNCs in the HDD industry followed
suit.  The Board of Investment’s tariff exemption scheme and other incentives (table 9.2)
facilitated the expansion of Thailand’s HDD industry and industrial expansion occurred.  The
MNCs’ affiliates in Thailand gradually acquired more technological capability; by 2008,
Thailand had become the world’s second-largest HDD exporter, accounting for about
17.4 per cent of world exports.  It can be argued that such policy initiatives further boosted
MNCs’ decision to relocate to these countries and set up production networks.  The role of
MNCs is clearly essential in the formation of IPNs.  Thus, IPNs exist because of market-led
integration.
9.3. Policy recommendations
The increased importance of IPNs and intraregional trade in East Asia imply a strong
incidence of regional integration.  However, this occurred more because of market-led
integration, rather than integration that results from formal trade agreements.  Following the
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, countries in East Asia moved one step ahead with their
regional integration agenda through an attempt to formalize the established market-led
integration.  This was done, essentially, by establishing regional trade agreements between
countries within the region.  Policymakers in East Asia believe that such formal
arrangements can be regarded as part of the policy framework for strengthening and
expanding production networks and supply chains formed by global MNCs and emerging
East Asian companies.  The rapid growth in the number of the agreements was, to a large
extent, triggered by China’s initiative to form RTAs with ASEAN, which implies that a domino
effect exists from the ASEAN-China FTA (Baldwin, 2007; and Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007).
Given the significant size of the Chinese economy, the domino effect that resulted in the
proliferation of FTAs reflects the response of the other ”big” countries in the region – Japan
and the Republic of Korea, in particular – to counter China’s rising economic role in the
region.
Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) deduced from their empirical results that there was
no evidence to support the hypothesis that RTAs promote (vertical) product fragmentation.
They then argued that much of product fragmentation in the world had actually taken place
mainly due to tariff concessions.  Therefore, the question is how can RTAs be made more
relevant to the development of IPNs?
Kimura (2006a) asserted that although much had been done through market-led
liberalization, there was still a great deal of room for RTAs in promoting IPNs, as
international transactions were still far from being friction-free and cross-border difficulties
remain numerous.  All this can be done, in principle, by furthering the reduction of SL costs.
Based on this approach, policy initiatives under RTAs could be directed towards:
(a) Reducing the costs arising from geographical distance (e.g., removal of
explicit and implicit trade impediments, improving trade facilitation, developing
logistics services etc.);221
(b) Promoting production cost savings in the fragmented production blocks (e.g.,
developing human capital, establishing stable but flexible labour policies,
developing a strong but healthy financial sector etc.);
(c) Promoting institutional building in order to reduce arm-length transactions by
companies (e.g., policies for reducing the informational cost of searching for
business partners, policies that secure intellectual property rights etc.).
A review of the findings of the case studies adds greater relevance to the argument
that policy initiatives under RTAs can be put to greater use in promoting IPNs.  From the
perception of the case study respondents in the five countries, formal trade agreements are
not considered a major driving force in strengthening and expanding IPNs.  This relies on
market initiatives.  First, interviews with respondents in the respective sectors revealed that
RTAs did not factor much in their business activities.  Perhaps that was because most of the
agreements were still in the early stages of implementation, and the effect had yet to be fully
realized.  Moreover, the exclusion of specific industries from the trade agreements resulted
in those industries not receiving the benefits of the RTAs, thus rendering the RTAs irrelevant
to the development of IPNs.  One example is the ASEAN-China FTA, in which the
automotive sector is among the sectors excluded from the agreement.
Related to the low utilization of RTA benefits is the overlapping of RoO among RTAs.
Exporters have difficulties in complying with RoO requirements.  Moreover, margin of
preference in RTAs is not large enough to compensate for the cost of compliance with RoO
requirements.  Overlapping RoOs across trade agreements give rise to the “noodle bowl”
effect.  A study by Kawai and Wignaraja (2009) showed that larger companies had more
negative perceptions of multiple RoO than smaller firms.  This is due to the fact that larger
companies have larger-scale activities, i.e., they export to multiple markets, and change
their business plans in response to RTAs.  In particular, if those companies are involved in
IPNs, they have to produce and ship components to multiple locations in order for the final
product to be assembled.  Therefore, they are more likely to be affected by overlapping RoO
across RTAs.  The current study confirms the findings of Kawai and Wignaraja (2009) that
survey respondents (which comprised large firms affiliated with foreign MNCs) expressed
scepticism of the role of RTAs.
However, evidence from selected RTAs in the country studies shows that the
thresholds for local value-added content are all 40 per cent.  The adoption of the 40 per cent
rule implies a move towards simpler RoO, which would assist in facilitating more trade
between countries involved in RTAs and thus make RTAs more relevant to the
strengthening and expansion of IPNs.  Based on this view, in theory overlapping RoO would
not with be such a huge problem because of the 40 per cent rule.  It may be that the
problem lies not the RoO, but rather with the implementation of those RoO.  The
bureaucratic process involved in determining origin can be quite frustrating for companies
and may create a hindrance to the utilization of RTA benefits.
Companies may also lack the capacity to qualify for the 40 per cent local content
requirement as shown by the survey in Indonesia.  The lack of capacity and development in
the Indonesian auto components sector implies that companies must rely on imported222
components from affiliates, thus making it difficult for them to qualify and receive preferential
tariffs under AFTA.  Moreover, there is less evidence of IPNs in the textiles and clothing
industry in Bangladesh, as RTAs are not considered an important factor in IPN
development.  This is largely because sourcing raw materials and intermediate products in
the textiles and clothing industry relies heavily on the principal specifications of geographical
proximity, adequacy of materials supply, a long-term relationship between buyer and seller
as well as the price and quality of the products.  Thus, there is only one-way trade in the
textiles and clothing industry, rather than the back-and-forth transactions that occur between
companies in the automotive and HDD industries.
There is also a positive note with regard to the role of RTAs in developing IPNs.  The
India-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (ITFTA) increased trade between the two countries in
gearboxes and parts used for spark ignition in engines.  The survey of the HDD industry in
Thailand suggests the coexistence of IPNs and industrial clustering.  Industrial clustering
has enabled foreign MNCs to coordinate production activities, from sourcing parts to
assembling the final product.  Furthermore, the close proximity of the principal company and
its affiliates in the cluster enable them to adjust quickly should a problem arise and to
provide a better just-in-time management.  Thus, the reduction of service links costs through
industrial clustering has helped Thailand’s HDD industry to develop IPNs.
The interviews with respondents in the current study also revealed problems related
to high service links costs, such as inefficient custom procedures and a lack of logistics
infrastructure.  This implies that without having the ability to move goods in an efficient
manner, RTAs would not be relevant to the development of IPNs.  The current study has
shown that although on paper the existence of RTAs can help to strengthen and expand
IPNs, interviews and focus group discussions with several key persons in the companies
studied revealed that this was not always the case.  Many of the earlier studies carried out
in this area were at the country or region level, whereas the findings of the current survey
highlight the importance of studies at the company level in understanding the linkages
between IPNs and existing RTAs.  Therefore, in order to make RTAs more relevant to the
development of IPNs, the following policy recommendations are proposed:
(a) Although there is a move towards simpler RoO across RTAs from based on
the use of the 40 per cent rule on local content (refer to table 3.10 in
chapter 3), the cost of documentation related to RoO needs to be reduced by
improving efficiency in document processing.  The dissemination of those rules
to the private sector is also important in fostering the utilization of RTA
benefits;
(b) More importantly, the current study shows that there is a communications gap
between governments that negotiated the RTAs and the private sector
companies that operate within the IPNs.  Communications between
government and the private sector needs to the intensified so that RTAs can
support the development of IPNs;
(c) The main purpose of RTAs is to facilitate more trade through preferential
access.  Despite the tariff reductions other sources of trade friction still exist,
implying that in some areas service links costs are still high.  Such costs arise223
from inefficient custom procedures as well as the lack of logistics and
transportation infrastructure.  Steps need to be taken to mitigate such
problems, as RTAs cannot facilitate the development of IPNs if goods cannot
move more freely across borders;
(d) The evidence of the coexistence between fragmentation and agglomeration
suggests that industrial clusters enable the development of IPNs through the
reduction of service links costs.  The current study reveals that while one
country was been able to capitalize on its industrial clustering policy, others
have not.  The optimization of the industrial clustering policy can supplement
RTAs in developing IPNs through better coordination between MNCs and
affiliates provided by the cluster; this will allow companies to increase
productivity and optimize tariff reductions provided by RTAs through increased
trade.
In summary, tariff reductions provided by RTAs, combined with improved
implementation of RoO, and better communications between governments and the private
sector, together with the reduction of service links costs through improved customs
procedures and transportation and the support of industrial clustering policies, are the
important ingredients for making RTAs relevant to the development of IPNs.224
Annexes
Annex 1. Interview questions
1.  To what extent and how does trade policy matter for international production networks
(IPNs) in Asia?
a. Tariff and non-tariff measures (mainly technical measures)
b. Trade-related investment policies (e.g., export requirement, local content)
c. EPZ and/or industrial zone
d. Fiscal incentive for investment or trade (e.g., subsidy, tax holiday);
e. Trade facilitation (EDI)
f. Labour mobility provision under RTAs?
g. Logistics-related, IT.
2.  Do RTAs matter for the IPNs in Asia and how?
a. Mechanism of liberalization under RTAs (i.e., positive or negative listing; fast-
track or gradual; scope: only tariff or comprehensive)
b. Rule of origins (trade diversion or creation?)
c. Labour mobility provision under RTAs?
d. Which RTAs are firms most familiar with?
e. Logistics-related, IT
f. Trade facilitation (e.g., Customs, EDI)
g. Trade diversion or creation?
h. EPZ and/or industrial zone
i. Companies/MNC strategy?
3.  Relative to RTAs, is the multilateral/unilateral trade reform more relevant for IPNs and
why?
4.  What trade policy would facilitate greater involvement of producers located in Asia in
IPNs?225
Annex 2.  Product Codes
Annex table 1. Product Codes for the automotive sector: India
HS 1996 Description
40051000 Compounded rubber, unvulcanised in primary forms or in plantes, sheet or
strip, compounded with carbon-free black or silica.
40081990 Other
40082990 Other
40092100 Tubes, pipes and hoses of vulcanized rubber other than hard rubber without
there fittings
40093100 Automotive hydraulic brake hose and radiator hose
40094100 Vacuum brake hoses without fittings
40094200 Air hose
40103290 Endless transmission belts of a trapezoid al cross-section (v belts) whether or
not grooved of a circumference exceeding 60 cms. but not exceeding 180 cms.
40103490 Other
40169320 Rubber rings (O rings)





68131000 Brake linings and pads
68139010 Asbestos friction materials
68139090 Others
70071100 Toughened (tempered) safety glass  for vehicles
70071900 Other tempered safety glass
70072110 Bullet proof safety glass
70072190 Laminated safety glass  for vehicles
70072900 Other laminated safety glass for vehicles
70091010 Prismatic rear-view mirrors for vehicles
70091090 Rear-view mirrors for vehicles




73182400 Cotters and cotter pins
73182910 Circlips
73182990 Others226
73201011 Leaf springs and leaves thereof for motor vehicles




73261910 Forged or stamped articles of iron or steel for automobiles and earth-moving
equipment
83012000 Locks of a kind used for motor vehicles
83023010 Curve drive stakes
83023090 Other mounting, fittings for motor vehicles
84073110 Engines for motorcycles (capacity <50 cc)
84073210 Engines for motorcycles (capacity >50 cc but <250 cc)
84073310 Engines for cars (capacity >250 cc but <1000 cc)
84073320 Engines for motorcycles (capacity >250 cc but <1000 cc)
84073390 Spark-ignition engines for others
84073290 Reciprocating piston engines for three-wheelers
84073410 Engine of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,000 cc
84073490 Spark-ignition engines for others
84082010 Compression ignition IC piston engines of cyl. capacity not exceeding 250 cc.
84082020 Engines of cyl. capacity exceeding 250 cc




84099120 Fuel injection equipment excluding injection pumps
84099191 Other parts of petrol engines for m/vehicles
84099194 Parts of gas engines
84099911 Valves, inlet and exhaust for use diesel engines
84099912 Pistons for diesel engines
84099913 Piston rings for diesel engines
84099914 Piston assemblies for diesel engines
84099920 Fuel nozzles for diesel engines
84099930 Fuel injection equipment excluding injection pumps
84099941 Other parts of diesel engines for motor vehicles
84133010 Injection pumps for diesel engines
84133020 Oil pumps for IC engines
84133030 Water pumps for IC engines




84152010 Air-conditioning units for buses
84152090 Air-conditioning units of a type used for persons in motor vehicles
84212300 Oil or petrol filters
84213100 Intake air filters for IC engines
84213990 Environment protection equipment for IC piston engines, i.e., Catalytic
convertor
84821011 Ball bearings not exceeding 50 mm bore diameter
84821012 Ball bearings  of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm but not exceeding 100 mm
84821013 Ball bearings of bore diameter not exceeding 100 mm
84821020 Other ball bearings (radia type) of bore diameter not exceeding 50 mm
84821030 Other ball bearings (radia type) of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm but not
exceeding 100 mm
84821040 Other ball bearings of bore diameter exceeding 100 mm
84821051 Thrust ball bearing of bore diameter not exceeding 50 mm
84821052 Thrust ball bearing of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm but not exceeding
100 mm
84821053 Thrust ball bearing of bore diameter exceeding 100 mm
84821090 Other
84822011 Tapered roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter not exceeding 50 mm
84822012 Tapered roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm but not
exceeding 100 mm
84822013 Tapered roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter exceeding 100 mm
84822090 Other
84823000 Spherical roller bearings
84824000 Needle roller bearings
84825011 Other cylindrical roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter not exceeding
50 mm
84825012 Other cylindrical roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm
but not exceeding 100 mm
84825013 Other cylindrical roller bearing (radial type) of bore diameter exceeding
100 mm
84825021 Thrust roller bearing of bore diameter not exceeding 50 mm or 2 inches
84825022 Thrust roller bearing of bore diameter exceeding 50 mm or 2 inches but not
exceeding 100 mm or 4 inches
84825023 Thrust roller bearing of bore diameter exceeding 100 mm or 4 inches
84829900 Others
Annex table 1 (continued)
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84831091 Crank shafts for heading No. 8407
84831092 Crank shafts for heading No. 8408
84831099 Other
84832000 Bearing housings, incorporating ball or roller bearings and those not
incorporating ball or roller bearings and plain shaft bearings
84833000 Bearing housings, not incorporating ball or roller bearings; plain shaft bearings
84834000 Gears and gearing, other than toothed wheels, chain sprockets and other
transmission elements presented separately; ball or roller screws; gear boxes
and other speed changers, including torque converters





84839000 Toothed wheels, chain sprockets and other transmission elements, parts
84841010 Asbestos metallic packings and gaskets (excluding gaskets of asbestos board




85011011 Micro motor (motors of an output not exceeding 37.5 W DC)
85011012 Stepper motor (motors of an output not exceeding 37.5 W DC)
85011013 Wiper motor (motors of an output not exceeding 37.5 W DC)
85011019 Other (output not exceeding 37.5 W DC)
85011020 AC motor (output not exceeding 37.5 W DC)
85013111 Micro motor (of an output not exceeding 750 W DC)
85013112 Stepper motor (of an output not exceeding 750 W DC)
85013113 Wiper motor (of an output not exceeding 750 W DC)
85013119 Other (of an output not exceeding 750 W DC)
85013120 DC generators (of an output exceeding 750 W DC)
85013210 DC motor (of an output exceeding 750 W but not exceeding 75 KW)
85103220 DC generators (of an output exceeding 750 W but not exceeding 75 KW)
85111000 Spark plugs (auto electricals)
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85122010 Head lamps, tail lamps, stop lamps, side lamps, blinkers
85122020 Other automobile lighting equipment
85122090 Auto bulbs and halogen bulbs
85123010 Horns
85123090 Others
85124000 Windscreen wipers, defrosters and demisters
85129000 Parts
85392120 Halogen lamps for automobiles
85392940 Other for automobile lamps
85438999 Other
85443000 Ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets of a kind used in vehicles, aircraft or
ships
87060011 Chassis fitted with engines for tractors of engine capacity not exceeding
1 800 cc
87060019 Chassis for tractors of engine capacity exceeding 1,800 cc
87060021 Other chassis for transport of not more than 13 persons including the driver
87060029 Other
87060031 Chassis fitted with engines, for three wheeled vehicles
87060039 Other
87060041 Chassis fitted with engines, for the three-wheeled motor vehicles
87060042 Chassis fitted with engines, for vehicles other than petrol driven
87060043 Chassis fitted with engines, for dumpers covered under heading 8704
87060049 Other
87060050 Chassis fitted with engines, for the motor vehicles under heading 8705
87071000 Bodies for vehicles of heading No. 8703
87079000 Bodies (including cabs) for motor vehicles under heading 87.01 to 87.05
(excluding 87.03)
87081010 Bumpers and parts thereof of tractors
87081090 Bumpers and parts thereof of other vehicles
87082100 Safety seatbelts
87082900 Other parts and accessories of bodies including caps
87083100 Mounted brake linings
87083900 Other brakes and servo-brakes and parts thereof
Annex table 1 (continued)
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87084000 Gear boxes
87085000 Drive-axles with differential, whether or not provide with other transmission
components.
87086000 Non-driving axles and parts thereof
87087000 Road wheels, and parts and accessories thereof
87088000 Suspension shock absorbers
87089100 Radiators
87089200 Silencers and exhaust pipes
87089300 Clutches and parts thereof
87089400 Steering wheels, steering columns and steering boxes
87089900 Other parts and accessories of vehicles
87099000 Parts
87141100 Saddles of motorcycles and other mopeds
87141900 Other parts and accessories of motorcycles/mopeds
87149100 Frame and forks, and parts thereof for motorcycles
87149290 Wheelrims, and sprockets for motorcycles
87149390 Other (hubs, other than coaster braking hubs abd hub brakes)
87149400 Brakes, including coaster braking hub brakes, and parts thereof







91040000 Instrument panel clocks and clocks of a similar type for vehicles, aircraft,
spacecraft vessels
94012000 Seats of a type used for motor vehicles
Annex table 1 (continued)
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Annex table 2. Product Code concordance for the automotive sector
HS SITC SITC Rev. 3 SITC
SITC2 description
1996 Rev. 3 description  Rev. 2
8706 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400921 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400922 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400931 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400932 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400941 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
400942 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
401011 62929 Conveyor etc. belts 6282 Transmission, conveyor/elevator
n.e.s belts of rubber
401012 62929 Conveyor etc. belts 6282 Transmission, conveyor/elevator
n.e.s belts of rubber
401013 62929 Conveyor etc. belts 6282 Transmission, conveyor/elevator
n.e.s belts of rubber
401019 62929 Conveyor etc belts 6282 Transmission, conveyor/elevator
n.e.s belts of rubber
401693 62999 Unhardened non-cell 62898 Articles of unhardened vulcanized
rubber articles rubber, n.e.s.
681310 66382 Asbestos material- 66382 Friction material for brakes, for
friction clutches etc.
732010 69941 Iron, steels prings, 69941 Springs and leaves for springs of
etc. iron or steel
840729 71332 Marine spark-ign 71332 Int. combustion piston engines for
engines other than outboard
840733 71321 Recip piston 7132 Int. combustion piston engines for
engs<1,000 cc propelling vehicles
840734 71322 Recip piston 7132 Int. combustion piston engines for
engs>1,000 cc propelling vehicles
840790 71381 Spark-ign piston 7138 Int. combustion piston engines,
engines n.e.s.
840820 71323 Diesel etc. engines 7132 Int. combustion piston engines for
propelling vehicles
840991 71391 Parts n.e.s spark-ign 7139 Parts of int. combustion piston
engines engines of 713.2-/3-/8-
841330 7422 Piston eng fuel/water 74288 Pumps for liquids, n.e.s.,
pump liq. elevators, chain kind
842123 74363 Engine oil/petrol filter 7436 Filtering and purifying mach.
for liquids and gases
842131 74364 Engine air filters 7436 Filtering and purifying mach.
for liquids and gases232
848210 7461 Ball bearings 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848220 7462 Tapered roller bearings 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848230 7463 Spherical roller bearing 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848240 7464 Needle roller bearings 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848250 7465 Cyl roller bearings n.e.s 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848280 7468 Ball/roller bearings n.e.s 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848291 74691 Bearing ball/needle/roll 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
848299 74699 Ball etc. bearing parts, 7491 Ball, roller or needle roller bearings
n.e.s.
848310 7481 Transmission shafts 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
bearing housings etc.
848320 74821 Ball/roll bearing housing 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
bearing housings etc.
848330 74822 Bearing housings n.e.s 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
bearing housings etc.
848340 7484 Gears and gearing 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
bearing housings etc.
848350 7485 Flywheels/pulleys etc. 7493 Transmission shafts,
cranks, bearing housings etc.
848360 7486 Clutches/sh coupling 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
etc. bearing housings etc.
848390 7489 Gear/flywheel clotch 7493 Transmission shafts, cranks,
part bearing housings etc.
848410 7492 Metal-clad gaskets 74992 Gaskets and sim. joints of metal
sheeting
848490 7492 Metal-clad gaskets 74992 Gaskets and sim. joints of
metal sheeting
870831 78433 Motor vehicle brake/part 7849 Other parts and accessories of
motor vehicles
870839 78433 Motor vehicle brake/part 7849 Other parts & accessories of motor
vehicles
870840 78434 Motor vehicle gear 7849 Other parts and accessories of
boxes motor vehicles
870850 78435 Motor vehicle drive axle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
etc. motor vehicles
870860 78436 Mot vehicle non-drive 7849 Other parts and accessories of
axles motor vehicles
870880 78439 Other motor vehicle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
parts motor vehicles
Annex table 2 (continued)
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Annex table 4. Textile and clothing industry
HS 1996 Description
28 Inorganic chemicals; compounds of precious metals
32 Tanning/dyeing extract; tanninsand derives
39 Plastics and articles thereof
52 Cotton
54 Man-made filaments
55 Man-made staple fibres
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted
62 Articles of apparel and clothing access, not knitted or crocheted
Annex table 3. Hard disk drive industry
HS 1996 Description
847170 Hard disk drive
3818 Wafer
8534 Printed circuit boards
8542 Integrated circuits
8541 Semi-conductors
8501 Electric motors and generators, excluding generating sets




Annex table 2 (continued)
HS SITC SITC Rev. 3 SITC
SITC2 description
1996 Rev. 3 description  Rev. 2
870891 78439 Other motor vehicle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
parts motor vehicles
870892 78439 Other motor vehicle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
parts motor vehicles
870893 78439 Other motor vehicle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
parts motor vehicles
870894 78439 Other motor vehicle 7849 Other parts and accessories of
parts motor vehicles234
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